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The present report is the Dutch contribution to an EEC-wide research 
project of the European University Institute in Florence, directed by 
Joseph Weiler, external professor of Law at this Institute. The aim of this 
project is to examine the “Follow-up by Member-State Courts of 
Preliminary References ex Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome”.
The report is the result of a truly collective effort. When in June 
1985 the T.M.C. Asser Instituut was invited to participate in the project, 
the Committee for European Law of this Institute, which consists of all 
teachers of European Law at the Dutch Universities, decided to establish a 
Special Working Group for this project. The members of this Working 
Group -  not only university staff, but also some other persons with spe­
cialized knowledge in the subject-matter concerned -  were to take care of 
the analysis of the 150 or so judgments of the Dutch courts which fell 
within the scope of the project. This analysis had to be carried out by an­
swering for each judgment a detailed questionnaire which had been estab­
lished by the Florence Institute. The names of the members of the 
Working Group and the institutes to which they belong have been listed in 
an Annex which is published at the end of this foreword.
The questionnaires have been answered during the period between 
March 1986 and April 1987. The T.M.C. Asser Instituut assisted with the 
documentation and coordinated the interpretation and distribution of the 
questionnaires; it also took care of the coordination with Florence. 
Subsequently, the Working Group appointed from among its members 
four rapporteurs, who would prepare -  each of them in respect of a part 
of the judgments -  draft-texts for the final report. These four rapporteurs 
are the authors of this report.
On 27 and 28 April 1987, the European University Institute held a 
conference for all national rapporteurs to enable them to make a prelimi­
nary exchange of information and to get some guidance for the finalisa­
tion of their reports. It took, however, until March 1988 before the na­
tional rapporteurs received an Interim report, established by the Florence 
Institute, containing a computerized overview of all the relevant judg­
ments. In April 1988, the Dutch rapporteurs received moreover a special 
report with all the computer data concerning the Netherlands’ judgments. 




























































































part of the report which he or she had been previously asked for. The fi­
nal version of the report has been prepared by Mr. J. Korte. The Dutch 
rapporteurs enjoyed the administrative assistance of Ms. R.J.M. Bosch, 
legal secretary at the Tariffcommission; they owe a special debt of grati­
tude to her for the pleasant and professional way in which she took care 
of this function.
The English of this report has been revised by Ms. Helen Smith, stu­
dent at the International course in European Integration of the University 
of Amsterdam.
When reading the report, one should keep in mind that it is intended 
to become a part of a larger one, which will cover all the national re­
ports. The terminology of the report has, therefore, been derived from 
the questionnaires which, as has already been remarked, had been estab­
lished by the European University Institute at Florence.
On behalf of the Committee for European Law of the T.M.C. Asser 
Instituut, I would like to thank all the members of the Working Group 
and in particular the four rapporteurs/authors for their work. The report 
certainly offers a clear and thorough analysis of the follow-up by the 
Dutch courts of the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice.
R.H. Lauwaars, May 1989
Chairman of the Committee for 
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1. Structure of the report
In accordance with the original objectives of the Florence research 
project, the Dutch national team considered all preliminary rulings given 
by the Court of Justice of the EC (ECJ) at the request of courts in the 
Netherlands in relation to which the judicial process came to an end, ei­
ther by final judgment or by a settlement of the parties, before December 
1st 1985. For each of these cases, a questionnaire drawn up by the 
Florence Steering Group, was completed. The number of rulings thus 
considered amounts to 152.1 As the total number of preliminary judg­
ments given by the ECJ in this period amounts to 1014, Dutch courts ac­
counted for some 15% of these judgments. In this respect, Dutch courts 
rank second to those in the Federal Republic of Germany, which have 
initiated 410 judgments, i.e., 40.4%. Compared to the remaining Member 
States of the EC, Dutch courts are responsible for a high proportion of all 
preliminary questions to the ECJ.
In view of the size of the population of the Netherlands, approxi­
mately 14 million, it is remarkable that its courts have requested more 
rulings than, e.g., courts in France and Italy, countries with approxi­
mately 60 million inhabitants. Apparently, other factors, like, e.g., the 
familiarity with Community Law, the degree of Community orientation 
of the Judiciary and the Bar or, the tradition of litigation and the system 
of judicial protection also have an impact on the practice of the national 
courts to refer preliminary rulings to the ECJ. However, in view of the 1
1 Unless expressly indicated otherwise, all numbers and percentages mentioned in this 
report relate to the period between 1961 and the first of December 1985, the cut-off 
point of the Florence research project. The 152 judgments given by the ECJ at the 
request of Dutch courts form the basis for all arithmetic conclusions submitted in this 
report. The relevant judgments as well as their follow-up, are listed in the annexes to 
this report.
It may be interesting to note that between December 1985 and the moment this report 
was finalized (May 1989), requests under Article 177 by Dutch courts have resulted in 




























































































scale of this report and the dimensions of the problem, we will not enter 
into these and other possible explanations for the distribution of the pre­
liminary cases over the various Member States. From the statistical data, 
presented in the Interim Report of the European University Institute,2 it 
appears that over the years, the differences between the Member States of 
the EC are becoming smaller. In this respect, the countries are converg­
ing and the Netherlands may soon lose its second position, to French 
courts in particular.
After this introduction and some remarks concerning the research 
methods, Chapter II gives a survey of the jurisdiction of the various 
Dutch courts which have requested preliminary mlings under Article 177 
EEC. In this report, the referring courts are chosen as the starting-point 
for the analysis of the 177 cases originating in the Netherlands. In chapter 
III, IV and V the application of the preliminary procedure by the various 
types of Dutch courts is subsequently analysed on the basis of the data 
collected by the Dutch national team and aggregated by the Florence 
Steering Group. The conclusions of the report are included in Chapter 
VI.
2. Methods of research
Each of the 152 relevant cases was investigated by the Dutch team on 
the basis of a detailed questionnaire, prepared by the Florence Steering 
Group. The Steering Group had prepared three types of questionnaires; 
one for preliminary questions on the interpretation of Community Law 
(“177a-questionnaire”), one for preliminary questions regarding the va­
lidity of Community acts (“177b-questionnaire”) and one for cases where 
an appeal was lodged against the judgment concerning the preliminary 
ruling or where some other kind of follow-up took place before another 
court in the same Member State.3 The “177a-questionnaire” is applicable 
to 143 of the Dutch cases investigated in this report. As will be indicated 
later in Chapters III and IV, the ECJ gave only 12 judgments at the re­
quest of courts in the Netherlands where the validity of Community acts 
was challenged.4 Thus, only 12 “177b-questionnaires” were completed. In 
three cases, both types of questionnaires were completed, because the re­
ferring court requested a ruling on the interpretation as well as on the
2 Primus Inter Pares, the European Court and National Courts: Thirty Years of 
Cooperation (The Florence 177 Project), An Interim Report, European University 
Institute, March 1988.
3 The questionnaires are included in Annex IV to this report.




























































































validity of Community acts. Finally, in 5 cases, the “appeal-questionnaire” 
is applicable.
The fact that the relevant cases were investigated solely on the basis of 
questionnaires imposes some important restrictions on the conclusions 
which may be drawn from this report. First of all it should be bom in 
mind that the questionnaires only relate to the judgments as such and not 
to the complete files of each case. The questionnaires, therefore, were 
completed entirely on the basis of the texts of the set of judgments con­
cerned, namely the judgment of the court making the reference, the ECJ’s 
ruling and the final judgment of the national court. It is submitted that an 
analysis of, for instance, the full arguments of the parties and of the other 
documents relating to the case might have provided us with even more in­
formation as to the application of the preliminary procedure and might, 
consequently, have infuenced the conclusions of the report.
Secondly, account is to be taken of the fact that the research was con­
ducted entirely in the form of desk-research. Thus, we did not supplement 
or test our information by interviewing judges, parties or their counsel or 
by conducting any other form of field-research.
Thirdly, answering some of the questions of the questionnaires re­
quires a personal evaluation of the person filling in the questionnaire. To 
avoid different standards being applied, the Dutch team5 devoted much 
attention to a uniform treatment of the questionnaires. Still, it should not 
be forgotten that the completion of the questionnaires for the Netherlands 
involved some fifteen people. Some caution, therefore, seems to be ap­
propriate when considering the results of these type of questions.
The “177a-” and “177b-questionnaires each consist of some 16 ques­
tions, mostly divided into several subquestions. Through these questions 
virtually every aspect of the preliminary procedure is assessed. The elab­
oration of the questionnaires, therefore, resulted in an impressive amount 
of information on the dialogue between the courts in the Netherlands and 
the ECJ. In view of the amplitude of information collected, the complete 
outcome of the “Dutch” questionnaires has not been included as such in 
this report. The exact computerized results of the questionnaires are con­
tained in a separate report drawn up by the Florence Steering Group6 at 
the request of the Dutch team. These data were used by the Dutch team as 
the basis for this report.
Rather than trying to review every aspect of the questionnaires, the 
Dutch team decided to give an analysis of a selective number of issues 
only. Consequently and in accordance with the guidelines for the national
5 Primus Inter Pares, The European Court and National Courts: Thirty years of 
cooperation, (The Florence 177 Project), The Netherlands, Data specified on a court 
by court basis, European University Institute, Florence, April 1988




























































































reports provided by the Florence Steering Group this report is built 
essentially upon two components: a global description of the functioning 
of the Article 177 procedure in the Netherlands (the general pattern) and 
an analysis of the cases considered to be most problematic (the exceptional 
or pathological cases).
Chapters III (Ordinary Jurisdiction), IV (Administrative Courts) and V 
(Special Courts) have the same structure; after a short introduction on the 
composition and jurisdiction of the various types of courts which have 
made use of Article 177, a global description of the application of Article 
177 by these courts is given. Next to a summary of the most relevant sta­
tistical data (how many references were made, type of proceedings in 
which the references were made, subject of the preliminary questions 
etc.), special attention is paid in these Chapters to those questions in the 
questionnaire, considered to be most important for this research project. 
These questions are: question 2b (who initiated the reference?), 3d (did 
the national judge offer any possible interpretation of Community Law?), 
6c (overall, do you have the impression that the ECJ was satisfied with the 
way the national court posed questions? Possible answers; satisfied; neu­
tral; less than satisfied), 10a (outcome of the national proceedings, was 
there a formal judgment?), 11 (does the national judgment comply with 
the preliminary ruling or does it deviate from the terms of the ruling? 
Assess the character of the compliance (possible answers: in strict con­
formity with the terms of the ruling; further interpreting the answers 
given by the ECJ) or deviation (possible answers: mistaken application; 
evasive application; defiant application) and 13b (did the national court 
give indication of the helpfulness of the preliminary ruling?).
Following these general remarks as to the application of Article 177, 
we discuss in Chapters III, IV and V two illustrative cases for each type 
of court. These cases may be considered as typical of the court concerned, 
where the ordinary procedural rules were followed and the rulings of the 
ECJ were duly taken into account. Through these cases, the general pat­
tern of the application of the preliminary procedure in the Netherlands is 
clearly illustrated.
The second component of the report deals with the pathologies, i.e., 
cases deviating from the general pattern for the Netherlands. If any 
pathological or exceptional cases were found, these are discussed in 
Chapters III, IV and V7 as well. In this respect, cases deserving special 
attention are those in which the mling was not, or was only partly fol­
lowed, or, in which the ruling turned out to be of no use to the referring
7 It should be noted that the terms “pathological” and “exceptional” stem directly from 
the guidelines for the national reports prepared by the Florence Steering Group. See 




























































































court. If we found any dramatic differences between Dutch courts and 
courts of other Member States these are also discussed.
3. Preliminary remarks
By way of the first preliminary remark, it is pointed out that this re­
port only gives a partial picture of the application of the preliminary pro­
cedure by Dutch courts. After all, a complete and accurate research into 
the attitude of the courts towards the procedure would require an analysis 
of every decision in which Article 177 EEC is, considered or mentioned 
in any manner whatsoever. Strictly speaking, Article 177 is applied also 
even if a case is not referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, e.g., 
because the national court considers that it can decide the case without a 
preliminary interpretation by the ECJ. These cases, which are not in­
cluded in this project, may in some respects be even more relevant to an 
analysis of the application of the procedure, than those in which questions 
were addressed to the Court in Luxembourg. However, the number of 
relevant cases that would have to be considered in this approach, would be 
far too great for any thorough analysis. Moreover, as they are not sys­
tematically registered it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
trace them all.
Between 1961, when the first (ever) preliminary ruling under Article 
177 was asked for by the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) at The Hague in 
Case 13/61 (De Geus and Uitdenbogerd), and the cutoff point of this pro­
ject a total of 152 preliminary rulings were given by the ECJ at the re­
quest of Dutch courts.
It is emphasized that this number relates only to the judgments that 
were given by the ECJ, not to the actual number of requests that were 
made by Dutch courts. For two reasons, the number of requests under 
Article 177 does not correspond with the number of judgments actually 
handed down by the ECJ. Firstly, the ECJ joined a considerable number 
of cases under Article 43 of its Rules of Procedure, for the purpose of the 
written or oral procedure and of its final judgment. Consequently, pre­
liminary references in approximately 33 cases before Dutch courts did 
not result in separate preliminary rulings by the ECJ. It is to be noted that 
these 33 rulings are “hidden” in the 152 rulings of the ECJ. Secondly, in a 
number of cases the ECJ did not succeed in answering the preliminary 
questions referred to it, due to the fact that the referring courts, for vari­
ous reasons, withdrew their requests.
By way of example, mention can be made of the following cases 
which were so removed from the Register; 271/80 (Pharmon v Hoechst), 




























































































Volharding”).8 The first case is particularly interesting, since it was re­
moved because appeal was lodged against the decision of the District 
Court in Rotterdam to request a preliminary ruling. Eventually, however, 
the case came back to the ECJ, when the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) re­
quested a preliminary ruling in case 19/84 (Pharmon v Hoechst).
Rulings by the Court of Justice under Articles 41 ECSC-Treaty on the 
validity of acts of the Commission (High Authority) and the Council, and 
under Article 150 EUR ATOM, do not form part of the original research 
project and are, therefore, not considered. There are no references under 
Article 150 EURATOM by Dutch courts. The ECJ has, up to now, only 
handed down one ruling under Article 41 ECSC at the request of a Dutch 
court.9 In the Gerlach Case, it is interesting to note that the referring 
court, i.e., the Court of Last Instance in Matters of Trade and Industry 
(College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven), did not specifically request 
for a ruling under Article 41 ECSC. In fact, it was the ECJ that classified 
the request under Article 41. However it could be argued that, strictly 
speaking, some of the questions, notably the ones concerning the interpre­
tation of secondary EEC Law, could not be answered under this Article. 
In this report, though, the classification given by the ECJ is followed. The 
Gerlach case is, therefore, not considered.
The judgments of the ECJ on the interpretation of the Convention of 
27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, have not been taken into consideration either. For 
the record, Dutch courts have to date (January 1989) requested some 12 
rulings under Article 3 of the 1971 Protocol on the Interpretation of the 
Convention.
Finally, in order to be comprehensive, we mention here the possibil­
ity for certain Dutch courts, to refer preliminary questions on the inter­
pretation of parts of the law of the BENELUX Economic Union to the 
Benelux Court of Justice in Bruxelles (BENELUX-Gerechtshof). It goes 
without saying that the 26 or so references (up to January 1, 1989) by 
Dutch courts under Article 6 of the Treaty concerning the Establishment 
and the Statute of the BENELUX Court of Justice (Verdrag betreffende 
de instelling en het Statuut van het BENELUX-Gerechtshof), are not 
considered in this report. Still, it may be useful to know that, Dutch 
courts, as well as those in Luxembourg and Belgium, have experiences 
with a second international court possessing “preliminary” jurisdiction 
besides the ECJ.
8 See OJ 1982, C113/6 and C180/4 and EC Bulletin 1987(4).




























































































Chapter II: Survey of the Judicial 
Organization in the Netherlands
Mr. J. KORTE
1. Division of Jurisdiction of the courts
Under Articles 112 and 113 of the Constitution (Grondwet) and under 
Article 2 of the Act on the Organization of the Judiciary (Wet op de 
Rechterlijke Organisatie), the courts of the Ordinary Jurisdiction 
(Gewone Rechterlijke Macht) have exclusive jurisdiction in disputes over 
property or rights and claims, as well as in the trial of criminal offences. 
It follows from these provisions that the ordinary courts which are listed 
below in paragraph 2 under A, have, in principle, jurisdiction over all 
civil (including commercial) and criminal matters. Under Article 112(2) 
juncto Article 115 of the Constitution, the law can give jurisdiction over 
disputes rising out of actions of an administrative nature to either the 
Ordinary Jurisdiction, to Administrative courts or to so-called adminis­
trative appeal bodies (administratief beroep).
Consequently, actions against the Government or other public au­
thorities, based on contract or a right in rem, as well as actions based on 
torts committed by public authorities, are in principle considered as civil 
matters and can therefore be dealt with by the Ordinary Courts. However, 
in the case of certain administrative actions, the law does indeed provide 
for specific procedures before an Administrative Court, referred to as 
Administrative Jurisdiction (administratieve rechtspraak) or provides for 
an appeal within the administrative hierarchy, referred to under Dutch 
law as Administrative Appeal (administratief beroep). Because of the 
availability of these two types of administrative remedies, the role of the 
Ordinary Jurisdiction in providing legal protection against the 
Government is a residual one only. Nonetheless, as shall be indicated 
later, Ordinary Courts, and the Presidents of the District Courts in par­
ticular, perform some important functions in this area. The impact on the 
obligations of the courts, under Article 177, on the residual character of 
the jurisdiction of the Ordinary Courts in administrative actions, is illus­




























































































questions were addressed by the Supreme Court on the obligations under 
Article 177 of courts adjudicating in summary proceedings.
1.1 Differences between Administrative Jurisdiction and 
Administrative Appeal
It follows from the preceding subparagraph that review of decisions 
of administrative law in the Netherlands is possible in two ways: within 
the public administration via administrative appeal or by Administrative 
Courts. There are major differences between appeals to an Administrative 
Court and appeals to administrative bodies. For the purpose of this re­
port, it is sufficient to mention only the most fundamental ones.
Firstly, the bodies to which administrative appeal lies cannot be con­
sidered as independent courts because they belong to the same organisa­
tion as the body against whose decision the appeal is brought. For in­
stance, an appeal against a decision of the Burgomaster and Aldermen of 
the Municipality can be brought before the Municipal Council. Also, an 
appeal lies to the Crown against a decision of a Minister. Usually, the 
body hearing the appeal belongs to a higher tier of authority and fre­
quently, there is a possibility of a second appeal to a still higher adminis­
trative body. The Provincial Executive and the Crown, in particular, are 
designated in many cases as the highest body to which appeal lies. The 
Administrative Courts on the other hand, are administering justice com­
pletely independent of the administration.
Secondly, the jurisdiction of the Administrative Courts is primarily 
governed by general provisions of jurisdiction, for the most part, found 
in Acts relating to the organisation of the relevant courts. Administrative 
appeals however, are provided for from case to case in the basic regula­
tion which also determines the kind of decision under appeal. This 
Chapter contains no information on the specific jurisdictions and powers 
of each individual court or body to which an administrative appeal lies, as 
these are discussed in Chapters III, IV and V.
Thirdly and finally, it is submitted that the modalities for judicial re­
view differ considerably for both remedies. According to the principle of 
separation of powers of the State, the courts can encroach upon the pow­
ers of the executive to a limited extent only. In the Netherlands this holds 
true for ordinary and administrative courts alike. Thus, all courts’ inter­
ference with Government policy is restricted primarily to certain legal 
aspects of the decision at issue. An administrative body hearing an admin­
istrative appeal, on the other hand, may also assess the expediency or ap­
propriateness of the contested order or decision.
For the present report, the administrative appeal procedures are not 
very relevant as only one of the bodies concerned has ever requested a 




























































































Disputes of the Council of State (Afdeling voor de Geschillen van Bestuur 
van de Raad van State) has to be considered. Unlike the other Division of 
the Council of State (the Judicial Division; Afdeling Rechtspraak van de 
Raad van State), this Division cannot be considered to be an administra­
tive court. As a matter of fact it only submits its recommendation to the 
Crown {Kroon) which, at its turn, takes the final decision. The Division 
for Administrative Disputes, therefore, is formally an advisory body to 
the supreme level in the administrative hierarchy. Consequently it must be 
regarded as part of an administrative appeal procedure rather than an 
administrative court. In practice, however, the Division maintains an in­
dependent position vis-à-vis the Crown itself which only very seldom de­
parts from the Division’s recommendations. The independent position of 
the Division was recently formally recognized for all administrative ap­
peal procedures in disputes relating to civil rights and obligations by the 
Temporary Act on Adminstrative Disputes (Tijdelijke Wet 
Kroongeschillen, 1987). The question whether the Division is a court in 
the meaning of Article 177 EEC was at issue in the N ederlandse  
Spoorwegen Case (36/73). Most doubts were removed by the ECJ, when 
it accepted without comments the preliminary questions addressed to it. 
The Council of State is discussed further in Chapter IV, paragraph 6.
Besides the Division for Administrative Litigation, no other prelimi­
nary rulings originated from administrative appeal bodies. There are 
various committees of e.g. the Municipal or Provincial Executives which 
submit recommendation to the Executives. It is the latter which take the 
final decision though, in the framework of the administrative appeal pro­
cedure. Therefore it is questionable whether these committees can be 
considered as courts in the sense of Article 177, on the same footing as 
the Division for Administrative Disputes. Unlike the Division for 
Administrative Dispustes, these organs are in most cases not sufficiently 
independent from the administration to fulfill the requirements set by the 
ECJ in this respect.1
1.2 Taxation matters
The jurisdiction in matters concerning taxation is shared between the 
Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court on the one hand and the 
Tariffcommission on the other. Tax matters belong to administrative law. 
Most of them, however, including those relating to direct taxation 
(notably income and corporation taxes) and turnover taxes (since 1976), 
are dealt with by the Courts of Appeal in the first instance. Appeals can 
be submitted to the Supreme Court in the framework of a cassation pro- 1
1 See, e.g., Case 17/76 (Brack v Insurance Officer) (1976)ECR 1429 and Case 318/85 




























































































cedure. For these purposes, the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
sit in specially constituted Taxation Divisions (B elastingkam ers). 
Although they are formally and organically part of the ordinary courts, 
the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court can effectively be considered 
as separate administrative courts when they deal with taxation matters.2
2. Relevant types of courts
Almost every type of court in the Netherlands has referred prelimi­
nary questions to the ECJ. In fact, of all the courts in the Netherlands 
only the Civil Service Tribunals of First Instance (Ambtenarengerechten) 
and the two instances of the Military Jurisdiction (Krijgsraden and the 
Hoog Militair Gerechtshof), have so far never asked the ECJ for a ruling 
under Article 177.
As regards the Civil Service Tribunals, it should first of all be taken 
into account that appeals from these courts can be lodged with the Central 
Court of Appeal. The former Courts are, therefore, under no obligation 
to refer questions regarding the interpretation of Community Law to the 
ECJ. Other possible explanations for the lack of references by the Civil 
Service Tribunals are discussed in Chapter IV, paragraph 5. The absence 
of references by the two instances of the Military Jurisdiction is self-evi­
dent and needs no explanation.
For the purpose of this report, three different types of courts can be dis­
tinguished.
A. The courts belonging to the Ordinary Jurisdiction (G ew one  
Rechterlijke Macht), i.e., Cantonal Courts (Kantongerechten)-, District 
Courts (Arrondissementsrechtbanken); Courts of Appeal in civil and 
criminal matters (Gerechtshoven) and the Supreme Court (Hoge R aad). 
The ECJ handed down 45 preliminary judgments at the request of the 
ordinary courts, i.e., approximately 30% of the total number of cases 
originating from Dutch courts. It is to be noted that the 13 preliminary 
judgments given at the request of the Supreme Court and the Courts of 
Appeal, in their capacities as taxation courts, are not included in this 
number. The application of the preliminary procedure by the courts be­
longing to the Ordinary Jurisdiction is discussed in Chapter III.
2 For the sake of completeness, it is to be noted that, under Dutch Law, the courts 
belonging to the Ordinary Jurisdiction are also empowered to hear appeals in some 
specific administrative actions, like the Act on Elections (Kieswet). As no references 




























































































B. The Administrative courts, i.e., the Court of Last Instance in Matters 
of Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven, CBB); 
the Tariffcommission, the court of last instance in Customs and Excise 
Matters (Tariefcommissie); the Courts of Appeal in taxation matters 
(Gerechtshoven in belastingzaken) and the Supreme Court in taxation 
matters (Hoge Raad in belastingzaken); the Social Security Courts of 
First Instance (Raden van Beroep) and the Central Court of Appeal, 
which is the court of last instance in social security matters (Centrale 
Raad van Beroep) and finally, both Divisions of the Council of State: the 
Judicial Division (Afdeling Rechtspraak) and the Division for 
Administrative Disputes (Afdeling voor de Geschillen van Bestuur). As 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, the latter, strictly speaking, cannot 
be regarded as an Administrative court. For practical purposes, however, 
it is listed under this letter (B) as well. The ECJ handed down 105 prelim­
inary judgments at the request of these administrative courts, i.e., approx­
imately 70% of the total number of preliminary rulings originating from 
Dutch courts. The application of the preliminary procedure by these 
courts and by the Division for Administrative Disputes of the Council of 
State is discussed in Chapter IV.
C. Finally, a special category has to be created for two courts which have 
each requested one preliminary ruling but which do not come under the 
courts mentioned earlier. In this report they are referred to as Special 
Courts. Firstly, the Arbitration Tribunal which settles Disputes regarding 
the Pension Fund for the Mining Industry (Scheidsgerecht van het 
Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf). This was the referring court in 
Case 61/65 (Vaassen-Goebbels). Secondly, the Appeals Committee for 
General Medicine (Commissie van Beroep Huisartsgeneeskunde), which 
requested a ruling in Case 246/80 (Broekmeulen).
These two judgments amount to approximately 1.3% of the total 





























































































Chapter II: Evaluation of the Application of the 
Preliminary Procedure by Courts Belonging to the 
Ordinary Jurisdiction (Gewone Rechterlijke Macht)
Mr. J. KORTE
1. Introduction
There are four instances of Ordinary Jurisdiction in the Netherlands. 
These are the Supreme (or Cassation) Court (Hoge Raad)1, Courts of 
Appeal (Gerechtshoven), District Courts (Arrondissementsrechtbanken) 
and Cantonal Courts (Kantongerechten). The 177-references made by 
these courts have resulted in 45 preliminary mlings of the ECJ, i.e., 30% 
of the total number of judgments considered in this report. From judg­
ments of the Cantonal Courts or District Courts, as a rule, appeal lies with 
the competent District Court or Court of Appeal respectively. The 
Supreme Court is the highest court of the Ordinary Jurisdiction. It hears 
appeals on points of law and procedure against judgments of lower courts 
in a cassation procedure. The Supreme Court has no power to hear ap­
peals on questions of fact.
This Chapter deals with the application of the preliminary procedure 
under Article 177 by these courts. A typical feature of the references by 
these Ordinary Courts is that no questions on the validity of Community 
Law were addressed to the ECJ. Every case considered in this report, was 
concerned with questions on the interpretation of Community Law. In 
fact, of all courts concerned, ordinary and administrative alike, only the 
Court of Last Instance for Matters of Trade and Industry and the 
Tariffcommission have ever requested mlings on the validity of EEC- 
law. This happened in 12 cases, i.e., in approximately 8% of the total 
number of Dutch cases considered. This compares to some 15% of the 
1014 preliminary mlings ex Article 177, given by the ECJ in the period 
covered by this research project. In paragraph 6 of this Chapter, this ob­
servation will be discussed further.
1 As the Hoge Raad’s only jurisdiction is virtually to hear appeals on points of law and 
procedure against judgments of lower courts belonging to the Ordinary Jurisdiction in 
a cassation procedure, it is formally speaking more correct to refer to it as a Cassation 






























































































2.1 Jurisdiction and composition
There are 62 Cantonal Courts which have jurisdiction in the first in­
stance over all claims not exceeding Dfl. 5,000, as well as over all dis­
putes concerning agency contracts, hire-purchase agreements, labour law 
matters and leases of real property. From these judgments appeal lies with 
the District Courts only if the claim exceeds Dfl. 2,500.
In criminal matters, the Cantonal Courts are competent to try minor 
offences that are not assigned to the District Courts. Normally appeal lies 
with the District Court. Furthermore, a petition for cassation can be filed 
with the Supreme Court against the civil and criminal judgments of the 
Cantonal Courts, where no (normal) appellate proceedings are available. 
It is to be noted, however, that the grounds for cassation against the 
Cantonal Court’s judgments, listed in Articles 100 and 101 of the Act on 
Judicial Organization, are more restrictive than those listed in Article 99, 
which can be used against judgments of the District Courts and the Courts 
of Appeal.
The Cantonal Courts sit with a single judge, referred to as 
Kantonrechter.
2.2 Application of Article 177 EEC
Only the Courts at Rotterdam, Case 104/75 (De Peijper), Apeldoom, 
Cases 141-143/81 (Holdijk et al.) and The Hague, Case 39/82 (Donner) 
have requested preliminary references to the ECJ.
The references in De Peijper and in Holdijk were made in criminal 
cases, whereas Donner concerned civil matters. The cases originating 
from Cantonal Courts represent approximately 2% of the total number of 
Dutch cases that were considered by the ECJ during the period of this re­
search.
Of course, the relatively few references by Cantonal Courts can be 
explained, primarily, by the fact that these courts are of first instance. 
Their decisions are always subject to appeal either to a District Court or, 
for cassation to the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Cantonal Courts 
are under no obligation to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ2.
2I n fact there is one procedure in Dutch Law, where there is no remedy whatsoever 
against a judgment of a Cantonal Court. Article 1639W(11) of the Civil Code 
stipulates that no remedy is available against an order of the Court concerning 
rescission of an employment contract for significant reasons (ontbinding wegens 
gewichtige redenen). In these cases, Cantonal Courts must be considered as being 




























































































Furthermore, most cases dealt with by these courts are of relatively mi­
nor importance, in particular as far as the financial implications are con­
cerned. References under Article 177 EEC by Cantonal Courts are, there­
fore, exceptional. A closer look at the three preliminary cases in the next 
subparagraphs shows that, in fact, exceptional circumstances were present 
in each reference from a Cantonal Court.
As for the follow-up of the three preliminary rulings, the statistical 
data indicate that only in one Case (Holdijk et al.), the final judgment was 
in strict conformity with the ECJ’s ruling. In the other two Cases (De 
Peijper and Donner), the Cantonal Courts further interpreted the rulings 
before giving their final judgments.
2.3 Two illustrative cases
1. The decision to refer in De Peijper, even though it was only the first 
stage of the procedure, was probably influenced by the fact that the con­
troversial actions of Centrafarm and its director Mr. De Peijper, regard­
ing parallel imports and the undercutting of the established prices of 
pharmaceutical preparations, had been in the focus of attention for some 
time already. Moreover, they had given rise to other legal proceedings as 
well. About a year before the Cantonal Court’s decision to request a pre­
liminary ruling, the ECJ had answered questions put to it by the Supreme 
Court in two civil proceedings against Centrafarm and its director on the 
subject of parallel imports and the protection of patent and trademark 
rights.3 The case against Mr. De Peijper before the Cantonal Court could 
in some respects be considered as the criminal counterpart of the civil 
proceedings against the Centrafarm company, which had been initiated by 
competing companies, as all three proceedings were aimed at ending the 
parallel imports. The relevance of Community Law to the Centrafarm 
Case was, therefore, obvious from the outset and this may have influenced 
the Cantonal Court’s decision to refer questions to the ECJ.4
The judgment of the ECJ in De Peijper is leading, particularly on the 
issue of the relation between Articles 36 and 100 EEC. In its final deci­
sion of September 6, 1976 the Cantonal Court held that the contested
restricted grounds for cassation on the basis of which judgments of Cantonal Courts 
may be quashed by the Supreme Court, have an impact on the Cantonal Courts’ 
obligations under Article 177. See: C.W.A. Timmermans in an annotation on a 
judgment of the Supreme Court of 8.1.1988 in NJ 1988, 942. See also: paragraph 
5.1.1 of this Chapter.
3 These cases were also the first references to the ECJ by the Supreme Court; Case 
15/74 (Centrafarm and De Peijper v Sterling Drug} and Case 16/74 (Centrafarm and 
De Peijper v Winthrop). See also paragraph 5.3 of this Chapter.
4 For the record, it is mentioned that the Centrafarm Company was involved in two 
other preliminary procedures originating in the Netherlands as well; Cases 24/67 




























































































provisions in the Decree on Pharmaceutical Preparations (B esluit 
Farmaceutische Preparaten) were contrary to Articles 30 and 36 EEC and 
acquitted Mr. De Peijper. To arrive at this decision, the Cantonal Court 
had to further interpret the preliminary answers given by the ECJ, no­
tably with regard to some factual questions. The Public Prosecutor did 
not lodge an appeal against the judgment of the Cantonal Court. Case 
104/75 is one of the relatively few preliminary rulings considered in this 
report, in which the judgment of the ECJ led to an amendment of the law. 
After consultations with the Commission of the EC, Article 23 of the 
Decree on the Registration of Medecines (Besluit Registratie  
Geneesmiddelen) was enacted by the Government on September 8, 1977. 
This article provides for a simplified registration procedure for parallel 
imported preparations from other EC Member-States. The fees payable 
upon such registration were also under discussion before the District 
Court in Roermond, which requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ 
on the matter in Case 32/80 (Kortmann).
2. The reference made by the Cantonal Court in The Hague in the Donner 
Case, concerned a dispute between Mr. Donner and the Netherlands 
Postal, Telegraphic and Telephone Services (P.T.T.) on charges for cus­
toms presentation of a consignment of books delivered by mail from 
other Member States. Mr. Donner was of the opinion that the sum 
charged upon him constituted a charge having equivalent effect to an im­
port duty in the sense of Articles 12 et seq. EEC and brought an action 
before the Cantonal Court for the recovery of the sum paid (Dfl. 85.30).
To explain the reference in this case, it is to be noted in the first place 
that the Cantonal Court was the final instance as far as the facts of the case 
were concerned. As mentioned in subparagraph 2.1, the claim of Mr. 
Donner was too low for appellate proceedings to be possible. Taking into 
account the remaining possibility of cassation on points of law with the 
Supreme Court, the Cantonal Court was not, strictly speaking, obliged to 
refer questions to the ECJ. Still, this aspect may have influenced the deci­
sion of the Cantonal Court to request a preliminary ruling.
A more important explanation for the reference may, in our view, be 
found in the person of the plaintiff, Mr. Donner, who is a former 
President of the ECJ. It appears from the file of the case that Mr. Donner 
was very determined to insist on his rights under Community Law, even 
though the financial implications of the dispute were rather small. Mr. 
Donner first appealed to the Council of State (Judicial Division) against 
the implied refusal of the P.T.T. to amend its invoices. After the Council 
of State had held the application inadmissable, he brought an action under 
civil law before the Cantonal Court claiming the recovery of the sum 
paid. The fact, referred to in the opinion of the Advocate-General, that 




























































































tions can be considered as another indication of the influence Mr. Donner 
had on the decision to request a preliminary ruling. Despite Mr. Donners 
efforts, the Cantonal Court, taking into account the judgment of the EC1, 
decided against him in its final decision of April 13, 1984. Mr. Donner 
did not lodge an appeal for cassation with the Supreme Court.
2.4 A Pathological case
The preliminary requests to be considered here were made by the 
Cantonal Court in Apeldoom in three criminal proceedings brought 
against Mrs. Holdijk and Mulder and the Alpuro Company. Cases 141 - 
143/81, which were joined by the ECJ can like the other references from 
Cantonal Courts, be regarded as exceptional. They can also be considered 
as pathological in that they deviate strongly from the normal procedure in 
several respects.
Criminal proceedings were brought against the three defendants for 
having kept fatting calves in pens which did not meet the requirements of 
Article 2(b) of the Royal Decree on fatting calves (Mestkalverenbesluit). 
The Cantonal Court in its order for reference, considered it “of crucial 
importance for the inquiry into the case (..), whether or not the Decree 
(..) is contrary to or incompatible with the EEC Treaty as regards the 
keeping of fatting calves and if so whether that is also the case if a specific 
set of rules, which still do not exist, are adopted in an amended decree in 
this regard concerning the pen in which the calf is kept”5. The Cantonal 
Court instructed the Public Prosecutor (Officier van Justine) to send the 
files of the cases to the ECJ and to ask for a ruling on this question.
At least three issues concerning the preliminary procedure may be 
distilled from these cases. Firstly, the Cantonal Court, instead of request­
ing a preliminary ruling itself, instructed the Public Prosecutor, who is 
one of the parties in the main proceedings, to send the files to 
Luxembourg. This is clearly not in conformity with the procedural rules 
of Article 177 and conflicts with the concept of the procedure as a dia­
logue between judges. Secondly, the Cantonal Court did not clearly phrase 
a question, it only indicated that Community Law was of “crucial impor­
tance” for the inquiry. Moreover, both the relevance of Community Law 
per se to the legal issues in these cases, and the actual justification of the 
reference were rather obscure. Thirdly, as the problem submitted to the 
ECJ concerned the compatibility of national law with Community Law, it 
could, strictly speaking, not be dealt with by the ECJ under Article 177. 






























































































The reference was severely criticized by Advocate-General Sir 
Gordon Slynn and by the Danish Government. The latter argued in its 
written observations that it could not go into the substance of the matters 
at issue because “(••) the incomplete judgments making the reference have 
not enabled it to decide whether or not it is appropriate to submit obser­
vations”6. The Danish Government did not explicitly submit that the ECJ 
should not answer the question at hand, still it did state that the traditional 
tolerance on the part of the ECJ as regards badly formulated preliminary 
questions, must not be allowed to deprive of all substance the right ac­
corded to, inter alia, Member States to submit observations.
Although the ECJ itself had to go to great lengths to remedy the defi- 
ciences in the orders of references, it did answer the “question” of the 
Cantonal Court. Almost half of the judgment of the ECJ is devoted to “the 
formulation of the reference”. Under this heading, the ECJ, in reaction to 
the remarks made by the Danish Government, summarized the guidelines 
which it had developed in earlier case law as to the requirements which 
references under Article 177 must satisfy. It then deduced a question 
from the referring judgments. After rephrasing this question in a more 
abstract fashion, the ECJ held that in the absence of specific EEC-legisla- 
tion on this point, Community Law does not prevent a Member State 
from maintaining such unilateral rules which apply, without distinction, 
to calves intended for the national market and to those intended for ex­
port.
The overall impression obtained from Holdijk et al. is that the 
Cantonal Court was not well informed, either on the use of the prelimi­
nary procedure or on the relevance of Community Law for the offences it 
had to try. Considering the absence of specific Community Law one can 
indeed seriously question whether the references were really necessary. 
This issue becomes even more pressing if regard is had to the final judg­
ment of August, 1 1983 in Case 141/81, in which the Cantonal Court sen­
tenced the defendant to a suspended fine of Dfl. 300, without even men­
tioning the preliminary ruling given at his request eights months earlier. 
(The same holds true for the final judgments in Cases 142 and 143/81). 
Against these judgments no appeals were lodged.
3. District Courts
3.1 Jurisdiction and composition
There are nineteen District Courts in the Netherlands. In civil matters 
they have jurisdiction in the first instance over all claims that do not come




























































































under the jurisdiction of the Cantonal Courts. They also act as instances of 
appeal with respect to judgments of the Cantonal Courts.
In criminal matters, the District Courts have original jurisdiction 
over a few minor offences that are not assigned to the Cantonal Courts 
and, over all (serious) crimes (misdrijven). Furthermore, they hear ap­
peals against decisions of the Cantonal Courts. Appeal lies with the Court 
of Appeal against the civil and criminal judgments of the District Courts, 
given in the first instance. Finally, the civil and criminal judgments of 
District Courts given in an appeal procedure are subject to appeal on 
points of law and procedure in a cassation procedure before the Supreme 
Court. In both civil and criminal cases, the District Courts usually sit with 
three judges in a so-called Full Court (Meervoudige Kamer). But, there 
are two important exceptions to this rule.
Firstly, in civil matters requiring urgent attention, the President of 
the court is competent to render a provisional order or temporary in­
junction in summary proceedings (Kort Geding). The decision of the 
President does not impair the decision of the Full Court sitting on the case 
in ordinary proceedings. But in practice the judgment of the Full Court is 
seldom sought after the President’s decision has been obtained. From the 
President’s decision, appeal lies with the Courts of Appeal, whose deci­
sions are, in turn, subject to review by the Supreme Court in a cassation 
procedure. Summary proceedings are used very often, in particular in 
disputes of a commercial nature and in proceedings contesting an act of 
the Government or of another public authority. As regards the latter 
cases, there emerges clearly, the residual jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts in offering protection against the Government or against public 
bodies, mentioned in Chapter II, paragraph 1.
Secondly, in criminal matters, a large number of cases is dealt with 
by a single judge. Simple criminal cases, are normally brought before a 
single judge known as the Magistrate (Politierechter), leaving only the 
more serious and complicated cases, as well as the cases on appeal from 
the Cantonal Courts, to be tried by the Full Court. Similarly, simple of­
fences that are listed and punishable under the Act on Economic Offences 
and Crimes (Wet op de Economische Delicten), are dealt with in the first 
instance by a single judge within the District Court, known as the 
Magistrate in Economic Matters (Economische Politierechter).
More serious or complicated crimes under the Act on Economic 
Offences and Crimes, on the other hand, are brought before a separate 
division within the District Court, referred to as the Full Court dealing 
with Economic Matters (Meervoudige Economische Kamer) which sits 
with three judges. Appeals against judgments of the Magistrate and of the 
Full Court in Economic Matters are decided upon by a special division in 




























































































Kamer\, sitting with three justices. Against the latter, like all other Court 
of Appeal judgments in criminal cases, an appeal for cassation can be filed 
with the Supreme Court.
3.2 Application of Article 177 EEC
The preliminary references by District Courts have resulted in 24 
judgments by the ECJ, i.e., approximately 16% of the cases considered in 
this report7. Of these, 13 cases concern civil matters and 11 concern 
criminal matters.
Nine out of the eleven criminal cases were concerned with economic 
offences and crimes; 8 of them were decided by a Magistrate in Economic 
Matters and the remaining 1 by a Full Court in Economic Matters. Only 
Cases 32/80 (Kortmann) and 227/82 (Van Bennekom) had to be decided 
by the (ordinary) Full Court dealing with criminal matters, as they were 
appeal cases from Cantonal Courts, concerning offences of an economic 
nature, but not listed in the Act on Economic Offences and Crimes. Not 
surprisingly, the conclusion may be drawn that the impact of EEC-Law 
on national criminal law is predominantly present in the field of economic 
law. As will be indicated in paragraph 4 of this Chapter, the same holds 
true for the Courts of Appeal.
As for the 13 civil cases, six cases were decided by the President in 
summary proceedings. The remaining judgments were given in ordinary 
proceedings by a Full Court. Three summary proceedings concerned ac­
tions of private parties brought against the State before the President of 
the District Court in The Hague; Case 181/82 (Roussel Laboratoria et al.), 
237/82 (Jongeneel Kaas et al.) and Case 238/82 (Duphar et al.). In the 
remaining two cases, private parties sued each other; Cases 106/79 (Eldi 
Records) and 187/80 (Merck & Co. v Stephar and Exler).
It is interesting to note that references by a Full District Court in civil 
matters, have tended to become rare since the end of the seventies. In fact, 
after three references in the sixties, two of which were concerned with an 
interpretation of Regulation No. 3 on social security for migrating work­
ers8, and four in the seventies, not one was made between 1980 and 1985.
7 It is to be noted that the actual number of requests by District Courts to the ECJ is 
much higher than 24 due to the fact that the ECJ joined a relatively high proportion of 
District Court cases under Article 43 of the Rules of Procedure. In Cases 185-204/78 
(Van Dam), e.g., the ECJ joined 20 cases in which the Rotterdam Court requested 
preliminary rulings.
8 Cases 31/64 (Bertholet) and 33/64 (Koster). These were also the first two cases in 
which preliminary questions were referred to the ECJ under Article 177 by District 
Courts. In Case 78/72 (L’Étoile-Syndicat Général}, the District Court in Breda, like 




























































































The last reference considered in this research project was made in 1979 in 
Case 99/79 (Lancome).
Compared to the preliminary rulings initiated by Cantonal Courts, it 
is rather difficult to trace the reasons for the references that were made 
by District Courts. According to the Interim Report, in 11 out of the 24 
cases considered, the reference has been initiated by one of the parties in 
the main proceedings9. In 5 cases the District Court decided to refer of its 
own motion and in 8 others, no information was available on this point. 
Save for the role that was played by the second party, these figures do not 
deviate considerably from those that were given for the other courts in 
the Ordinary Jurisdiction, he., the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court. In some 30% of the District Court cases, the second party in the 
main proceedings, he., the defendant or respondent, suggested to submit 
questions to the ECJ. This compared to 7.7% of the Courts of Appeals 
and 6.3% of the Supreme Courts cases. We were not able to find a satis­
factory explanation for this difference.
In 17 cases, by far the greater part of the proceedings considered in 
this report, the District Courts gave a formal judgment after the prelimi­
nary ruling of the ECJ. In five cases, the proceedings ended without a 
formal judgment and in two cases no information is available on this 
point. Again, these numbers do not differ considerably from those that 
were found for the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. However, as 
can be inferred from paragraph 2 above, all proceedings before Cantonal 
Courts ended in a formal judgment. Of the 17 cases in which the District 
Courts gave a formal judgment, 15 were considered to be in strict con­
formity with the ECJ’s ruling. In only one case, the court first had to in­
terpret the ECJ’s ruling before giving its final decision. On the remaining 
case no such details appears from the statistical information.
Generally speaking, it can be inferred from the statistical data that the 
application of the 177 procedure by District Courts is satisfying. With a 
few exceptions, the proceedings in which the ECJ was addressed had a 
regular character. In practically every case the preliminary judgment was 
helpful to the referring court and duly taken into account.
3.3 Two illustrative cases
1. In Case 94/83 (Albert Heijn BV), the owner of a supermarket-chain, 
whose distribution centre is in Zaandam, was summoned before the
9 The expression “initiated” was adopted in this report, following the original Florence- 
questionnaire on the basis of which all 177 cases were analysed. The expression may 
give rise to confusion as, formally speaking, it is always the national court which 
decides to make a request under Article 177. Whenever the expression is used in this 





























































































Haarlem Magistrate in Economic Matters. The company was charged with 
having in stock for sale, a quantity of “Granny Smith” apples on which 
was found residues of a pesticide called “vinchlozoline”, not permitted by 
the Law of Pesticides (Bestrijdingsmiddelenwet). The apples were im­
ported from Italy. Violation of the Law of Pesticides is punishable under 
the Law on Economic Offences and Crimes. The Law of Pesticides con­
tains rules prohibiting the sale, possession, storage and use of any pesti­
cide not authorized thereunder. A pesticide is approved only if it satisfies 
the requirements laid down by the Minister in the Residues Decree 
(Residubesluit) and the Residues Order (Residubeschikking). As regards 
the pesticide “vinchlozoline”, the Residues Order provides that the level 
of residues allowed in apples is zero.
Before the Magistrate, the defending company did not deny the of­
fence. It contended, however, that the apples had come from Italy where 
they had been legally placed on the market. Consequently, the prohibition 
on their being marketed in the Netherlands was a measure having equiva­
lent effect to quantitive restrictions, contrary to Articles 30 to 36 EEC. It 
was argued therefore, that Albert Heijn should be acquitted. The 
Magistrate submitted, therefore, by judgment of April, 25 1983, four 
preliminary questions to the ECJ on the compatibility of the Residues 
legislation with Community Law. In its ruling of September 9, 1984, the 
ECJ joined these questions and held that in the absence of specific 
Community rules on “vinchlozoline”, Articles 30 and 36 do not prevent a 
Member State from prohibiting the importation of apples from another 
Member State on account of the presence of a quantity of this pesticide 
greater than that authorized by the legislation of the first Member State. 
The authorities of the importing Member State are however obliged to 
review the prescribed maximum level if it appears to them that the rea­
sons which led to its being fixed have changed, for example, as a result of 
the discovery of a new use for the pesticide involved.
In the subsequent proceedings before the Magistrate, Albert Heijn in­
sisted that the rules under discussion were contrary to Community Law 
because they can not be justifiably exempted under Article 36 EEC. 
Firstly, because there is no proof that the apples in question are harmful 
to public health and secondly, because the application of the mles by the 
authorities is so strict and rigid that it constitutes a disproportionate 
means to attain the protection of public health. As to the latter point, 
Albert Heijn argued that it was almost impossible to have the Minister 
amend the Residues Decree to take account of new scientific develop­
ments, within a reasonable period of time. Both arguments were rejected 
by the Magistrate in its final decision of May 6, 1985. The Magistrate 
held that following the preliminary ruling, the legislation at hand should 




























































































The fact that the Residues Decree had been amended several times since 
its enactment in 1965 formed sufficient proof in itself for the Magistrate 
that the application by the authorities was not too rigid. Furthermore, it 
was considered that the three months which the Minister needed to reply 
to Albert Heijn’s request for allowing a certain amount of “vinchlozoline” 
was not excessive given, inter alia, the time that it took to collect the nec­
essary information from Italy. The Magistrate sentenced Albert Heijn to a 
fine of Dfl. 600.
2. In Case 238/82 (Duphar et al. v the Netherlands State), the President of 
the The Hague District Court referred five preliminary questions to the 
ECJ. Duphar and 22 other pharmaceutical companies brought an action 
before the President in summary proceedings for the adoption of an in­
terim measure prohibiting the implementation of the Sickness Insurance 
Fund (Provision o f M edicinal Preparations) Order (B e s lu it  
Farmaceutische Hulp Ziekenfondsverzekering). This Order was intended 
to enhance the quality of pharmaco-therapeutical services and to eliminate 
the considerable deficit of the Netherlands health care scheme. To that 
end, the Order prohibited the supply of certain medicinal preparations, 
laid down in several annexes, to persons insured under the Sickness 
Insurance Fund (Ziekenfonds).
The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that this measure is contrary to 
Community Law, notably Articles 30 and 34 EEC, as roughly 80% of the 
medicinal preparations consumed in the Netherlands are imported, most 
of them from other Member States. Also, the Order denies persons in­
sured under the Sickness Insurance Scheme, who account for more than 
70% of national consumption, the entitlement to supply of a specifically 
listed medicinal product from another Member State. These arguments 
were rejected by the counsel for the State and the President decided, by 
judgment of September 16, 1982 to stay the proceedings and request a 
preliminary ruling.
The ECJ gave its judgment on February 7, 1984. In an extensively 
motivated ruling it rejected all arguments but the one concerning Article 
30. As to Article 30, it held that the provisions under discussion could be 
brought under the so-called “rule of reason”. Therefore the measures 
which aim to refuse insured persons the right to be supplied, at the ex­
pense of the insurance institutions, with specifically named preparations 
may only be compatible with Community Law under certain conditions. 
These are; the determination of the excluded medicinal preparations in­
volves no discrimination regarding the origin of the products and is car­
ried out on the basis of objective and verifiable criteria. Furthermore, it 
must be possible to amend the list whenever compliance with such speci­




























































































Again, before the President of the The Hague District Court, the 
plaintiffs argued that the measures are not in conformity with Community 
Law because the requirements set by the ECJ are not met. They contended 
firstly that the measures are not appropriate to attain the wanted bud­
getary savings. Furthermore, the determination of the excluded products 
is not carried out on the basis of objective and verifiable criteria and, the 
lists are not amended whenever required. The President, basing himself 
strictly on the literal wording of the ECJ’s ruling and on the additional in­
formation supplied by the State, rejected these arguments in his judgment 
of June 7, 1984.
3.4 A pathological case
It follows from the preceding subparagraphs that there are no “real” 
exceptional cases among the references by District Courts. The only Case 
that may be considered as such is 31/68 (SA Chanel v Cepeha). In this 
Case, an appeal was lodged with the Court of Appeal against the referring 
judgment of the District Court in Rotterdam, after the questions had 
reached the ECJ. Because of the appeal, execution of the judgment was 
deferred. In its judgment of May 6, 1970, the Court of Appeal in The 
Hague eventually quashed the judgment of the District Court.
These events resulted in two orders of the ECJ. In the first order of 
June 3, 1969, it suspended judgment pending notification that the appeal 
has been decided. Secondly, after the ECJ was informed of the outcome of 
the appeal, it removed Case 31/68 from the Register by order of June 16 
1970, considering that “the reference for interpretation has lost its pur­
pose”.
As indicated in Chapter I, paragraph 2, Case 31/68 is not the only 
Case in which the ECJ did not answer the preliminary questions, due to 
the fact that the referring court withdrew its request. In this respect, Case 
31/68 may be regarded as a rather arbitrary example for the problems 
arising whenever appellate proceedings are brought against preliminary 
references. Chanel v Cepeha is nevertheless explicitly mentioned here be­
cause it is the only preliminary reference originating from a Dutch court, 
in which the order of the ECJ, suspending and removing the Case, was 
published in the European Court Reports (ECR). In paragraph 4.3 of this 
Chapter, the consequences for appellate proceedings brought against re­
ferring judgments for Dutch (procedural) Law are discussed with Case 




























































































4. Courts of Appeal
4.1 Jurisdiction and composition
The five Courts of Appeal are situated in Amsterdam, The Hague, ’s- 
Hertogenbosch, Amhem and Leeuwarden. The most important part of the 
jurisdiction of these courts is to hear appeals against the judgments in civil 
and criminal matters, given at first instance by the District Courts within 
their region. As mentioned before, each Court also consists of a Taxation 
Division, which serves as a court of first instance in certain tax matters. 
These Divisions are discussed in Chapter IV, paragraph 4.
All decisions of the Courts of Appeal in civil, criminal and tax mat­
ters are subject to appeal on points of law and procedure in cassation with 
the Supreme Court. The Courts of Appeal usually sit with a bench of 
three justices, but in tax matters, chambers consisting of a single justice 
may be established.
4.2 Application of Article 177 EEC
The ECJ has given 15 judgments at the request of Courts of Appeal, 
i.e., 10% of all preliminary rulings considered. Four of them concern 
taxation matters, i.e., almost 30% of the Courts of Appeal cases.
Of the 11 non-taxation cases, six concern criminal matters, which 
were all tried by the Economic Divisions of the Courts of Appeal. The 
remaining five references were made in civil matters, two of which were 
made in summary proceedings; 6/81 (Beele) and 144/81 (Keurkoop). The 
share of references made by Courts of Appeal in summary proceedings, 
corresponds largely with the share of requests made by Presidents of 
District Courts in the framework of such proceedings. As indicated ear­
lier in paragraph 3.2, about 50% of the references in civil cases from the 
procedure of District Courts were summary proceedings. Different to the 
District Courts, however, these proceedings related to disputes between 
private parties only.
Only the Courts in The Hague, Amsterdam and Amhem have re­
quested preliminary rulings (in non-tax matters) in the period considered 
in this report. As for the references in criminal cases, it is quite remark­
able that all but one, (Case 272/80, Biologische Producten) which em­
anated from the The Hague Court of Appeal, were made by the 
Amsterdam Court.
Similarly, for the references in civil matters, clear preponderance is 
evident in the practice of the Court in The Hague which requested all 
rulings except one. Besides the court in The Hague, only the Amhem 
Court of Appeal requested a preliminary ruling in case 25/75 (Van Vliet). 




























































































pends entirely on appeals from the District Courts within their region. 
Therefore, only fragile conclusions as to the attitude of the Court of 
Appeal in relation to Article 177, may be drawn from this distribution of 
cases. In this respect, the preponderance of some Courts as well as the 
lack of references from other Courts of Appeal concurs more or less 
logically with the distribution of the 177-cases requested by District 
Courts. The absence of references by the Court of Appeal in Leeuwarden, 
e.g., is not surprising given the fact that only one of the three District 
Courts in its region, the court in Assen, has ever addressed questions to 
the ECJ in the period considered here, viz., 33/64 (Koster) and 27/80 
(Fietje). The curious absence of references from the Leeuwarden and 
Groningen District Courts, as well as from the Leeuwarden Court of 
Appeal itself, may, furthermore, be explained by the fact that these courts 
do not deal with issues of EEC-Law on a large scale. Alternatively, the 
question may be raised whether these courts are fully aware of their obli­
gations under Article 177.
As the Courts of Appeal in their capacity as taxation courts, are the 
courts of first instance, a more accurate picture on the basis of the geo­
graphical distribution may be drawn for them.10
Much of what is said about the application of the preliminary proce­
dure by District Courts in paragraph 3 holds true for the Courts of 
Appeal as well. The influence of the parties on the decision to refer was 
discussed in paragraph 3.2. The Courts of Appeal handed down a final 
judgment taking into account the preliminary ruling in 9 cases, leaving 
only two undecided by judgment. The statistical data further indicate that 
all 9 judgments were in strict conformity with the ECJ’s ruling.
Generally speaking, the conclusion to be drawn from the statistical 
data available, must be that the application by Courts of Appeal is also 
satisfying.
4.3 Two illustrative cases
As there are no real exceptional cases among the references initiated 
by the Courts of Appeal, we decided to discuss two cases in which some­
thing “peculiar” occurred. These cases can also be considered as illustra­
tive of the referring practice of the Courts of Appeal under Article 177.
1. Firstly, in Case 13/61 (De Geus and Uitdenbogerd) -  more or less 
similar to Case 31/68 (SA Chanel v Cepeha) -  the referring judgment of 
the Court of Appeal in The Hague was submitted for cassation with the 
Supreme Court. The proceedings before the Supreme Court were particu­
larly interesting for this report because the plaintiffs asked the Supreme 
Court to quash the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the ground that it




























































































wrongfully requested a preliminary ruling. The reactions of both the ECJ 
and the Supreme Court as regards this complication are discussed briefly 
here.
Before the ECJ, the plaintiffs in the main proceedings, Bosch and Van 
Rijn, as well as the French Government argued that this court should 
await the outcome of the cassation proceedings before giving a ruling on 
the question referred to it by the Court of Appeal. The argument was 
based, inter alia, on Article 389(5) (in the meantime replaced by Article 
404(1)) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke 
Rechtsvordering), under which a petition in cassation has suspensory ef­
fect. The ECJ, following Advocate-General Lagrange, dismissed the ar­
gument that a preliminary ruling can only be made in a case which is res 
judicata, as “[t]his interpretation of Article 177 is not only not suggested 
by the literal meaning of the wording, but rests also on a failure to ap­
preciate that the municipal law of any Member State, whose courts re­
quest a preliminary ruling from this court, and Community law constitute 
two separate and distinct legal orders.”11 From the considerations in De 
Geus & Uitdenbogerd, it can be inferred that the ECJ retains jurisdiction 
until and unless the referring order is quashed in appellate or cassation 
proceedings. Apparently, the risk is taken by the ECJ, that the referring 
judgment might be quashed after the ECJ has given its ruling, which ac­
cordingly would be without legal effect as to the judgment in the main 
action.
In its judgment of May 18, 1962, i.e., after the ECJ had given its 
judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the referring judgment of the Court 
of Appeal.1 2 The Supreme Court considered that in the absence of specific 
EEC rules on the matter, the suspension of proceedings by a Dutch court 
for the purpose of a preliminary ruling, has to be in conformity with na­
tional law and is, therefore, “in principle” within the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court. In order to judge whether the suspension was allowed 
under Dutch law, the Supreme Court, subsequently examined whether the 
question as formulated by the Court of Appeal, was suitable and necessary 
for submission to the ECJ under Article 177. Notwithstanding the some­
what factual nature of the question, which was also criticized by the ECJ, 
the Supreme Court concluded that these conditions were clearly met in the 
present case. In the end, the cassation proceedings turned out to be of no 
relevance to the completion of the preliminary procedure in De Geus & 
Uitdenbogerd. However, the readinesss of the Supreme Court to examine 
the suitability and necessity of preliminary references under Article 177
11 (1962)ECR 49 and 50.




























































































according to national law, must be criticized since it may conflict with the 
primacy of Article 177 over national law (of procedure).
2. In Case 82/77 (Van Tiggele) the reference by the Court of Appeal was 
made at the very end of the proceedings, viz, after the case had been dealt 
with by the Supreme Court which quashed the first appellate judgment of 
the Court of Appeal in The Hague. It remitted the case to the Court of 
Appeal in Amsterdam for final settlement, taking into account the 
Supreme Court’s judgment. The Court of Appeal, eventually, suspended 
proceedings and requested a preliminary ruling.13 It is rather peculiar 
that, apparently, the relevance of Community Law was only recognized in 
the ultimate stage of the proceedings. However, a closer examination of 
the facts of the case provides an explanation for this.
Criminal proceedings were brought against Mr. Van Tiggele for in- 
fringment of the rules concerning minimum prices for the marketing of 
spirits, issued by the Product Board for Spirits (Produktschap voor 
Gedistilleerde Dranken). As a matter of fact, price competition in the 
Dutch spirits retail sector used to be limited, by mutual agreement, via the 
application of individual resale price maintenance agreements. In 1975, 
however, after these agreements were held invalid by the Utrecht District 
Court, the Government empowered the Product Board to fix minimum 
retail prices, which it did by issuing the relevant regulation at the end of 
1975.
The judgment of the Rotterdam Magistrate in Economic Matters, 
sentencing Van Tiggele in the first instance, was quashed by the Court of 
Appeal in The Hague on the ground that the price control was invalid un­
der national law, inter alia, because the Council of State had not been 
heard on the matter. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal and held the regulation valid under national law. The 
controversy with respect to the validity under national law appears to 
have completely preoccupied the parties and the courts so far. Only once 
this issue had been settled by the Supreme Court, did the Community Law 
perspective emerge in the proceedings before the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal.
In its judgment of April, 27 1978, this court acquitted Mr. Van 
Tiggele of both charges brought against him, even though, strictly speak­
13 More or less thè opposite occurred in Case 286/81 (Van Oosthoek’s Uitgeverij). Here, 
the final judgment of the Court of Appeal of November 11, 1983 in which the 
defending company was fined Dfl. 235 for having infringed the Act on the Curtailment 
of Sales Promotion (Wet Beperking Cadeaustelsel)., was submitted for cassation with 
the Surpreme Court by Van Oosthoek’s Uitgeverij. As the sole ground for cassation, 
submitted by the counsel of Van Oosthoek’s Uitgeverij concerned an alleged violation 
of national law only, the judgment of the Supreme Court of November 29, 1983, in 
which the appeal was dismissed (NJ 1984, 293), had no impact on this case as far as 




























































































ing, the ECJ’s judgment compelled a partial acquittal only. The Court of 
Appeal considered this lenient approach justified, given the fact that the 
entire Product Board Regulation, as a consequence of the ECJ’s ruling, 
had not been renewed by the Product Board. The fact that the regulation 
happened to be partially valid under Community Law at the time of the 
infringment, was “in view of the changed perceptions of the Product 
Board” left outside of consideration by the Court of Appeal.
5. Supreme Court (H o g e  R a a d )
5.1 Jurisdiction and composition
The Supreme Court is the highest court of the Ordinary Jurisdiction 
in the Netherlands. Its most important role is to hear appeals on points of 
law and procedure against judgments of lower courts in a cassation pro­
cedure. The essential difference between the cassation procedure before 
the Supreme Court and the appeal procedure before courts with appellate 
jurisdiction, is to be found in the fact that the Supreme Court may only 
adjudicate on questions of law (and procedure), whereas appeal courts 
may consider questions of law as well as the facts of the case. The 
Supreme Court regards the facts of the dispute as irrevocably established 
by the lower courts and it only decides on points of law. The grounds on 
which the Supreme Court may quash a judgment, the so-called grounds 
for cassation (cassatiegronden) are, therefore, limited.
As for the parties in the dispute, they can only appeal for cassation if 
there are no other (so-called “normal”) legal remedies available (gewone 
rechtsmiddelen). Thus, only judgments given in the final instance, i.e., 
judgments that can not be submitted for appeal to either a District Court 
or a Court of Appeal, can be quashed by the Supreme Court.
In addition to the parties, the Attorney-General (Procureur-Generaal) 
can also, under certain conditions, file an appeal for cassation with the 
Supreme Court “in the interest of the Law” (cassatie in het belang der 
wet). So far, the Supreme Court has never requested a preliminary ruling 
in a procedure concerning cassation in the interest of the Law14.
The Supreme Court can hear appeals for cassation in civil, criminal 
and taxation matters. For this purpose, the court is divided into three 
Chambers, one for each field of law. The First or Civil Chamber and the 
Second or Criminal Chamber, decide on judgments given by the Cantonal 
Courts, District Courts and, most frequently, Courts of Appeal. The
14 However, we found one case in such proceedings in which the Attorney-General 
requested the Supreme Court to do so. The Supreme Court did not follow its 





























































































Third or Taxation Chamber can hear appeals for cassation against judg­
ments of the Courts of Appeal and, in a limited number of cases, against 
judgments given by the Central Court of Appeal.
If the Supreme Court quashes a judgment, it can either decide itself 
on the final outcome of the case or refer the case to a lower court. The 
rules for this differ according to whether it concerns a civil, criminal or 
taxation case;
The Supreme Court usually sits with a bench of five justices. Benches 
of three or one justices, however, may be established under Article 102 of 
the Act on the Organization of the Judiciary.
5.1.1 Differences between the procedures in cassation
There are some important differences between the procedures in cas­
sation to be followed before the Supreme Court. Firstly, the grounds for 
cassation differ according to whether a civil, criminal or taxation case, on 
the one hand, or, on the other, a judgment from a Cantonal Court, is be­
ing brought. The grounds for cassation in the former cases are listed in 
Article 99 of the Act on the Organization of the Judiciary; neglect of 
(important) procedural requirements and violation of the law. The di­
verging, and more restrictive, grounds for the cassation of (civil and 
criminal) judgments of the Cantonal Courts can be found in Articles 100 
and 101. So far, no preliminary references were made by the Supreme 
Court in cassation proceedings against judgments of Cantonal Courts15.
Secondly, whenever the Supreme Court has to decide a civil case, the 
rules of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. The mles of proce­
dure to be followed in those cases are more strict in some respects than in 
criminal or, in particular, taxation cases. The difference which is most 
relevant to this report, bears upon the rule that the Supreme Court cannot 
quash a civil judgment ex officio. Thus, such a judgment can only be 
quashed if: (1) the Supreme Court finds that one of the requirements of 
Article 99 is violated, and (2) this is raised explicitly and substantiated by 
the appealing party16. Judgments in criminal and taxation matters, on the 
other hand, may be quashed ex officio. In those cases, the Supreme Court 
may quash more easily, i.e., even if one of the grounds for cassation has 
not been brought forward explicitly. The question may be raised whether
15 In a Case decided by the Supreme Court on 8.1.1988 (Hofmann, NJ 1988, 942), this 
Court had a rare opportunity to make a reference in such a case. See also supra note 2.
16 This essential rule for cassation proceedings in civil cases is laid down in Article 
419(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the interpretation of this rule by the 
Supreme Court and for the impact it may have on the referring practice of the Supreme 
Court in civil cases, see: C.W. Dubbink, “Als vragen niet vrij staat maar verplicht is, 
Uitleggingsvragen aan het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Gemeenschappen en het 
BENELUX-Gerechtshof in de cassatieprocedure”, in: Een Goede Procesorde, 




























































































the strict rules which are to be followed in cassation proceedings in civil 
cases, are always reconcilable with the Supreme Court’s obligations under 
Article 177. This question becomes particularly pertinent if the Supreme 
Court would decline from making a reference, as a result of these proce­
dural rules in a case in which it is, under Community Law, bound to ad­
dress preliminary questions to the ECJ. However, such a conflict between 
Dutch Law of Procedure and Community Law will probably not occur 
frequently in practice, in particular not, because it is hardly conceivable 
that the party appealing for cassation actually omits to argue before the 
Supreme Court that Community Law is relevant to the outcome of the 
case. Taking into account the purpose of the Florence project and the 
rather academic nature of this problem, this is not the proper place to 
elaborate it further. Therefore, we confine ourselves here to the observa­
tion that questions may be raised as to the compatibility of the rules of 
procedure in (civil) cassation proceedings with the requirements of 
Article 177 EEC.
Finally, it is submitted that the divergent procedural rules may have 
an impact on the application of Article 177 by the various Chambers of 
the Supreme Court, in that more references are likely to be made when 
the court has the power to quash ex officio. Next to the fact that 
Community Directives have largely harmonized national VAT-legislation, 
the power to quash ex officio may, e.g., explain the large share of taxa­
tion cases in which the Supreme Court referred questions to the ECJ.
5.2 Application of Article 177
The Supreme Court requested 18 preliminary rulings in the period 
considered in this report. Due to the fact that several cases were joined by 
the ECJ, these requests resulted in 16 preliminary mlings by the ECJ, i.e., 
approximately 10 % of the total number of cases originating from courts 
in the Netherlands. Nine of these references were made in taxation cases 
by the so-called Third Chamber of the Supreme Court, i.e., 50% of its 
cases which is much higher than the 30% taxation cases of the Courts of 
Appeal. These cases will be considered below in Chapter IV, paragraph 4. 
Of the remaining seven cases, five were concerned with civil matters and 
two with criminal matters. In four of the civil cases preliminary questions 
were referred in the framework of summary proceedings.17 This percent­
age corresponds with those of the District Courts and the Courts of 
Appeal. Two of these summary proceedings (Morson and Jhanjan) con­
cerned actions against the State.





























































































The Supreme Court gave a formal judgment in six out of the seven 
cases in which preliminary rulings were requested. Only in Case 35 and 
36/82 (Morson and Jhanjan) there was no judgment. All final judgments 
were considered to be in strict conformity with the ECJ’s mling.
It is remarkable that the number of cases in which the assistance of 
the preliminary ruling was indicated by the Supreme Court, differs 
significantly from the other ordinary courts. In 92.9% of the cases, as 
compared to 16.7% for the Courts of Appeal and 38.95% for the District 
Courts, the Supreme Court considered the ruling of the ECJ to be helpful. 
This percentage comes as no surprise. After all, the Supreme Court will 
only make a reference for a preliminary mling if this is strictly necessary 
in the light of one of the grounds for cassation. If the Supreme Court 
were able to quash a judgment on a ground lying in national law, it would 
not make a reference. The Supreme Court, therefore, needs the ECJ’s 
ruling to decide whether or not the judgment involved should be quashed. 
In other words, if after a preliminary procedure, the judgment is quashed 
this is because of the preliminary mling and if not, this is also due to the 
interpretation given by the ECJ. Consequently, it is practically unavoid­
able that the Supreme Court mentions the helpfulness of the ECJ’s judg­
ment in its own final decision.
It follows from the information available that the application of the 
177 procedure by the Supreme Court in civil and criminal matters is sat­
isfactory. There are no pathological cases. However, as has been men­
tioned earlier in this report, the Florence 177 project only examined the 
cases in which questions were actually put to the ECJ, leaving out all cases 
in which a preliminary procedure might have been initiated. In this re­
spect the Supreme Court, being the highest court in the hierarchy, bears a 
larger responsibility than the other courts of the Ordinary Jurisdiction.
In this respect, the following critical remarks may be submitted. In a 
judgment of January 13, 1961 (KIM v Sieverding)1*, e.g., the Supreme 
Court did not make a reference because it did not consider itself to be un­
der an obligation to do so as the question of Community Law was of no 
relevance to the outcome of the case. The approach of the Supreme Court 
in this case was, eventually, approved by the ECJ in CILFIT  (Case 
283/8118 9). Even though it is admittedly common sense for a national court 
to decline from making a reference if this is not necessary to decide the 
dispute before it, it is submitted that at the time the Supreme Court gave 
its judgment (1961), the approach was not in complete conformity with 
the ECJ’s case-law on Article 177.





























































































Secondly, there have been some cases in which the Supreme Court re­
fused to address questions to the ECJ even though its Attorney-General 
(or one of its Advocates-General) considered the Court to be under an 
obligation to request a ruling under Article 177. This occurred, e.g., in a 
judgment of April 10, 1964 (Constructa Werke v De Geus & 
Uitdenbogerd)20. In a recent criminal case, brought before the Supreme 
Court by the Attorney-General in cassation proceedings “in the interest of 
the law”, the latter asked the Court to quash a judgment of the Court of 
Appeal because it misinterpreted an EEC Directive.21 In the event that the 
Supreme Court were to uphold the judgment, the Attorney-General ar­
gued, it could only do so after having asked the ECJ for an interpretation 
under Article 177. Unlike the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General did 
not consider the matter to be an acte clair or an acte éclairé. The Supreme 
Court, however, upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It did not feel 
obliged to request a preliminary ruling, because it considered there was 
no doubt as to the meaning of the Directive concerned.
5.3 Two illustrative cases
1. The first two requests for preliminary rulings by the Supreme Court 
were made on March 1, 1974 in Cases 15/74 (Centrafarm v Sterling 
Drug) and 16/74 (Centrafarm v Winthrop). The proceedings in these 
Cases being to a large extent identical, we will only discuss Case 15/74.
Sterling Drug is the holder of national patents in several countries 
(including the Netherlands and the U.K.) relating to the mode of prepara­
tion of a medication with the trade-mark “Negram”. Centrafarm imported 
medicinal preparations which were manufactured according to the patent 
method. Some bore the trade-mark “Negram”, without the agreement of 
Sterling Drug, from England and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
where they had been put onto the market in a regular manner by sub­
sidiaries of Sterling Drug. Sterling Drug brought an action against 
Centrafarm in summary proceedings before the President of the 
Rotterdam District Court. Sterling Drug applied, inter alia, for interim 
measures, requiring Centrafarm to refrain from any further infringement 
of the patent belonging to Sterling Drug. The President rejected the appli­
cation by judgment of May 9, 1972 whereupon Sterling Drug brought an 
appeal before the Court of Appeal at The Hague. This Court found in 
favour of Sterling Drug in a judgment of March 2, 1973. It is interesting 
to note that the Court of Appeal explicitly refused to submit preliminary 
questions to the ECJ. Apparently, the Court of Appeal refused, inter alia, 
because of the fact that it concerned summary proceedings.
20 Judgment of 10.04.1964, NJ 1964, 439.




























































































Centrafarm submitted a ground for cassation with the Supreme Court, 
which related, inter alia, to the impact of articles 30 to 36 and article 85 
on the lawfulness of parallel importations by Centrafarm. Considering 
that the decision on this part of the ground depended on the interpretation 
of Community Law, the Supreme Court stayed the proceedings and re­
quested a preliminary ruling. The Attorney-General with the Supreme 
Court had also concluded that a preliminary procedure was necessary.
In response to the questions, the ECJ held in essence that it is contrary 
to Articles 30 to 36 EEC for the patentee to prohibit the sale of a product 
protected by patent, which has been marketed in another Member State by 
him or with his consent. The ECJ, therefore, limited the protection of 
patent rights under Article 36 EEC to the specific subject-matter of that 
right. Thus, the patentee as a reward for his creative effort, is guaranteed 
the exclusive right to use the invention with a view to manufacturing the 
product and putting it into circulation for the first time, as well as the 
rights to oppose infringements of this right. Consequently, the patentee’s 
right is exhausted when the product is marketed in another Member State 
in a legal manner, by himself or with his consent. After putting the prod­
uct into circulation in one Member State, the patentee can, therefore, no 
longer partition off national markets and thereby restrict trade between 
Member States.
In its final judgment of February 21, 1975 the Supreme Court 
quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and rejected the applications 
for interim measures submitted by Sterling Drug.
2. In Case 279/80 {Alfred John Webb), preliminary questions were put to 
the ECJ by the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court. Webb is the 
manager of International Engineering Services Bureau (UK), a company 
based in the United Kingdom according to British company law. The 
company’s principle business is supplying technical staff to the 
Netherlands, the staff being recruited by the company and supplied for a 
fixed period to businesses located in the Netherlands. The company holds 
a licence as provided for by U.K. legislation, but pursues its business 
without of a Netherlands licence. Webb was sentenced by a judgment of 
April 27, 1978 of the Magistrate in Economic Matters at the Amsterdam 
District Court for having provided manpower without being in posession 
of a licence issued by the minister for Social Affairs, under the Law on 
the provision of manpower (Wet op het ter beschikking stellen van 
Arbeidskrachten). The judgment was confirmed on appeal by a decision 
of the Economic Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, on 
February 14, 1980. The accused sought to have the conviction quashed by 
the Supreme Court.
In the grounds for cassation submitted by Webb, he argued, inter alia, 




























































































Appeal. His main argument was that the Netherlands may not require a 
separate Dutch licence from those who provide manpower in another 
Member State as well, if they hold a licence in the latter State which duly 
supervises its activities and which has been issued on conditions compa­
rable to those imposed by the State in which the services are provided. In 
a judgment of December 9, 1980 the Supreme Court considered that a 
decision in the dispute depended on questions concerning the interpreta­
tion of Community Law and referred three questions to the ECJ. The 
Advocate-General with the Supreme Court had also concluded that a pre­
liminary reference was required.
The ECJ gave its judgment on December 17, 1981. It held that Article 
59, in principle, does not preclude a Member State which obliges agencies 
for the provision of manpower to hold a licence, from requiring a 
provider of services established in another member State, to comply also 
with that condition even if he holds a licence issued by the State in which 
he is established. After this judgment, the Supreme Court rejected the ap­
peal for cassation and upheld the Court of Appeal’s ruling in a decision of 
April 20, 1982. The final judgment of the Supreme Court is remarkably 
short. In fact, the Court only repeated the dictum of the ECJ and rejected 
the appeal without giving a reasoning of its own.
6. Summary of the main results of the questionnaires
1. The ECJ gave 45 preliminary mlings at the request of courts belonging 
to the Ordinary Jurisdiction, i.e., 30% of all requests made by Dutch 
courts. Overall, the answers that were given to the questionnaires indicate 
that the application of the 177 procedure by courts belonging to the 
Ordinary Jurisdiction is satisfactory. We found only one pathological 
case, viz., 141-143/81 (Holdijk et al.).
In 35 of the 45 cases, the referring courts delivered a formal judg­
ment taking into account the ECJ’s ruling. Eight cases were resolved 
otherwise and the outcome of two cases remained unknown.
Of the 35 cases in which a final judgment was given, 32 are consid­
ered to be delivered in strict conformity with the ECJ’s ruling. In the re­
maining three cases the referring courts had to further interpret the ECJ’s 
ruling first. We found no cases in which an evasive application of the 
ECJ’s ruling was given.
2. As for the distribution of the cases over the various fields of the law, it 
appears from the statistical data that 24 cases were concerned with civil 
matters and 21 with criminal matters.




























































































goods (12). Six cases concerned Articles 85 and 86 EEC and another 
three, social security. Finally, there were two cases on the free movement 
of persons and one on EEC Social Policy. Thirteen of the 24 civil cases 
were decided in summary proceedings, demonstrating the important 
function of such proceedings in judicial protection under Community Law 
in the Netherlands.
In view of the scope of EEC-Law, it goes almost without saying that 
in criminal matters, the Magistrates in Economic Matters and the Full 
Courts within the District Courts and Courts of Appeal dealing with 
Economic Matters, have played an important role as far as the references 
under Article 177 are concerned. Looking more closely at the criminal 
cases, it appears that only two of them were not concerned with the Act 
on Economic Offences and Crimes, viz., 32/80 (Kortmann) and 227/82 
(Van Bennekom). These two cases were decided by the District Courts on 
appeal from judgments of Cantonal Courts even though they dealt with 
offences of an “economic nature”. However, as they are not punishable 
under the aforementioned Act, they had to be decided in the first instance 
by a Cantonal Court.
3. Only in 7 out of the 45 cases (16%) were the references made by 
courts of last instance. Apparently, the question whether or not the court 
is under the obligation to request a ruling under the third paragraph of 
Article 177 does not have an important influence on the courts’ decisions 
to actually address questions to the ECJ.
4. In all cases, the courts asked for a preliminary ruling on the interpre­
tation of Community Law. In the period considered in this report, not a 
single validity question was put to the ECJ by courts belonging to the 
Ordinary Jurisdiction. By way of explanation it may be submitted that the 
ordinary courts are not called upon frequently to decide matters relating 
to secondary Community Law. Such disputes usually have to be brought 
before an administrative court. This holds true in particular for those 
parts of Community Law which have to be further implemented by a na­
tional administrative body. This probably explains why Dutch adminis­





























































































Chapter IV: Evaluation of the Application of the 
177 Procedure by Administrative Courts
1. Introduction
In this Chapter the following courts belonging to the Administrative 
Jurisdiction are subsequently discussed: the Court of Last Instance in 
Matters of Trade and Industry, the Tariffcommission, the Courts of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court in taxation matters, the Civil Service 
Tribunals, the Social Security Courts and the Council of State. After these 
administrative courts, paragraph 6 is devoted partially to the referring 
practice by the Division for Administrative Disputes of the Council of 
State, which has been accepted by the ECJ as a court under Article 177.
One of the main features of the Administrative Jurisdiction in the 
Netherlands is the existence of so many highly specialized courts. These 
courts all have their own specific jurisdictions and are functioning com­
pletely independent from one another. Therefore, it needs no explanation 
that the Dutch system of judicial protection against the Government is 
often regarded as being too fragmentary. In the light of Article 177, 
however, it may be assumed that the existence of several specialized ad­
ministrative courts together with the fact that most of them are last in­
stance courts, is beneficial since it produces more references. 
Furthermore, it is important for this project to note that three of the ad­
ministrative courts hear cases in the first as well as in the final instance. 
This holds true for the Court of Last Instance in Matters of Trade and 
Industry, the Tariffcommission and the Judicial Division of the Council of 
State.
Under the present organization of the Administrative Jurisdiction, it 
is possible that a dispute over Community Law, following, e.g., from one 
(Customs) declaration (aangifte), has to be brought before three separate 
courts. The Tariffcommission for customs and excises, the Courts of 
Appeal for VAT and the CBB for agricultural levies. Consequently, pre­
liminary rulings may be requested by one of these courts, which do not 
stand in a hierarchical relation to each other. In the cases considered in 
this report, no such double references to the ECJ have been made. In the 





























































































Several other types of conjunction can be distinguished in this respect. 
For instance, the amount of an agricultural levy, due under the rules of 
the Common Agricultural Policy, often depends on the classification of 
the agricultural product under the CCT. This inter-relation between the 
CAP and the CCT, however, is not found in the organization of the 
Administrative Jurisdiction in the Netherlands. As a matter of fact two 
administrative courts, the CBB for most CAP disputes and the 
Tariffcommission for the CCT, are administering justice independently 
from each other. It comes as a surprise that no “double” references have 
been made as yet by Dutch courts in these matters. However, some flaws 
can be discerned. In three Cases 101/78 (Granaria II), 80/72 (Koninklijk 
Lassiefabrielcen) and 137/78 (Henningsen Van Den Burg et al.), referred 
by the CBB, e.g., this court dealt with classification problems even though 
the General Act on Customs and Excises clearly stipulates that this comes 
under the jurisdiction of the Tariffcommission. In later cases the CBB 
took a correct position by referring applicants in similar cases to the 
T ariffcommission.
The 177 references made by the administrative courts and by the 
Division for Administrative Disputes of the Council of State have resulted 
in 105 preliminary judgments of the ECJ, i.e., 70% of the total number of 
preliminary rulings which originated in the Netherlands. On the basis of 
this percentage we may assume that most litigation on matters of 
Community Law is brought before the administrative courts in the 
Netherlands. It is clear, therefore, that these courts perform an important 
function in offering judicial protection under Community Law.
2. Court of Last Instance in Matters of Trade and 
Industry (C o l le g e  v a n  B e r o e p  v o o r  h e t  B e d r i j f s l e v e n ,
C B B )
A .E. KELLERMANN and F .H .M . POSSEN
2.1 Jurisdiction and composition
The Court of Last Instance in Matters of Trade and Industry, henece- 
forth abbreviated to CBB, is considered to be the most specialized court 
in the field of economic law. The jurisdiction, organization and proceed­
ings of the CBB are laid down in two administrative laws; the Act con­
cerning Administrative Jurisdiction in Matters of Trade and Industry 
(Wet Administratieve Rechtspraak Bedrijfsorganisatie, 1954) and the Act 
on Disciplinary Proceedings within the Organization of Trade and 
Industry (Wet Tuchtrechtspraak Bedrijfsorganisatie, 1954). The latter 




























































































was under review in Case 29/82 (Van Luipen) as a result of a disciplinary 
measure by the Quality Standards and Control Bureau for Lettuce and 
Fruits (Kwaliteits Controlebureau voor Groenten en Fruit), a disciplinary 
Body.
The Act concerning Administrative Jurisdiction in Matters of Trade 
and Industry, regulates, inter alia, the procedure of appeal against deci­
sions of the various bodies established under public law. Under Article 4 
of the Act, any private or legal person can lodge an appeal with the CBB 
against decisions and acts taken by these public bodies, provided they do 
not involve matters of civil law. However, these persons must be either, 
individually concerned or directly affected by that decision or act.
The grounds for appeal are listed in Article 5. An appeal may be 
lodged on the grounds that,: (1) the decision is contrary to a generally 
binding provision; (2) in taking the decision, the administrative body 
manifestly used its power for purposes other than for which the powers 
were vested in it; (3) in taking the decision, the administrative body acted 
contrary to a principle of proper administration generally held to be 
equitable. The first is the most important. This ground may also be in­
voked in case of violation of European Community Law. The CBB may, 
after annulment of a decision, order the responding body to take certain 
action and even to pay damages to the applicant. Against a judgment of 
the CBB no further appeal is possible.
The bodies referred to are either the Social and Economic Council 
(Sociaal Economische Raad) or, one of the various Boards (trade and in­
dustrial organizations) designated to execute a specific part of Dutch so­
cial and economic legislation. These executive functions are primarily 
performed by so-called Productboards (Produktschappen) and Trade and 
Industry Boards (Bedrijfschappen). Both have an autonomous power, un­
der the general supervision of the Government, to issue regulations for 
the trade and industry with which they are concerned. This covers, inter 
alia, certain aspects of production, competition, labour conditions and 
training and employment.
These already existing bodies were called in by the Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries to assist, inter alia, in the implementation of the 
EEC Common Agricultural Policy. Important powers have been con­
ferred ever since upon the Productboards and Trade and Industry Boards. 
On the basis of the Act on Agriculture (Landbouwwet, 1957), e.g., the 
Minister has designated the Productboards to effect intervention purchases 
under the various EC common market organizations. Equally, the Import 
and Export Act (In- en Uitvoerwet, 1962) and the Royal Decrees based 
thereon, confer upon the Productboards the power to charge levies or 





























































































Apart from the two Acts mentioned, a number of others also give the 
CBB jurisdiction in the sphere of economic law. Consequently, it is com­
petent to hear appeals against decisions taken by, inter alia, the Chambers 
of Commerce and by the Central Bank of the Netherlands.
2.2 Application of Article 177
The CBB holds the record for the Netherlands in requesting prelimi­
nary rulings to the ECJ. The preliminary references made by the CBB 
have resulted in 42 judgments of the ECJ. This amount represents 28% of 
the total number of references put forward by Dutch courts in the period 
of this research. Besides the fact that it is a court which decides in the 
first and last instance, there is another reason for the relatively frequent 
recourse by the CBB to the preliminary procedure. Appeals against the 
decisions of the bodies referred to in the previous subparagraph, imple­
menting the Common Agricultural Policy, are heard by it. In fact, 25 of 
the ECJ judgments at the request of the CBB were concerned with EEC 
Common Market Organizations, i.e., 60 %. Some specific remarks as to 
the follow-up of these cases will be made in subparagraph 2.2.1 below. 
The other references made by the CBB were concerned mainly with the 
interpretation of the Common Customs Tariff and the EEC Commercial 
Policy. Six cases relate to the freedom to provide services and the free 
movement of goods.
According to the Interim Report, one of the parties initiated the ref­
erence in 11 cases, i.e., approximately 25% of the total number of refer­
ences by the CBB. For the remaining cases no indication was found as to 
the question who initiated the reference. This is the highest percentage of 
all Dutch courts, ordinary and administrative alike. In all 11 cases, the 
initiating party happened to be the applicant. Apparently, the responding 
party, which is always a body vested with certain powers under public 
law, never suggested the CBB to make use of Article 177. The same con­
clusion can be drawn from the statistical data for the Tariffcommission 
and for the Judicial Division of the Council of State. The responding par­
ties before these courts never suggested the submission of preliminary 
questions to the ECJ either. In fact, the only administrative courts where 
the responding parties demonstrated more initiative as to the application 
of Article 177, are the two instances of the Social Security Courts. The 
statistics show that the responding parties before a Social Security Court 
of First Instance initiated a reference in one out of seven cases and before 
the Central Court of Appeal, in 6 cases (approximately 25%!). This is a 
deviation from the normal pattern found for administrative courts.
The CBB requested a ruling of its own motion in approximately 7 
cases, 17%. In even more cases, however, no information on this point 




























































































The CBB requested a preliminary ruling on the validity of 
Community Law in 10 cases (24%). This “score” is by far the highest of 
all Dutch courts. In fact, next to the CBB only the Tariffcommission re­
ferred questions on validity of Community Law. This happened in two 
cases, 12%.'
In 27 cases (65%), the proceedings before the CBB ended with a for­
mal judgment taking account of the preliminary ruling. In two cases, the 
outcome is unknown. The remaining 13 cases were resolved otherwise, 
but the statistical information does not indicate clearly, in what manner. 
Twenty-six of the cases in which final judgments were delivered, were 
considered to be in strict conformity with the ECJ’s rulings. In the re­
maining cases, the CBB had to further interpret the ruling before giving 
its final judgment. The CBB gave an indication as to the usefulness of the 
ECJ’s interpretation, in 15 cases (35%).
2.2.7 Some specific remarks as to the follow-up o f the preliminary 
rulings requested by the CBB in cases concerning Common Market 
Organizations.
From the analysis of the proceedings before the CBB in these 25 
cases, it appears that the Central Product Board for Agricultural Produce 
(Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten) holds the record for ap­
pearing as the respondent. The Central Product Board was the respondent 
in 15 of these cases.
In these cases, the CBB had to deal with a variety of sometimes rather 
technical agricultural matters. These included the application of the sys­
tem of import and export licences, the advance fixing of refunds in re­
spect of milk and milkproducts, the criteria for fixing monetary compen­
satory amounts or the denaturing of sugar.
In eight of the investigated cases, questions concerning the validity of 
Community Law were put forward by the CBB. It is remarkable that of 
these eight cases, the ECJ held the Community Regulation to be invalid in 
only one. This happened in Case 116/76 (Granaria /), which will be anal­
ysed in subparagraph 2.3 below. This is even more remarkable since, in 
one year falling outside this project, 1988, the ECJ declared a Regulation 
invalid in two cases originating from the CBB, viz., Cases 120/86 
(Mulder) and 217/87 (Krohn and Van E s)l
In seven out of the eight cases in which validity questions were ad­
dressed to the ECJ, this court held the provision of Community Law to be 1
1 The 12 cases in which questions on the validity of Community Law were addressed to 
the ECJ are listed in Annex III to this report.
2 ECJ judgment of 28.04.1988, not yet reported (Mulder) and ECJ judgment of 




























































































valid. In those 7 cases, the CBB did not have to give a final judgment be­
cause the applicants withdrew their claims. This is a remarkable conclu­
sion as regards the follow-up.
In the Second Granaria Case, 101/78, the CBB decided on January 18, 
1980 not to provide compensation for damage, inter alia, because the 
Central Product Board For Agricultural Produce could not be held re­
sponsible for applying an invalid Regulation. In two recent cases, which 
fall outside the scope of this project, however, the CBB did order dam­
ages to be compensated by the responding authority. In Case 207/84 
{Rederij De Boer),3 e.g., the CBB decided on April 12, 1988 that the 
Product Board for Fish and Fishproducts (Produktschap voor Vis en 
Visprodukten) should compensate the damage incurred by enacting an in­
valid Decision (Besluit Maatjesharingvisserij). According to the CBB, the 
amount of damages had to be fixed between the parties. In Case 275/84 
(FRICO)4 the CBB decided on July 15, 1988 that compensation for dam­
ages should be given to the applicants. Even though the granting of 
MCA’s by the Product Board for Dairy and Dairyproducts turned out to 
be contrary to Community Law, it nonetheless had raised legitimate ex­
pectations and confidence. Parties were themselves ordered to agree 
amongst each other on the amount of the damages, according to the crite­
ria given by the CBB.
In Case 327/82 (EKRO), the CBB requested a preliminary ruling on 
the interpretation of Regulation 2787/81. The CBB did not deliver a final 
judgment in this Case. We were informed that EKRO’s claim for an ex­
port refund was dropped because the responding body, the Product Board 
for Meat and Cattle (Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees) decided itself to 
pay EKRO the disputed export refunds after the preliminary ruling, 
without awaiting the outcome of the proceedings before the CBB.
Generally speaking, it took the CBB approximately one year to give 
judgement once the preliminary rulings had been handed down by the 
ECJ. It is submitted however, that the length of time it takes to provide 
the final decision is tending to become longer. For example, in more re­
cent cases like 207/84 (Rederij De Boer)5 6and 275/84 (FRICO),5 which 
fall outside the scope of this project, it took the CBB some 30 months to 
deliver the final judgment. One explanation for this may be found in the 
increasing workload of the CBB after 1985, caused, inter alia, by approx­




5 Supra note 3.




























































































2.3 Two illustrative (or pathological) cases
As there are no real exceptional cases among the references initiated 
by the CBB, we decided to discuss two cases in which something 
“peculiar” occurred. These cases can also be considered as illustrative for 
the referring practice under Article 177 by the CBB.
1. Joined Cases 51-54/71 and 21-24/72 (International Fruit Company et 
al.) concern safeguard measures enacted by the EC for certain apples 
originating from third countries. They are implemented in the 
Netherlands by the Productboard for Lettuce and Fruit (Produktschap 
voor Groente en Fruit), against which the applicants lodged several ap­
peals.
Thus, proceedings were brought before the CBB against the national 
measures. In addition, the companies brought direct appeals under Article 
173 EEC against the Commission of the EC, before the ECJ in Cases 41- 
44/70. In the former Cases, the applicants argued in particular that the 
national measures were invalid because they were based on invalid 
Community Regulations of the EC Commission. The CBB decided to re­
fer several preliminary questions as to the validity of the said Regulations 
in the light of Article 30 EEC, by orders of July 30, 1971 (Cases 51- 
54/71).
In its judgment of December 15, 1971 the ECJ upheld the 
Regulations. It considered, inter alia, that Member States are free to or­
ganize the proceedings regarding the execution of Community Law. Back 
before the CBB, this court decided to refer another set of preliminary 
questions to the ECJ by orders of May 5, 1972 (Cases 21-24/72). This 
time, the validity of the Regulations was questioned in relation with pro­
visions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT. In a 
judgment of December 12, 1972, however, the ECJ held the Regulations 
to be valid in this respect as well. As a consequence of these ECJ rulings, 
the complaining companies withdrew their appeals before the CBB. The 
latter court, therefore, never had to give its final judgment. The Article 
173 Cases (41-44/70) against the Commission were rejected by the ECJ as 
well.7
2. In Case 116/76 (Granaria /), the applicant in the main action applied to 
the Central Board for Agricultural Produce for a protein certificate 
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Regulation 563/76. This would fa­
cilitate the free circulation in the Community of a consignment of maize 
gluten feedmeal pellets originating from North America. Replying to this 





























































































possible to issue such a certificate without a security being provided for 
first. Granaria instituted proceedings for the annulment of this decision 
on the ground that it was based on Regulation 563/76, which, they argued, 
was void because it conflicted with various provisions and principles of 
Community Law. The CBB stayed the proceedings and asked the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling on 7 questions and 7 sub-questions. In its order for 
reference of December 7, 1976, the CBB specified that it questioned the 
validity of Regulation 563/76 because of its possible incompatibility with 
the following; Article 190 EEC, the objectives of the common agricul­
tural policy as defined in Article 39 EEC, Articles 3(f) and 85-86 and 
40(3) EEC and with Article 1 of the Decision of the EC Council of April 
21, 1970. As a matter of fact several German Courts had requested pre­
liminary rulings on the validity of Regulation 563/76 just before the CBB, 
in Cases 114/76 (Bela-Miihle) and joined Cases 119 and 120/76 (Ohlmiihle 
Hamburg and Kurt Becher). On July 5, 1977, the ECJ answered the pre­
liminary questions of the German Courts8 and the CBB; it held Regulation 
to be null and void as it violated Articles 39 and 40(3) EEC.
In its original appeals against the decisions of the Central Product 
Board for Agricultural Produce in Case 116/76, Granaria had requested 
the CBB to annul them because Regulation 563/76 was invalid, thus leav­
ing it for the CBB to determine the consequences of this annulment. 
Following the ECJ’s judgment in Case 116/76, the parties filed further 
submissions on September 8, 1977. They requested the CBB to annul the 
decisions and to order the Central Board to make good the damage which 
they had suffered, together with the costs and disbursements of the action. 
Since the CBB considered that the action raised further questions on the 
interpretation of Community Law, it decided to suspend proceedings 
again and refer 9 preliminary questions to the ECJ. These concerned the 
effect in time of the invalidity and, the interpretation of Article 215 
(second paragraph) EEC. This reference was registered at the ECJ as 
Case 101/78 (Granaria II).
On February 13, 1979 the ECJ gave its mling; the declaration of in­
validity under Article 177 has an effect ex nunc. Furthermore, it held that 
the question of compensation by the national agency for damage caused to 
private parties, must be determined in accordance with the national law of 
the Member State concerned. The CBB gave its final judgment in the 
Granaria Cases on January 18, 1980. It annulled the decisions of the 
Central Product Board and ordered the latter to pay the applicant’s legal 
charges. Concerning the compensation for damages incurred by Granaria, 
these were rejected by the CBB. It argued that the Central Product Board 
could not be held responsible for applying the invalid Regulation. At the




























































































time concerned it took the necessary decisions and could not be held re­
sponsible for matters beyond its influence. After the preliminary rulings 
by the ECJ, several German companies attempted to order the 
Commission and Council of the EC to compensate the damages, but failed 
also. Their actions under Articles 178 juncto 215 EEC were dismissed by 
the ECJ which did not hold the EC liable. (Cases 83 and 94/76 and 4, 15 
and 40/77).9
The conjunctions between the procedures of Articles 177 and 173 
which emerged from the International Fruit Company Cases, demonstrate 
the double judicial protection available under Community Law. That is, 
via the national courts, if need be in combination with a preliminary ref­
erence and/or via a direct appeal to the ECJ. It can be expected that the 
application of both “remedies” in one case will occur more frequently in 
the future.
In the area of customs law, this may, e.g., be caused by the introduc­
tion some years ago, of a kind of “administrative preliminary procedure” 
in EEC Regulations 1430/79, 1697/79 and 918/83. Under this procedure, 
the national tax authorities are compelled to ask the EC Commission for 
its decision, before taking a position themselves. The ECJ has judged sev­
eral times already that importers are directly and individually concerned 
by these decisions, given by the Commission at the request of (and ad­
dressed to) the authorities of the Member States. Actions for annulment, 
instituted against the Commission by the importers concerned will, there­
fore, in general be held admissable under Article 173. Of course, action 
instituted under national law against the decision eventually taken by the 
administration remains possible as well. The national court may, before 
deciding the case, request a preliminary ruling on the validity of the 
Commission Decision under Article 177.
As for the relationship between the preliminary procedure and the 
action for damages (Article 178 juncto 215, second paragraph), which 
arose in the “German” cases mentioned above, it may be interesting to 
take note of a recent Case of the CBB in which more or less the reverse 
happened.
In De Boer v Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries of February 3, 
1987 the CBB had to settle a dispute on the restriction of exports of steel 
pipes and tubes to the United States of America. In this case the CBB did 
not ask for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the relevant secondary 
Community Law (Regulations 60/85 and 61/85), even though the appli­
cant requested it.
The decision not to refer may be explained by the fact that De Boer 
had also instituted proceedings according to Articles 178 juncto 215 EEC.




























































































The validity of the Regulations could, therefore, be examined by the ECJ 
in the framework of the direct action under Article 215 EEC making a 
preliminary reference not strictly necessary in that case. In case 81/86, 
the ECJ rejected the appeal for damages by De Boer, inter alia, because 
the system of export licences provided for in the two Regulations was not 
shown to be illegal.10
3. Tariffcommission (T a r i e f c o m m i s s i e )
Mr. F.H.M. POSSEN
3.1 Jurisdiction and composition
The jurisdiction with regard to customs, excise duties and several 
other comparable levies, which are considered to be “special” taxes under 
Dutch law, belongs to the Tariffcommission. The present organization of 
the Tariffcommission, the court deciding these cases in the first and last 
instance, is dealt with by the T ariffcom m ission’s Act 
(Tariefcommissiewet,1971). This Act regulates its composition and pro­
vides, inter alia, for professional judges as well as lay members with a 
specific expertise in, for instance, customs law or accountancy, to sit in 
the court. The Tariffcommission is supported by a Secretary and a legal 
and administrative staff. Its actual jurisdiction is laid down in Articles 108 
and 109 of the General Act on Customs and Excises (Algemene Wet in- 
zake de douane en de accijnzen, 1961). Before appealing to the 
Tariffcommission, the appellant first has to make an objection against the 
litigious decision by the Inspector of Customs and Excises (Inspecteur 
lnvoerrechten en Accijnzen). Upon this notice of objection, an appeal can 
be lodged with the Tariffcommission. As the General Act on Customs and 
Excises does not contain any specific ground for appeal, any ground can 
be brought forward by the appellant against the assessment by the 
Inspector of Customs and Excises.
3.2 Application of Article 177
The Tariffcommission addressed preliminary questions to the ECJ in 
16 cases, resulting in 13 judgments of the ECJ, i.e., 8.5% of the cases 
considered in this report.
From the statistical data aggregated by the Florence Steering Group, 
it can be inferred that no active role was played by the parties before the 
Tariffcommission, in initiating the references. The court referred of its 
own motion in 12 cases, i.e., 75%. For the remaining 4 cases no informa­




























































































tion was available. The number of references made by the 
Tariffcommission out of its own motion is by far the highest of all courts 
(administrative and ordinary alike) considered in this report.
As mentioned in subparagraph 2.2 of this Chapter, two of the prelim­
inary rulings were concerned with the validity of secondary Community 
Law; Cases 38/75 (Douaneagent N.S.) and 185/83 (In terfaculta ir  
Instituât). In the latter Case, however, it was clearly not the intention of 
the Tariffcommission to submit “validiy-questions”. In fact, the ECJ han­
dled the preliminary request as a “validity” question even though the 
Tariffcommission had formulated a question on the interpretation.
The Tariffcommission gave a formal judgment taking into account the 
preliminary ruling, in 12 cases (75%). For the remaining 4 cases, viz., 
26/62 (Van Gend & Loos) and 28-30/62 (Da Costa en Schaake), no in­
formation is available as to the resolution of the case. From the 12 cases 
in which the Tariffcommission delivered a final judgment, 10 are consid­
ered to be in strict conformity with the ECJ’s ruling. Two cases needed a 
further interpretation before the dispute could be decided. Furthermore, 
the Tariffcommission explicitly mentioned the helpfulness of the prelimi­
nary ruling in all 12 cases in which it gave a final judgment. This re­
markable “score” of 100% is even higher than the one found for the 
Supreme Court (92.7%) in Chapter III, paragraph 5.
The area of customs law has been almost completely harmonized by 
EC legislation, leaving only the administration and enforcement in the 
hands of the Member States. Therefore, it goes without saying that the 
Tariffcommission always has to decide whether to apply the procedure of 
Article 177 or to abstain from using it because of an acte clair or éclairé. 
As excise duties have not been harmonized at EC level, they are primarily 
judged by the Tariffcommission in the light of Article 95 EEC.
In custom matters, the Tariffcommission often has to decide about the 
classification of goods under the Nomenclature of the Common Customs 
Tariff (CCT). As a court against whose decision there is no judicial rem­
edy in the meaning of Article 177, paragraph three, the Tariffcommission 
is under an obligation to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ, when­
ever this is necessary to enable it to give judgment. Many of the classifi­
cation problems brought before it, however, concern factual problems or 
problems of evidence only. For this reason, the Tariffcommission distin­
guishes between cases concerning principle matters and cases which are of 
a more procedural and technical nature. Generally speaking, preliminary 
questions are only referred to the ECJ in the former type of cases, leaving 




























































































3.3 Two illustrative cases
1. Case 160/80 (Smuling-De Leeuw) concerned the classification of a 
bacterium called “Xanthomonas campestris”, which is naturally found on 
cabbage leaves where it forms a slimy thickener called “Xanthan gum”. In 
the chemical industry, this process has been imitated in such a way that 
the product is produced in economically profitable quantities for the tex­
tile, food and pharmaceutical industries. The appellant argued that the 
product, still being obtained through a natural/biological process, should 
be classified under heading 13.03 C-III “lacs, resins and other vegetable 
saps and extracts”, for which no customs duties are due. The Inspector of 
Customs and Excises, however, found the product to be a polymer pro­
duced in the chemical industry as meant in heading 39.06 of the CCT, for 
which a 16% customs duty had to be charged. After the objection had 
been rejected by the Inspector, the dispute was brought before the 
Tariffcommission. In a well reasoned judgment of June 27, 1980 this 
court found that a preliminary interpretation was required.
The ECJ subscribed the position taken by the tax authorities and clas­
sified “Xhantan gum” under heading 39.06. This judgment was directly 
applied by the Tariffcommission in its final judgment of February 1, 
1982. In similar disputes over the same product which have subsequently 
arisen, the Tariffcommission considered the matter to be an acte éclairé.
2. In Case 28/77 (ENKA), the action before the Tariffcommission con­
cerned the method to be used for the calculation of the value for customs 
purposes, of goods which are declared for import ex a customs ware­
house. Steel cord used in the manufacture of tyres was stored in a customs 
warehouse under the control of ENKA, pending their sale and delivery to 
Ireland. In assessing the value of these goods the Inspector for Customs 
and Excises relied on the Customs Order (Tariefbesluit) adapted in the 
light of EEC Directive 69/74 (on the harmonization of customs ware­
house procedures). ENKA contested this assessment and argued, inter 
alia, that Article 10(2)(b) of the Directive had been transformed into 
Dutch law incorrectly.
On November 11, 1976 the Tariffcommission requested a prelimi­
nary ruling on the interpretation of Article 10(2)(b) and on the question 
whether this Article could be relied upon in proceedings before a 
Member State court. In its judgment of November 23, 1977 the ECJ held, 
inter alia, that parties may rely on this Article for the purpose of verify­
ing whether the national measures adopted for its implementation are in 
accordance with it. In addition the national court must give it precedence 
over any national measure which may prove incompatible with its terms. 
Furthermore, it appeared from the interpretation given by the ECJ that 




























































































In its final judgment of January 30, 1978 the Tariffcommission fol­
lowed completely the ECJ’s ruling. It held that the Customs Order was in­
compatible with Article 10(2)(b) of the Directive and that the Inspector of 
Customs and Excises had, consequently, incorrectly assessed the customs 
duties. He should not have included certain costs for the storage of the 
steel cords in the customs warehouse in the value for customs purposes. 
Shortly afterwards, the Customs Order was amended by the legislator 
taking into account the ECJ’s ruling.
3.4 A pathological case
Case 72/77 (Universiteit Utrecht) concerned a request for the exemp­
tion from import duties of scientific apparatus. EEC Regulations 1798/75 
and 3195/75 allow certain educational, scientific and cultural materials to 
be imported from third countries free of CCT duties. As importing com­
panies apply for exemptions under these provisions frequently, it is cru­
cial for the Tariffcommission to distinguish between cases concerning 
principal questions and, the more technical and procedural cases. Case 
72/77, being the first case in which an interpretation of the term 
“scientific apparatus” was requested, clearly belongs to the first category.
The application for exemption of an ultraviolet spectrophotometer 
made by the University’s heart surgery department on behalf of its bio­
chemical laboratory, was rejected by the Inspector of Customs and 
Excises on the ground that such apparatus can, next to research, be used 
for general purposes as well, thereby losing its specific scientific charac­
ter. The request for a preliminary ruling was made on May 2, 1977 and 
was answered on February 2, 1978 by the ECJ. The ECJ held, inter alia, 
that the term “scientific apparatus” means equipment which has objective 
characteristics making it particularly appropriate for scientific research.
The application of this criterion to the case before it, caused some 
difficulty for the Tariffcommission and forced it to further interpret the 
ECJ’s ruling, in particular with regard to the requirement of “objective 
characteristics”. After giving the matter thorough consideration, the 
Tariffcommission ordered the appellant to give evidence of the equipment 
having such characteristics. Due to the fact that neither the appellant nor 
his representative were present at the hearing, this evidence was not pro­
duced and the request for exemption was rejected in the Tariff- 
commission’s final judgment of March 13, 1978.
The final judgment in Universiteit Utrecht is not completely satisfy­
ing. It is submitted that, by deciding that the onus of proof for the appara­
tus being considered as scientific rests with the appellant, the 
Tariffcommission introduced too subjective a criterion. Thus it ignored 
the ECJ’s interpretation, according to which the “objective characteris­




























































































not manage to furnish this proof, the preliminary ruling turned out to be 
of no relevance to the outcome of the case. The clear wish of the ECJ for 
an objective examination of the equipment was thus frustrated by national 
rules of procedure and evidence.
4. Courts of Appeal (G e r e c h ts h o v e n ) and Supreme Court 
(H o g e  R a a d )  in taxation matters
M r. F .H .M . POSSEN
4.1 Jurisdiction and composition
Specific tasks have been attributed to the Courts of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court in the sphere of taxation, under the Act on the 
Administrative Jurisdiction in Taxation Matters (Wet Administratieve 
Rechtspraak Belastingzaken, 1956). Under this Act, the five Courts of 
Appeal administer justice at first instance in taxation matters, except cus­
toms and excise duties. Appeal for cassation against these judgments lies 
with the Supreme Court.
The hearings before these taxation courts are in general not open to 
the public. Prior to a case being brought before the Courts of Appeal, an 
objection to the tax assessment has to be made to the tax authorities within 
two months. Within a period of another two months, an appeal can be 
lodged with the Courts of Appeal against the decision on the objection. As 
the Act does not contain any specific grounds for appeal, any ground can 
be brought forward by the appellant against the assessment by the tax au­
thorities. In accordance with the relevant Articles in the Act on 
Administrative Jurisdiction in Taxation Matters, (Article 25) the Supreme 
Court can quash judgments of the Courts of Appeal at the request of the 
parties in the dispute or ex officio on one of the grounds for cassation 
listed in Article 99 of the Act on the Organization of the Judiciary. For 
this and other reasons, like the fact that no legal counsel is required, the 
rules governing the cassation procedure in taxation matters are less strict 
than those applicable to proceedings in civil and criminal cases. As men­
tioned in Chapter III, paragraph 5, this difference may open the way to a 
more extensive use of the 177 procedure by the Supreme Court whenever 
it deals with taxation matters.
After quashing, the Supreme Court can either take a new decision on 
the principal matters, or, if a closer examination of the facts is necessary, 
refer the case back to the Court whose judgment was quashed or, even to 
another Court of Appeal. If it only concerns facts of marginal impor­
tance, the Supreme Court, instead of making such a reference, usually 




























































































4.2 Application of Article 177
The Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court requested a preliminary 
ruling in 14 cases, resulting in 13 judgments of the ECJ, i.e., approxi­
mately 8% of the total number of preliminary rulings given at the request 
of Dutch courts. The Courts of Appeal requested 4 preliminary rulings 
and the Supreme Court 10. The ECJ joined Cases 181 (Van Paassen) and 
229/78 (Denkavit Dienstbetoon).
All taxes with the exception of customs and excises can be brought be­
fore the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Most preliminary re­
quests by Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court, were made in cases 
concerning turnover tax (VAT). In the period considered in this report, 9 
out of 13 cases were concerned with VAT. In fact, only in some of the 
old cases, were other problems of taxation law referred to the ECJ; see 
Cases 32/67 (Van Leeuwen), 23/68 (Klomp) and 7/74 (Broverius van 
Nidek).
As for the jurisdiction in VAT matters, it should be noted that a 
change has taken place during the period of this research. Until the first 
of January 1976, when this jurisdiction was transferred to the Courts of 
Appeal and Supreme Court, the VAT came under the jurisdiction of the 
Tariffcommission. Interesting illustrations for this tranfer can be found in 
Cases 51/76 (VNO), 126/78 (N.S) and 181/78 (Van Paassen), in which 
preliminary questions were referred to the ECJ by the Supreme Court. 
These cases were brought before the Supreme Court on appeal (for cassa­
tion) from the Tariffcommission. Such proceedings were possible under 
transitional law for a limited period of time orlly. Every taxation case in 
which the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court requested preliminary 
rulings, ended in a formal judgment. All but one judgment were consid­
ered to be in strict conformity with the ECJ’s ruling.
In Chapter III, subparagraph 5.2 it was concluded that the performances 
of the First and Second Chambers of the Supreme Court under Article 
177 appear to be satisfying. The same conclusion must be drawn for the 
Taxation Chamber. No pathological cases were found. Still, the Taxation 
Chamber has been criticized for its application of Article 177 several 
times, in particular for not making a reference. In various judgments, the 
Court considered the matter of Community Law to be an acte clair or 
éclairé, even though a different approach was justifiable, or the require­
ments set by the ECJ in CILFIT were not completely met. The criticism 




























































































declined to make a reference despite the opinion of its Advocate-General 
that it was necessary.11
4.3 Two illustrative cases
1. Case 15/81 (Schul I) concerns some fundamental aspects of VAT with 
regard to the importation of a second-hand pleasure boat from another 
Member State by a private person. The person concerned had bought the 
boat, for which VAT had been paid in the past in France, from another 
private person in France. At the importation in the Netherlands, however, 
the Dutch tax authorities charged VAT again. Schul lodged an objec­
tion with the Inspector against the turnover tax on importation, claiming 
that the boat had already been subject to VAT within the Community, 
namely France and that there had been no remission of tax on exporta­
tion. The Inspector, however, dismissed the objection on the ground that 
the levy was made pursuant to the provisions of the Netherlands law on 
VAT. Against this decision, Schul lodged an appeal before the Court of 
Appeal in Den Bosch. His main contention being that the taxation is con­
trary to Article 13 and, as the case may be, Article 12 EEC. He also ob­
served that Article 95 may be relevant to the case.
After the Court of Appeal had referred several questions to the ECJ 
in a judgment of December 19, 1980, the ECJ endorsed the arguments of 
the appellant, stating that the second charge of VAT in the Netherlands is 
an additional burden, prohibited by Article 95 EEC. As a consequence of 
the ECJ’s judgment, dated May 6, 1982, the Dutch tax authorities had to 
reduce the amount of VAT with the residual part of the VAT paid in 
France and which was still supposed to rest on the pleasure boat.
2. Case 47/84 (Schul II) is a continuation of the first Schul Case. The 
State Secretary for Finance argued that the Court of Appeal had given a 
wrong interpretation of the ECJ’s ruling in its final judgment of February 
18, 1983 and lodged an appeal for cassation with the Cassation Court. On 
February 15, 1984 the Supreme Court referred further questions to the 
ECJ, asking in particular how the residual part of French VAT still rest­
ing on the boat had to be determined. As the method applied by the Court 
of Appeal in the first instance was endorsed by the ECJ’s judgment of 
May 21, 1985, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal by judgment of 
October 23, 1985. Thus, after some five years of litigation including two 
preliminary references to the ECJ, Gaston Schul had finally won his case, 
demonstrating that pleasure boats sometimes, partly due to the 177 proce­
dure, have to make unpleasantly long trips! 1
11 See, e.g., judgments of 22.12.1965, BNB 1966, 165 and of 27.9.1977, NJ 1978, 





























































































4.4 A pathological case
In Case 23/68 (Klomp), the Taxation Division of the Court of Appeal 
in the Hague requested a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
Article 11(b) of the ECSC Protocol on Priviliges and Immunities. The 
case concerns an appeal lodged by Mr. Klomp, a civil servant of the 
ECSC, against the assessment by the Tax Inspector of his insurance con­
tribution to be paid over the year 1959, under the General Act on Old 
Age Pensions (Algemene Ouderdomswet). The Tax Inspector had in­
cluded the salary paid by the ECSC in his calculation of the contribution 
to be made. Mr. Klomp argued that this was in violation of Article 11(b) 
of the ECSC Protocol on Priviliges and Immunities. The reference was 
made on September 24, 1968.
Before the ECJ two complicated problems arose. Firstly, the Court of 
Appeal did not clearly indicate the legal basis of the request. Apparently, 
it founded its reference on Article 177 EEC. However, when the facts 
giving rise to the case before the Court of Appeal actually arose (1959), 
there was no express legal foundation for a preliminary ruling. The pro­
visions relevant in 1959, were either Article 41 ECSC or Article 16 of 
the ECSC Protocol on Priviliges and Immunities. Strict application of the 
law therefore, would have resulted in the case being considered under one 
of these provisions. As Article 41 is not applicable to questions concern­
ing the interpretation of the ECSC law and, Article 16 of the Protocol 
does not provide for a preliminary procedure at the request of national 
courts, this would have left the Court of Appeal empty-handed.
In this respect, Advocate-General Gand submitted that there was no 
reason to oppose a preliminary ruling under Article 16 of the Protocol, in 
combination with Article 43 of the ECSC Treaty. Thus, the Advocate- 
General argued that, under these Articles, national courts are also entitled 
to request preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the 
Protocol. The ECJ followed the Advocate-General in this reasoning.
Before answering the question, the ECJ had to solve the second prob­
lem. By the time the question was addressed to the ECJ (1968), the ECSC 
Protocol had been repealed and Article 16 had not been re-enacted in the 
new EC Protocol on Priviliges and Immunities. For this reason, the ECSC 
Protocol could, strictly speaking, not be the legal basis of the request at 
all. On this problem of transitional law, the Advocate-General had sug­
gested that the ECJ should nonetheless accept jurisdiction on the basis of 
Article 177 EEC (150 EURATOM).
The ECJ followed the Advocate-General here as well. It held that the 
procedure provided for by Article 16 of the ECSC Protocol and the pro­
visions on preliminary rulings for interpretation of the Treaties establish­




























































































a uniform interpretation and application of the Protocol in the (then) six 
Member States. To fill the lacuna, the ECJ, in the interest of continuity of 
the legal system, based itself, inter alia, on “principles common to the le­
gal systems of the Member States, the origins of which may be traced 
back to Roman Law”. Thus, it held that it had jurisdiction to give a ruling 
ex Article 177 EEC or 150 EUR ATOM.
On the substance of the case, the ECJ held on February 25, 1969 that 
the contributions under the Act on Old Age Pensions did not come within 
the meaning of the taxes covered in Article 11(b) of the ECSC Protocol 
on Priviliges and Immunities. Consequently, ECSC-staff were not ex­
empted from paying those contributions.
In its final judgment of June 20, 1969, the Court of Appeal rejected 
the appeal made by Mr. Klomp. Afterwards, an appeal for cassation was 
submitted to the Supreme Court on a different ground than the one dis­
cussed before the ECJ. The Supreme Court, in a judgement of January 7, 
1970, further interpreted the ECJ’s ruling and, taking into account the 
judgment of the ECJ in Humblet (Case 6/60),12 rejected this appeal as 
well.
5. Civil Service Tribunals, Social Security Courts of 
First Instance and the Central Court of Appeal
Prof. Mr. W.M. LEVELT-OVERMARS
5.1 Jurisdiction and composition
5.1.1 First Instance Courts
The Civil Service Tribunals (Ambtenarengerechten) decide all dis­
putes between civil servants and their employer, arising from the ap­
pointment of the former. The Social Security Courts of First Instance 
(Raden van Beroep), decide all appeals brought before them by individu­
als, against decisions concerning social security benefits or contributions 
made by the various administrative bodies competent in this field.
There are ten (regional) Civil Service Tribunals and ten Social 
Security Courts of First Instance. They have the same territorial jurisdic­
tion and share the same President, registrar, clerks and registry and are 
residing in the same courthouse. Both courts usually sit with three judges, 
of whom only the President is a professional judge appointed for life. The 
other two members are lay-judges appointed for six years, by the Crown 
on recommendation of the unions of employers and employees (Social 





























































































The jurisdiction and the rules of procedure regarding the Civil 
Service Tribunals are laid down primarily in the Civil Servants Act 
(Ambtenarenwet, 1929). As regards the Social Security Courts, only the 
most important rules of procedure and the rules governing its composi­
tion and organization are embodied in the Appeals Act (Beroepswet, 
1955). The jurisdiction of these courts, on the other hand, is to be found 
in the various Acts (governing social security benefits) which provide the 
basis for the administrative bodies to take their decisions.
Uncomplicated cases can be dealt with by the President of the Social 
Security Courts alone. However, the parties have the right to appeal to the 
full court from judgments of the President, except in most cases concern­
ing sickness-benefit. The last sentence renders the present factual situa­
tion. The Appeals Act outlines a different procedure for most cases con­
cerning sickness benefits. This Act prescribes for cases concerning dis­
ability because of sickness that the President, sitting as a single judge, 
gives a ruling solely on the basis of expert medical opnion (Articles 131- 
152a Appeals Act). From these judgments the parties have the right to ap­
peal to the Full court only on ground which are strictly limited to incor­
rect use of procedural rules (Article 142). As will be sen in paragraph 
5.1.2, no appeal can be lodged to the Central Court of Appeal against the 
judgments of a Social Security Court, given by a Full Court, in which an 
appeal against the judgment of its President held to be inadmissable on 
good grounds. Formally speaking, the Social Security Courts are courts 
of last instance in this type of cases and thus, obliged to refer questions on 
the interpretation of Community Law to the ECJ under Article 177 EEC. 
However, no references were made by the Social Security Courts in this 
type of cases during the period of this research. The European Court of 
Human Rights stated in the Feldbrugge Case that this procedure does not 
satisfy the requirements set by Article 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.13 Following this judgment the 
association of Presidents of the Social Security Courts decided to apply 
the normal rules for an appeal to the Full Court for all cases decided by 
the President sitting as a single judge. This practice has been approved by 
the Central Court of Appeal.14
Generally speaking, an appeal may be lodged against the disputed de­
cision of an administrative body on three grounds; (1) the decision was 
taken contrary to a generally binding provision, (2) the administrative 
body manifestly used its powers for a purpose other than that for which 
the powers were vested in it; (3) the administrative body acted contrary to
13 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of May 29, 1986, Series A: Judgments 
and Decisions, Voi. 99, Feldbrugge.




























































































a principle of proper administration generally held to be equitable. Next 
to these grounds, the Civil Service Tribunals can, in disputes concerning 
disciplinary measures, hear appeals based on a breach of the principle of 
proportionality, between the disputed measure and the violation in respect 
of which, the civil servant concerned was punished. Finally, in some dis­
putes concerning social security benefits, the Social Security Courts can 
quash the contested decision on the ground that it was taken contrary to 
reasonableness.
The rules of procedure to be followed before both courts are not 
strict. However, both courts do have the right to make inquiries ex offi­
cio, whenever this is necessary to come to judgment. The courts have the 
right to confirm or annul a decision. In the case of annulment they can 
instruct the responding administrative body to enact a new decision in 
conformity with their judgment or, replace the one annulled with a deci­
sion of their own. However, the latter is not possible if the decision under 
appeal refers to matters which are within the discretion of the adminis­
trative body.
5.1.2 Central Court o f Appeal
The Central Court of Appeal serves as a court of appeal for both the 
Civil Service Tribunals and the Social Security Courts. The Central Court 
of Appeal is situated in Utrecht and consists of only professional judges, 
who are appointed for life. The court is divided into different chambers 
of three judges each. Both parties can lodge an appeal against the judg­
ments of the Civil Service Tribunals and the Social Security Courts.
As regards some judgments of the Social Security Courts, however, 
no appeal can be lodged. This holds true for most cases concerning sick­
ness benefits, referred to in the previous subparagraph, which are given 
by the President of the Social Security Court, acting as a single judge. 
Like the Social Security Courts, the rules governing the composition and 
organization of the Central Court of Appeal, as well as its rules of proce­
dure, are primarily laid down in the Appeals Act. Equally, the various 
acts concerning social security benefits provide for the jurisdiction of 
both courts. Finally, in a limited number of cases, the Third Chamber of 
the Supreme Court can hear appeals for cassation against judgments of the 
Central Court of Appeal. This concerns only questions of law regarding 
terms or notions which are common to social security as well as taxation 
law. In the period covered by this project, no preliminary references have 
been made by the Supreme Court in cases originating from the Central 
Court of Appeal. In fact, Case 43/86 (De Rijke) is the first case in which 
this occurred.15




























































































5.2 Application of Article 177
Nearly all preliminary rulings in social security cases deal with the 
interpretation of the relevant EEC Regulations on social security for mi­
grant workers. At first, these questions concerned Regulations No. 3 and 
4, which were later replaced by Regulations No. 1408/71 and 573/72. 
Regulations No. 3 and 4 originally derive from a Treaty on social secu­
rity, signed in December 1957, which was based upon Article 69 of the 
ECSC Treaty. On December 9, 1958, the EEC Council decided, on the 
basis of Article 51 EEC, to adopt the text of the Treaty on Social Security 
as EEC Regulation No. 3. Likewise, the text of a second Treaty imple­
menting the Treaty on Social Security was transformed into Regulation 
No. 4.
The origins of the two Regulations have caused many problems of 
interpretation. In the first place, it should be noted that the text of the 
provisions, being originally accepted by the parties as a Treaty, was 
meant to be interpreted primarily according to the intention of the signa­
tory States. After the transformation into a Regulation ex Article 51, 
however, the ECJ took the aim and purpose of this Article as the guiding 
principle for the interpretation of the Regulations. It took a long time be­
fore the administrative bodies and the judiciary in the Netherlands fully 
realized the consequences of the ECJ’s approach.
Secondly, problems arose in the Netherlands because the EEC 
Regulations were never introduced as such into Dutch social security law. 
These Regulations and the relevant Articles of the EEC Treaty are di­
rectly applicable in the Netherlands, putting aside the otherwise relevant 
national law. However, that turned out to be insufficient for a correct 
application of several provisions. This may, e.g., be a simple matter with 
provisions which exclude foreigners from some benefits. On the other 
hand it can be very complicated in respect of those provisions in Dutch 
law which are conflicting with the scheme envisaged in the Regulations. 
By way of example, two difficulties are described here.
The basic rule of Regulation 1408/71 holds that a person is submitted 
to the social security scheme of the State where he or she is working. 
According to the Dutch social insurance schemes, however, every resident 
is, in principle, insured. Thus, the question was raised before Dutch 
courts whether non-residents could be insured and whether residents 
could be excluded from insurance. As Community Law prevails, this is no 
longer a matter of interpretation of Dutch law alone.
The same kind of problem rose with regard to the divergence be­
tween the Dutch disability and widow pension schemes on the one hand 
and, the scheme of the EEC Regulations on the other. Under Dutch law, 




























































































spective of the period of his affiliation. Conversely, an individual receives 
no benefit whatsoever, if the contingency occurs after the insurance has 
ended. This scheme conflicts with the EEC Social Security Regulations, 
which provide for benefits being built up during the period of affiliation. 
Consequently, it produces differences in benefits according to the time of 
affiliation. Moreover, it is not strictly necessary that the person concerned 
is insured at the moment the contingency occurs. In subparagraph 5.3 
some of the problems mentioned here confronting the Central Court of 
Appeal, are discussed on the basis of two illustrative cases.
5.2.1 First Instance Courts
The Civil Service Tribunals have, up to now, never requested a pre­
liminary ruling from the ECJ. This is not surprising, given their juris­
diction and the fact that they are first instance courts. In fact, practically 
the only ground for reference imaginable, would be Article 119 EEC and 
the Directives concerning equal treatment of men and women. The 
Central Court of Appeal, though, serving as a court of appeal for several 
Civil Service Tribunals, has referred a number of preliminary questions 
regarding equal treatment, in Case 23/83 (Liefting).
The Social Security Courts, taking into account their jurisdiction, 
seem to have ample opportunity to refer questions to the ECJ, in particu­
lar with regard to cases concerning the implementation of EEC 
Regulations on social security. However, it is only in recent years that 
these courts have found their way to Luxembourg. In 1976, the first pre­
liminary ruling ever was asked for by the Court in Amsterdam (Case 
109/76, Blottner). The total number of cases to be considered for this 
project amounts to seven, i.e., 4.6% of all preliminary rulings considered 
in this report. A possible explanation for the rather late start and this 
relatively low number are discussed in the next subparagraph, concerning 
the application of Article 177 by the Central Court of Appeal.
The statistical information aggregated by the Florence steering group 
indicates that the First Instance Social Security Courts referred prelimi­
nary rulings to the ECJ of their own motion, in 4 cases. As was men­
tioned earlier in this Chapter, the responding party suggested that a refer­
ence be made in one case. Surprisingly, the first party (applicant), never 
initiated a reference according to the statistical information. This is 
clearly a deviation from the normal pattern in administrative cases.
The statistics further show that the Social Security Courts gave a final 
judgment in six out of the seven cases in which preliminary questions 
were put to the ECJ. In one case, 104/84 (Kromhout), the outcome is un­
known. Five of the judgments were considered to be delivered in strict 
conformity with the ECJ’s ruling. In one case, the referring court had to 




























































































cases (about 50%), the referring courts indicated that the preliminary 
ruling was helpful.
5.2.2 Central Court o f Appeal
The ECJ has given 25 judgments at the request of the Central Court 
of Appeal, i.e., approximately 15% of the preliminary rulings considered 
in this report. The court asked for a preliminary ruling as early as 1963, 
thereby giving the ECJ an early opportunity to direct the Member-States 
in the interpretation of Articles 48-51 EEC and of EEC Regulations No. 3 
and 4 (respectively 1408/71 and 572/72) concerning the social security of 
migrant workers. In the previous subparagraph, the discrepancy between 
the number of preliminary rulings asked by the lower courts and the 
Central Court was mentioned. Two explanations bearing upon the type of 
procedure can be given for this.
Firstly, the Social Security Courts of First instance have a huge case­
load. For reasons of economy and time, therefore, most cases are decided 
by way of a so-called oral judgment. In these cases, the decision is taken 
in chambers, on the day of the public session and is recorded in the min­
utes of the session. Then, after a week, a judgment in writing, containing 
only the grounds for this decision is sent to the parties. Written judg­
ments, which are more fully argued, are given relatively seldom by the 
Social Security Courts. As the brevity of the oral judgments paves the 
way for a factual rather than a legal argumentation, the administrative 
bodies tend to keep in store their full legal arguments, for the appeal pro­
cedure before the Central Court of Appeal, rather than raising them in 
the first instance. This attitude is likely to have an impact on the number 
of preliminary rulings requested by the lower courts.
Secondly, it is to be noted that, in the first years of the introduction of 
the EEC Regulations on social security for migrant workers, their context 
and meaning could hardly be called public property. In fact, hardly any 
literature was available on the subject and the knowledge about it was 
largely kept in the seclusion of the administrative bodies designated to pay 
out the benefits. As the knowledge increased, legal counsels of the 
claimants, as well as the Presidents of the Social Security Courts of First 
Instance, started to question more closely the (non-)application of the 
Regulations. Consequently, the Social Security Courts felt the need to ask 
for preliminary rulings. This process is still continuing and one can even 
say that in recent years, instead of the Central Court of Appeal, it is some 
of the Social Security Courts which are predominant in the scrutinous 
implementation of the EEC Regulations and Directives in the field of so­
cial security. This is in particular so for those concerning the equal treat­




























































































Actually, the fact that most preliminary rulings in the field of social 
security were requested by a last instance court, concurs the overall pic­
ture which appears from the statistical data for all Dutch administrative 
courts. In fact, administrative courts of last instance account for the 
greater part of references under Article 177. Besides the fact that most 
administrative courts in the Netherlands administer justice in the first as 
well as in the last instance, this may, as far as social security is concerned, 
also be explained by the two factors mentioned above.
Furthermore, it appears from the statistics that both parties in the 
proceedings before the Central Court of Appeal initiated 6 references,
i.e., 25%. The court itself took the initiative in another 6 cases. As we 
concluded earlier, this is a deviation from the normal pattern found for 
the administrative courts.
The Central Court of Appeal gave a formal judgment in 24 of the 
preliminary cases considered. In only one case did the parties settle the 
dispute after the ECJ handed down the preliminary ruling. Twenty of 
these judgments were considered to be delivered in strict conformity with 
the ECJ’s ruling. In four cases, the referring court further interpreted the 
ruling before giving its final judgment. In one Case, 51/73 (Smieja), the 
final judgment is regarded as an evasive application of the ECJ’s prelimi­
nary ruling. This case is the only one case considered in this report which 
has been qualified as such. It is further discussed in the next subpara­
graph. Finally, the Central Court of Appeal indicated the usefulness of the 
preliminary rulings in 13 cases, i.e., approximately 50% of all cases in 
which questions were referred. In the remaining cases, there was no ex­
plicit comment as to the question of helpfulness.
5.3 Two illustrative (or pathological) preliminary cases from 
the Central Court of Appeal
1. Case 100/63 (Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen), illustrates the difficulties 
which arise when the referring court is under a serious misapprehension 
about the interpretation of an EEC Regulation. The case concerns the set­
tlement of widow pensions for persons who have acquired insurance peri­
ods in the Netherlands and in Germany.
A pension was granted to several widows under the Netherlands 
General Widows’and Orphans’Act (Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet). 
The amount of the pension, however, was below the normal amount since 
the widows also benefitted from a widow’s pension under the German 
Life Annuity Insurance Scheme. The competent Netherlands administra­
tive body considered that, under Article 28 of Regulation No. 3, it was 
compelled to so calculate the pensions (pro rata), resulting in a lower 
pension for the widows concerned. As a matter of fact, the combined 




























































































than the amount which would have been due under the Dutch Scheme 
alone. Mrs. Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen and 9 other widows disputed the 
application of Article 28 to their case.
Their applications being rejected by the Social Security Courts, the 
women appealed to the Central Court of Appeal. The latter court decided 
to request a preliminary ruling to the ECJ on November 30, 1963. Out of 
the procedure that followed, it appears in the first place, that the Central 
Court was not fully conversant with the rules governing the preliminary 
procedure as such. The questions had been phrased in a way as to obtain, 
inter alia, an interpretation of Dutch Law. In its reply of July 7, 1964 the 
ECJ noted that it is not entitled, under Article 177 EEC, to apply 
Community Law to a particular case before it or, to judge on the propri­
ety of a measure of domestic character. The ECJ then answered the ques­
tions put before it, without rephrasing them first. The criticism of the 
ECJ as to the phrasing of the questions did not affect the answers given.
After having decided that the General Widows’and Orphans’s Act 
came within the scope of Regulation No. 4, the ECJ went on to give an 
interpretation of Articles 27 and 28 of the said Regulation. Contrary to 
the views expressed by the responding administrative body and the 
Commission of the EEC, which stated that Article 28 (containing the pro 
rata calculation of the benefits) was made with the intention of sharing the 
financial burden of the pensions and was in accordance with one of the 
objectives of Regulation No. 3 which is to prevent the joint application of 
different laws to the same periods and the resultant cumulative payment 
of benefits, the ECJ did not consider the original intentions lying behind 
the Social Security Treaty. Instead, it interpreted Regulation No. 3 en­
tirely within the framework of Articles 48-51 EEC, which are aimed at 
securing freedom of movement. It held that Article 28 {pro rata calcula­
tion) is only applicable in cases provided for by Article 27, that is when 
there is a question of the acquisition, maintenance or recovery of the right 
to benefit. By restricting the interpretation of Regulation No. 3 in this 
way, the ECJ deprived the Regulation of one of the original intentions of 
the Social Security Treaty, i.e., next to the aggregation of insurance peri­
ods for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit, the 
prevention of double insurance and so-called unjustified cumulation of 
benefits.
A close study of the final judgments in each of the ten cases, discloses 
that the Central Court of Appeal did not expect the ruling given by the 
ECJ. The fact of the matter is that the ten widows did not find themselves 
in the same circumstances at all. Some of them could claim a Dutch pen­
sion as well a German pension without having to rely upon Article 28, 
while at least one of them did not need Regulation No. 3 to effect her 




























































































of Appeal did not distinguish between these positions leads one to suppose 
that the ruling of the ECJ was not expected. Moreover, as it appears that 
the Central Court of Appeal by its implementation of the ECJ’s ruling, 
applied Article 28 in the last case mentioned, one can doubt whether it 
fully understood the extent and scope of the preliminary ruling.16 17The 
wording of the preliminary ruling was perhaps ambiguous and would 
have justified a second request for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, later 
judgments by the ECJ, given at the request of a French and a Belgian 
court (Cases 1/67, Ciechielski and 12/67 Guissart11) made it abundantly 
clear that Article 28 should be considered from the national viewpoint 
alone, so as to exclude the application of it to all widows concerned.
As a result of the ECJ’s judgment in Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen, a na­
tional anti-cumulation measure was enacted in the W idows’and 
Orphans’Act (Article 30a). In the disability insurance scheme which en­
tered into force in 1967, a corresponding provision was included right 
from the beginning (Article 52 of the Disablement Insurance Act, Wet op 
de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering). On the basis of these new provi­
sions, the insured person could receive more or less than he or she would 
have received under the Dutch pension scheme alone. The wording of 
these provisions covers all persons which enjoy foreign pensions of a 
certain type. It is the responsibility of the competent administrative bodies 
to discern whether the application of the Royal Decree is compatible with 
the EC Regulation in a given case. As the full extent of the ECJ’s ruling 
became clear, the administrative bodies decided to apply the national anti­
cumulation measures to all cases in which the pro-rata calculation was no 
longer allowed. This practice was abandoned again when Regulations No. 
3 and 4 were replaced by Regulations No. 1408/71 and 573/72. Articles 
37-51 of Regulation 1408/71 provide for a comprehensive regulation of 
the determination of disablement- and widows-pensions for migrant 
workers who have completed insurance periods in more than one Member 
State.
These new rules and Article 46(3) in particular, however, have given 
rise to the same kind of problems as Article 28 of Regulation No. 3 had 
done in the past. Article 46(3) limits the total amount of benefits payable 
in the Member States to the highest theoretical amount, i.e., the amount 
which would have been due in each State if the migrant worker had ac­
quired all his insurance periods in that State. Considering the differences 
which exist between the pension schemes of the various Member States, it
16 Compare two of the judgments which were delivered by the Central Court of Appeal, 
taking into account the ECJ’s ruling in Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen (both final judgments 
were delivered on October 7, 1964); Case AWW 1963/4, RSV, 1964, 169 with Case 
AWW 1963/9, RSV  1964, 187.




























































































is possible that a migrant worker claims benefits to a higher total amount 
on the basis of national laws alone in the States in which he has been em­
ployed, than he could on the basis of Article 46(3). In the Petroni Case,18 
the ECJ upheld the essence of its Van Der Veen judgment, stating that 
Article 46(3) is incompatible with Article 51 EEC is so far as it limits 
calculation of benefits acquired in two different Member States, by reduc­
ing the amount acquired under the legislation of one Member State alone.
Consequently, the national authorities decided that the national anti­
cumulation measures should be used again in cases in which Article 46(3) 
could no longer be applied. From certain Belgian cases,19 it was already 
clear that the employment of national anti-cumulation measures was re­
stricted by Article 46 of Regulation 1408/71 in such a way as to guarantee 
the migrant worker at least the amount due under that Article. The 
wording of the preliminary ruling and the text of the said Article or parts 
of it were not applicable at all. It was held that in those cases the national 
rules should be applied without restrictions.
Looking backward one is inclined to say that the intention of the court 
to compel the national authorities of making in each case two calculations, 
one according to the national law and according to the EC Regulation, to 
be able te determine the highest amount which should be awarded, was 
clear enough. The fact is that there have been at least 15-20 preliminary 
rulings concerning the exact scope and meaning of Article 46 of 
Regulation 1408/71. For the Netherlands, 4 cases can be mentioned: Cases 
98/77 and 176/78 (Schaap I and II), Case 105/77 (Boerboom-Kersjes) and 
Case 238/81 (Van Der Bunt-Craig). In all four cases, the ECJ spelled out 
the rule that the migrant worker has a right to the application of those 
Articles which would result in the calculation most favourable to him. 
One is inclined to expect that after the Boerboom-Kersjes Case of 1978, 
the interpretation of the relevant rules would be clear to the Dutch admin­
istrative bodies responsible for paying out the pensions. The Van Der 
Bunt-Craig case, however, gives reason to doubt this as the Central Court 
of Appeal had to overrule the application of the Dutch anti-cumulation 
rules by the administrative body concerned, as late as January 1983 (!), 
the system of Article 46 of Regulation 1408/71 being more favourable to 
the widow in question.
2. A different solution to the problems caused by a preliminary judg­
ment of the ECJ can be found in the follow-up of the Case 51/73 (Smieja) 
concerning the Dutch old-age pensions scheme.
In January 1957 the General Old Age Pensions Act (A lgem ene  
Ouderdomswet) entered into force, introducing an old age pension cover­
18 Case 24/75 (Petroni), (1975)ECR 1149.




























































































ing all residents. This Act contains transitional provisions whereby any­
one who had attained the age of 15 years but not 65 years on the first of 
January 1957 shall be deemed to have been insured for the period be­
tween the date on which he completed his fifteenth year and the first of 
January 1957, provided he has been resident in the Netherlands for the six 
years immediately following the completion of his fifty-ninth year. 
Article 44 of the Act adds that only persons of Dutch nationality, who are 
habitually resident in the Netherlands may be accorded these transitory 
benefits. The requirements listed in Article 44, however, may be waived 
by an administrative order.
Mrs Smieja, a German national and resident in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, was granted an old age pension amounting to 45.6% of the 
pension normally available. She appealed against this decision before the 
Social Security Court of First Instance and argued that it was contrary to 
Community Law. In the course of these proceedings, the administrative 
body concerned altered its position and suggested that the court award a 
pension of 88% instead. The Social Security Court rejected this proposi­
tion and upheld the original decision, as it considered it to be in confor­
mity with the relevant provisions of Dutch law.
The administrative body concerned, however, was not satisfied with 
the Social Security Court’s interpretation. Consequently, it appealed to the 
Central Court of Appeal and argued that these requirements are contrary 
to Article 10(1) of both Regulations No. 3 and 1408/71. They provide, in 
sum, that benefits acquired under the legislation of one or more Member 
States shall not be subject to any reduction by reason of the fact that the 
recipient resides in the territory of a Member State, other than that in 
which the institution or body responsible for payment is situated. The 
Central Court of Appeal referred two preliminary questions to the ECJ in 
a judgment of March 8, 1973.
The second question dealt with the transitional provisions of the Old 
Age Pensions Act, according to which only those persons who have been a 
resident in the Netherlands for the six years following the completion of 
their fifty-ninth year, can enjoy the transitional benefits. The ECJ ruled 
on November 11, 1973 that the protection afforded by Article 10(1) ex­
tends to benefits arising from particular schemes under national law, 
which are given effect by increasing the value of the payment to be made 
to the beneficiary. Thus, the ECJ continued, to the extent that a national 
law such as Article 44 of the Old Age Pensions Act imposes a condition of 
residence on would-be recipients of some of the benefits of the type men­
tioned in Article 10, the fact that the person concerned resides in the 
territory of a different Member State is no ground for modification, 




























































































One would expect that, as a result of the ECJ’s ruling, Mrs. Smieja 
would be granted a full transitional benefit. Surprisingly, however, the 
Central Court of Appeal ruled differently in its final judgment of 
February 19, 1974. It considered that the terms of Article 10 as well as 
the considerations of the ECJ had brought it to the conclusion that the 
Article includes a guarantee for the payment of benefits acquired under 
national law after a change of residence, but does not guarantee the ac­
quisition of these rights.
The Dutch Government, not tmsting that the judgment of the Central 
Court of Appeal would prevail in the end, initiated certain alterations in 
Appendix VI of Regulation 1408/71. In Article J2 of the Appendix, the 
so-called transitional benefits under the Old Age Pensions Act were ex­
tended to non-residents of other EC Member-States who fulfill certain 
conditions. Subsequent case-law of the ECJ proved that the Government 
took the right decision. In Case 92/81 (Carcciolo20) and still more explicit 
in Case 300/84 (Van Roosmalen21), the ECJ whilst referring to the Smieja 
judgment, held that Article 10 covers also the acquisition of benefits. The 
legality of Appendix VI under J2 has not yet been contested before the 
ECJ. However, in a recent case, falling outside the scope of this project, 
the ECJ gave an extensive interpretation of a part of this appendix, clearly 
going beyond the literal wording of the text (Case 284/84, Spruijt22).
By way of conclusion it is submitted that in the Kalsbeek-Van Der 
Veen Case as well as in the Smieja Case, it is difficult to assess the final 
judgments of the Central Court of Appeal. Even if it is clear today that 
the court misinterpreted the ECJ’s judgment in both cases, it is hazardous 
to conclude that it did so in defiance of the ECJ’s ruling. As the Central 
Court of Appeal was one of the first courts to ask for preliminary rulings 
in the Netherlands and has continued this practice ever since, it is difficult 
to doubt its willingness to follow the guidance of the ECJ. Therefore, it 
seems more likely that the Central Court of Appeal acted in good faith 
but, simply did not fully understand the bearing of ECJ’s approach to in- 
































































































6. Council of State
M r. A.E. KELLERMANN
6.1 Jurisdiction and composition
The legal basis for the Council of State can be found in Articles 73-75 
of the Constitution. The implementing and detailed rules concerning the 
powers, functions and organization of the Council of State are contained 
in the Act on the Council of State (Wet op de Raad van State, 1962) and in 
the Administrative Jurisdiction (Government Orders) Act (W et 
Administratieve Rechtspraak Overheidsbeschikkingen, 1975 (AROB)). 
The Council of State is one of the bodies collectively known as the High 
Institutions of State. Its origins are in the sixteenth century, when 
Emperor Charles V established it as an advisory body to the Crown.
Her Majesty the Queen is President of the Council of State. Meetings 
of the plenary Council are presided by the Vice-President, who supervises 
the work of the Council and is the head of the Council’s staff. The 
Council is at present composed of 25 members, out of a maximum of 28. 
Up to 14 additional members can be appointed as extraordinary 
Councillors for special duties. Under the present Constitution, the Council 
of State is entrusted with important advisory and judicial tasks. The judi­
cial tasks are dealt with by the two Divisions (Afdelingeri) of the Council 
of State; the Judicial Division (Afdeling Rechtspraak) and the Division for 
Administrative Disputes (Afdeling voor de Geschillen van Bestuur).
6.1.1 Judicial Division
The Judicial Division of the Council of State only adjudicates on dis­
putes submitted to it under the Administrative Jurisdiction (Government 
Orders) Act. Under this Act, any interested party may lodge an appeal 
against government orders, falling within the scope of this Act, for which 
no other remedy is available under Dutch law. Other than the Division 
for Administrative Disputes, the Judicial Division is an administrative 
court (of last instance). The grounds on which the Judicial Division must 
exercise judgment are listed in Article 8 of the Administrative 
Jurisdiction (Government Orders) Act. An appeal may be lodged on the 
ground that: (1) the order is contrary to a generally binding provision; 
(2) in making the order the administrative body manifestly used its power 
for a purpose other than that for which the powers were vested in it; (3) 
the administrative body could not reasonably have made the order if it 
weighed up the interests involved or (4) in making the order, the adminis­
trative body acted contrary to a principle of proper administration gen­
erally held to be equitable. It appears that the Division’s examination is 




























































































aspects of expediency. The Judicial Division deals with approximately 
9,000 cases yearly. It is divided into a number of Chambers with three 
councillors in each. In matters requiring urgent attention, the President of 
the Judicial Division can order temporary injunctions.
6.1.2 Division for Administrative Disputes
The Division for Administrative Disputes is responsible for handling 
administrative appeals and other disputes which are to be settled by the 
Crown. As mentioned before in Chapter II, subparagraph 1.1, such 
Crown appeals (Kroonberoep) are provided for in certain legislation. 
Before deciding on the appeal, the Crown is under the obligation to con­
sult the Division for Administrative Disputes, which produces a draft 
Royal Decree. Moreover, the Crown can only depart from the Division’s 
draft under certain strict conditions. In practice it follows the latter’s ad­
vice in nearly all cases. Still, the Division cannot be regarded as an 
(administrative) court. The Division for Administrative Disputes evalu­
ates not only the legality of the contentious order but also its expediency. 
Thus, it is authorized to examine the order in its entirity, without restrict­
ing itself specifically to the grounds given for the appeal. It can also re­
view aspects of the disputed decison ex officio. The rules of procedure 
for Crown appeals are primarily laid down in the Act on the Council of 
State.
The Division for Administrative Disputes is divided into a number of 
Chambers with each three members. Simple cases can be dealt with by a 
single member of a Chamber. In the Benthem Case, the European Court 
of Human Rights judged that the procedure for Crown appeals is not in 
conformity with Article 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms as far as it concerns the determination of 
“civil rights and obligations”.23 The Temporary Act on Administrative 
Disputes (Tijdelijke Wet Kroongeschillen, 1987), enacted to comply with 
this judgment, gives the Division for Administrative Disputes a more in­
dépendant position vis-à-vis the Crown, whenever it is consulted in ad­
ministrative appeals in disputes relating to civil rights and obligations. 
The Act entered into force on January 1, 1988.
6.2 Application of Article 177
The ECJ gave 5 preliminary rulings at the request of the two 
Divisions of the Council of State, i.e., some 3% of all references by Dutch 
courts. No statistical information on the Council of State is available as to 
who initiated the reference. However, from the files of the cases, it ap­
23 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of October 23, 1985, Series A: 




























































































pears that in both Cases of the Division for Administrative Disputes, the 
applicants or their counsel suggested a request for a ruling from the ECJ. 
From the remaining statistical information it can be inferred that the 
Council of State gave a formal judgment in all 5 cases, all of which were 
considered to be in strict conformity with the ECJ’s rulings. The Council 
of State gave no specific indication as to the usefulness of the preliminary 
rulings.
1. In the period investigated here, the Judicial Division requested 3 pre­
liminary rulings; 145/78 (Augustein), 146/78 (Wattenberg) and 53/81 
(Levin). One can wonder why only three references were made, espe­
cially since the Division is a court of last instance with a rather broad 
jurisdiction. It is most likely that the low number can be explained first of 
all, by the jurisdiction of the Division under the Administrative 
Jurisdiction (Government orders) Act. In fact, most of the 9,000 cases 
relate to regulations and laws on subjects like military service and, vari­
ous local authority decision contested by individuals, which have little or 
nothing to do with Community Law. If the jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Division is compared to the jurisdiction of the other administrative 
courts, like the CBB, the Social Security Courts and the 
Tariffcommission, it is more or less self-evident that the latter attract 
much larger proportions of cases with Community Law-aspects. In fact, 
the only area where Community Law is frequently involved before the 
Judicial Division, concerns disputes under the Aliens Act (V reem - 
delingenwet). Whenever residents of EC Member-States are involved, 
Community Law on the free movement of persons may emerge before the 
Division.
A second explanation can be found in the fact that the Judicial 
Division started functioning only in 1976, when the Administrative 
Jurisdiction (Government Orders) Act entered into force. A third may be 
found in the policy which appears to be followed by the Judicial Division, 
to make “economical” use of the preliminary reference instrument. By 
this it is meant that, apparently, the Division makes a great effort in 
finding the answers to problems of Community Law raised before it, in 
the case-law of the ECJ. This leaves only questions on which there is no 
such established case-law, to be referred for interpretation by the ECJ. 
The Division can maintain such a policy in compliance with the rules of 
Article 177, because it appears to be well-informed on the development of 
Community Law and because it deals mainly with a relatively limited part 
of Community Law only, viz., the free movement of persons.24
24 Still, the Judicial Division has been criticized on some occasions for not making a 
reference under Article 177. See, e.g., the unfavourable comments made on a decision 




























































































As a consequence of this approach, the references by the Judicial 
Division have resulted in judgments of the ECJ which are important for 
the development of Community Law. The fourth explanation submitted 
here is related to the previous one. There are indications that the Judicial 
Division applies the preliminary ruling requested for, to more cases than 
the one case pending before it. Rather than requesting in each individual 
case a preliminary ruling, the Division chooses one representative case 
which it uses as a basis for the request, at the same time staying the other 
proceedings. In a decision of November 28, 1980, e.g., the Division sus­
pended the case until the ECJ would have delivered its ruling in a similar 
question in Case 53/81 {Levin). The Division rendered its final judgment 
in the former case on January 23, 1983, taking into consideration the 
ECJ’s ruling in the Levin Case. More or less the same occurred with 
problems of Community Law referred by the Judicial Division and de­
cided by the ECJ, after the period considered in this report, in the Kempf, 
139/85 and the Steymann Cases, 196/87.25 It goes without saying that the 
number of preliminary cases originating from the Judicial Division of the 
Council of State would have been much higher if this approach were not 
adopted. Moreover, it is self-evident that the small number of references 
is not due to any misapprehension on the part of the Division, of its re­
sponsibilities and obligations under Article 177.
2. In two cases brought before the Division for Administrative Disputes, 
preliminary rulings were requested; 36/73 {Nederlandse Spoorwegen v 
Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat) and 126/78 (Smit v Commissie 
Grensoverschrijdend Beroepsgoederenvervoer).
It is difficult to explain this relatively small number of cases before 
the Division in which questions were referred to the ECJ. This is particu­
larly so if one takes into consideration that it is a “court” against whose 
decision there is no judicial remedy under national law and that the 
Division has a fairly broad jurisdiction. It should be pointed out in the 
first place, however, that for the period up to 1973, it was questioned 
whether the Division, or rather the Crown, for reasons which were dis­
cussed in the previous subparagraph and in Chapter II, subparagraph 1.1, 
could be regarded as a court in the meaning of Article 177. The uncer­
tainty as to their status under Article 177, may have caused some reti­
cence on their part to request preliminary rulings. The doubts were re­
moved by the ECJ’s ruling in Case 36/73, when it accepted without any 
comment the questions referred in a case brought before the Division for 
Administrative Disputes. The ECJ’s position, however, did not result in a 
substantial increase in references from the Division. Actually, it took an­





























































































other thirteen years before the next, and up to now last, preliminary 
questions were referred to the ECJ.
A second and more satisfying explanation for the few preliminary cases 
may, therefore, be found in the fact that relatively few disputes concern­
ing Community Law are brought before the Division. Even though the 
jurisdiction of the Division is broad, parties will only rarely bring before 
it disputes in which, aspects of Community Law play an important role. 
Like the Judicial Division, most cases before the Division for 
Administrative Disputes concern typical internal Dutch matters falling 
outside the present powers of the EC. The Division, for instance, deals 
with zoning schemes and redivision of Municipalities. This submission is 
also illustrated by the fact that the only references made to date were con­
cerned with matters of transportation, a subject not dealt with very often 
by the Division for Administrative Disputes.
6.3 Two illustrative cases
As there are no real exceptional cases among the references initiated 
by the Council of State, we decided to discuss two cases in which some­
thing “peculiar” occurred. These cases can also be considered as illustra­
tive of the referring practice under Article 177 by the Council of State.
1. Case 36/73 (Nederlandse Spoorwegen), is the first case in which a 
preliminary ruling was requested in a case pending before the Division 
for Administrative Disputes.
In this case, the Netherlands Railway Company appealed to the Crown 
on the basis of the Act on Appeal against Administrative Decisions (Wet 
Beroep Administratieve Beslissingen), against a decision taken by the 
Minister of Transport and Waterways. The Division for Administrative 
Disputes was called upon to produce a draft Royal Decree. After being 
authorized by the Crown to do so, the Minister concerned, and thus not 
the Division itself, submitted three preliminary questions on Regulation 
1191/69 of the EC Council to the ECJ on January 26, 1973.
Before the ECJ, Advocate-General Mayras considered the question 
whether, given the organization, jurisdiction and procedure of the 
Council of State, this reference could be accepted under Article 177. He 
concluded that, in view of the authorization given by the Crown to make 
the reference, the Sovereign only felt it her duty to give the Division for 
Administrative Disputes formal authority to apply for a ruling under 
Article 177 and that the question could be accepted. The Advocate- 
General further argued that even though the Division does not have the 
last word, the decisions of the Crown on the basis of its advice are of a 





























































































The ECJ gave its ruling on November 27, 1973. It answered all three 
questions without making any comment on the status of the Division un­
der Article 177. It is submitted that the ECJ could easily take this position 
because the Netherlands Government had not raised the issue of the 
Crown’s or the Division’s standing under Article 177.
Following the ECJ’s mling, the Crown gave its final decision on June 
6, 1974. The decisions of the Minister of Transport and waterways were 
upheld.
As for the other reference (Case 126/78) originating from the 
Division for Administrative Disputes, it is to be noted that instead of the 
Minister concerned, the Division requested the preliminary ruling itself. 
In this Case as in Case 36/73, however, the Crown was asked first for an 
authorization to make the reference. This authorization was given to the 
Division in a separate Royal Decree of February 2, 1982. The Division 
subsequently requested the ruling in the form of a (simple) letter to the 
ECJ, dated April 4, 1982. The final decision of the Crown, taking the 
preliminary ruling into account, was given in a Royal Decree of 
December 2, 1983.
2. In Case 53/81 (Levin), a British subject applied for a residence permit 
in the Netherlands on January 13, 1978. Her application was rejected as 
she was not regarded as “a favoured EEC subject” under the Dutch Aliens 
Order (Vreemdelingenbesluit). By letter of April 9, 1979 she applied to 
the Secretary of State for Justice for the decision to be reconsidered, 
claiming, inter alia, that even though she had not pursued an occupation in 
the Netherlands in the sense of the Dutch regulations, this does not in it­
self constitute a relevant argument for refusing her a residence permit 
since she and her husband had sufficient property and income for their 
maintenance. No decision being taken within the period prescribed, Levin 
took her case to the Judicial Division. The Division took the view that the 
case raised questions of Community Law and referred three questions to 
the ECJ in an interlocutory judgment of November 28, 1980.
The ECJ answered these questions in its judgment of March 28, 1980. 
It held, inter alia, that Mrs. Levin pursued an activity as an employed per­
son and could, therefore, be regarded as a “worker” under Community 
Law even though she yields an income lower than that which is consid­
ered in the Netherlands as the minimum required for subsistence, pro­
vided the activity she pursues is effective and genuine.
Following this ruling, the Judicial Division gave its final decision on 
July 21, 1982. It considered that the Secretary of State had unlawfully re­
fused to consider whether Mrs. Levin could be regarded as “a favoured 
EEC citizen” and declared the decision refusing a residence permit to mrs 




























































































It may be interesting to note that Mrs. Levin lodged appeals to the 
President of the Amsterdam District Court in summary proceedings as 
well. Against the President’s judgment, the Netherlands State appealed to 
the Court of Appeal. The appeal to the President of the District Court was 
made by Mrs. Levin to prevent the State from expelling her as long as the 
appeal before the Judicial Division of the Council of State was still to be 
decided. Both courts decided in favour of her. These summary proceed­
ings are an indication of the conjunction which exists under Dutch law, 
between administrative proceedings and proceedings brought before the 
ordinary courts against the Government.
More or less the reverse situation rose in Cases 35 and 36/82 (Morson 
and Jhanjan). In these cases the applicants, like Mrs. Levin, appealed to 
the Judicial Division to contest the refusal of a residence permit by the 
Secretary of State. They also appealed to the President in summary pro­
ceedings to avoid being expelled before the outcome of the former ap­
peals. After the injunction was denied by the President and, on appeal, by 
the Court of Appeal, Morson and Jhanjan filed a petition for cassation 
with the Supreme Court. This court requested a preliminary interpreta­
tion, inter alia, on its obligations under Article 177. The ECJ held that in 
this type of proceedings the Supreme Court could not be regarded as a 
court in the meaning of Article 177, third paragraph. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court was not under an obligation to make preliminary refer­
ences in these cases.
7. Summary of the main results of the questionnaires
1. The ECJ gave 105 preliminary rulings at the request of courts 
belonging to the Administrative Jurisdiction, i.e., 70% of all requests 
made by Dutch courts. Overall the answers that were given to the 
questionnaires indicate that the application of the Article 177 procedure 
by these courts is satisfying. Four cases may be regarded as pathological, 
i.e., 4% of all cases originating from these courts.26
In 86 of the 105 cases, the referring courts delivered a formal judg­
ment taking into account the ECJ’s ruling. Sixteen cases were resolved 
otherwise, the outcome of 3 cases remained unknown.
Of the 86 cases in which a final judgment was given, 77 were consid­
ered to be given in strict conformity with the ECJ’s mling. Eight final 
judgments required a further interpretation of the ECJ’s ruling. In only 
one case, viz., 51/73 (Smieja) was the application of the ECJ’s ruling





























































































found to be “evasive”. No judgments were found, in which the referring 
court gave a “defiant” application to the preliminary ruling.27
2. The predominance of the Administrative courts in referring prelimi­
nary questions to the ECJ can be explained by the fact that EEC-Law 
consists mainly of rules, regulating sectors of the economy where the 
Government or other organs under public law are actively engaged. In 
this respect, mention can be made of, inter alia, the Common Agricultural 
Policy, matters concerning customs, tariffs and excises, VAT and social 
security of migrating workers. This explains the fact that the bulk of liti­
gations on EEC-Law takes place against the State or its organs and not 
between private parties.
Consequently, the Administrative courts are called upon most fre­
quently to decide disputes on EEC-Law. The number of preliminary re­
quests by these courts, therefore, will be higher than the requests by 
courts belonging to the Ordinary Jurisdiction.
Other factors like, e.g., the system of administration of justice, the 
cost of litigation, the procedural techniques that have to be followed and 
the attitude of the judges concerned, may have an impact on the number 
of references to the ECJ as well. Even though these factors are much 
more difficult to determine, the following submissions can be made.
a) The relatively great number of specialized administrative courts in 
the Netherlands is probably beneficial to the number of requests being 
made under Article 177. It may even be assumed that this has caused the 
initial lead of Dutch courts when it comes to referring preliminary ques­
tions. The CBB, the Central Court of Appeal and, to a lesser extent, the 
Tariffcommission asked for a large number of rulings in the early sixties, 
probably due to their specialized jurisdiction. Consequently, they have 
built up a considerable familiarity with Community Law and have ac­
quired much experience in cooperating with the ECJ under Article 177. 
Furthermore, it is possible that these circumstances explain the relative 
decline of references by Dutch courts in comparison with courts from 
other Member States. As a matter of fact, the considerable Community 
Law know-how present at some of the administrative courts to date, may 
result in (relatively, i.e., in comparison with references from courts in 
other Member States) less references being made in the future.
27 The expressions “evasive” and “defiant” stem from the questionnaire drawn up by the 
Florence Institute (Question 11 of the 177-interpretation questionnaire). The 
application of the preliminary ruling is to be considered “evasive” when the national 
court, although it is aware that the ECJ would have preferred another solution, 
deliberately misconstrues the preliminary ruling. As an example of “defiant” attitude, 





























































































(b) Furthermore, the fact that the majority of the administrative 
courts considered in this report are first and last instance courts, may 
have an influence as well, since these courts are restricted in their discre­
tion to decide whether or not to make a reference.
c) The fact that proceedings before administrative courts and adminis­
trative appeal bodies are usually more informal than proceedings before 
the ordinary courts, may make it easier to suggest preliminary rulings. 
This holds true in particular for the cassation procedure in taxation cases 
before the Supreme Court, which is relatively simple if it is compared to 
the procedures to be followed in civil and criminal cassation cases.
3. It appears clearly from the statistical information that the responding 
parties in administrative proceedings, i.e., some kind of public authority, 
have made hardly any suggestion to the courts as to the application of 
Article 177. Only for disputes before the Social Security Courts and the 
Central Court of Appeal, we found a more active approach from the part 
of the responding parties.
4. In 12 cases, the referring administrative court requested a prelimi­
nary ruling on the validity of Community Law.28 In only one of these 
Cases did the ECJ hold the litigious provision to be invalid, viz., 116/76 
{Granaria I).
Even though the ECJ makes a clear distinction between questions as to 
the interpretation of Community Law and questions concerning the valid­
ity of secondary Community Law, we found two cases in which this court 
handled a request for interpretation as a “validity-question”. This oc­
curred in Case 80/72 (Koninklijke Lassiefabrieken) and Case 185/83 
(Interfacultair Instituut). In Case 38/75 (Douaneagent N.S.) a certain re­
structuring of the preliminary questions was brought about as well.
5. It is somewhat surprising that the Netherlands Government seems to 
make use of its right to submit observations to the ECJ only very rarely, 
in cases concerning customs and excises referred to the ECJ by Dutch 
courts. This is even more surprising if regard is taken of the fact that the 
responding party in the main proceedings before the Tariffcommission, 
the Inspector of Customs and Excises, does not submit observations ei­
ther. Apparently, the Government considers these cases to be of too little 
relevance for submissions to be made before the ECJ.




























































































Chapter V: Evaluation of the Application of the 
Article 177 Procedure by Special Courts
Mr. J. KORTE
1. Introduction
In this Chapter, the references made by the Arbitration Tribunal for 
Disputes regarding the Pension Fund for the Mining Industry (henceforth 
abbreviated to the Arbitration Tribunal) and the Appeals Committee for 
General Medicine, are briefly discussed. As these courts do not come un­
der the Ordinary Jurisdiction nor under the Administrative Jurisdiction, 
they are referred to as special courts. The references made by the special 
courts represent 1.3% of all preliminary rulings considered in this re­
port.1
In accordance with the objectives of the Florence research project, 
these courts were only examined as to their performance under Article 
177.
2. Arbitration Tribunal for Disputes regarding the 
Pension Fund for the Mining Industry (S c h e id s g e r e c h t  
v o o r  h e t  B e a m b te n  f o n d s  v o o r  h e t  M ijn b e d r i j f )
In Case 61/65 (Vaassen-Goebbels), the plaintiff appealed to the 
Arbitration Tribunal because the Pension Fund for the Mining Industry 
refused to reinstate her as a member of its Sickness Insurance Fund. Mrs. 
Vaassen argued that the decision by the Pension Fund was not in con­
formity with Community Law, because under Regulations No. 3 and 4 she 
was still entitled to benefit from the Insurance Fund. The Pension Fund 
contested this submission and argued that the Regulations are only appli­
1 After the conclusion of this report two further references were made by a special court. 
Preliminary questions were submitted to the ECJ by the “Commission of Appeal for 
Disputes regarding the granting of Scholarships by the Government” (Commissie van 
Beroep Studiefinanciering) on December 24, 1987 in joined Cases 389 and 390/87 
(Echternach and Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen). The ECJ 




























































































cable to social security regulations provided for by legislation and not to 
private arrangements like its Sickness Fund.
On December 10, 1965 the Arbitration Tribunal decided to suspend 
proceedings in order to request a preliminary ruling on the matter. The 
referring judgment does not indicate who initiated the reference. As to its 
position under Article 177, the Pension Fund argued that the Arbitration 
Tribunal is not a “court or tribunal of a Member State” in the meaning of 
Article 177 as it is formally not a “court” under Dutch legislation. The 
Tribunal itself, however, considers that the fact that it is not instituted un­
der Dutch legislation does not necessarily mean that it is not a court under 
Article 177 either. It states that it is for the ECJ to decide whether its 
questions are admissable under Article 177. On the substance of the case, 
the Arbitration Tribunal did not submit its own interpretation.
In its judgment of June 30, 1966 the ECJ considered the request to be 
admissable. The Netherlands Government had taken the same position in 
its observations to the ECJ. On the substance of the case, it held that the 
Sickness Insurance Fund comes, in principle, under Regulations 3 and 4.
The Arbitration Tribunal delivered its final judgment on October 4, 
1966. Further interpreting the ECJ’s ruling, it decided in favour of the 
plaintiff when it ordered that the Pension Fund could not refuse the re­
entry into the Sickness Insurance Fund.
3. Appeals Committee for General Medicine (C o m m is s i e  
va n  B e r o e p  H u is a r ts g e n e e s k u n d e )
In Case 246/80, Mr Broekmeulen, a Netherlands national, had ob­
tained the diploma of doctor of medicine, surgery and obstetrics at the 
Catholic University of Louvain. When he applied to be enrolled on the 
register of recognized general practitioners in the Netherlands, this was 
refused by the General Practitioners Registration Committee, which is an 
organ of the Royal Netherlands Society for the Promotion of Medicine. 
Broekmeulen appealed against that decision to the Appeals Committee for 
General Medicine, which is also set up by the Society to determine dis­
putes as to the registration of general practitioners.
Before this Committee Broekmeulen argued, inter alia, that the 
Registration Committee’s refusal was contrary to Community Law and in 
particular, to EEC Directives 75/362 and 75/363. By order of October 
21, 1980, the Appeals Committee stayed the proceedings and referred a 
preliminary question to the ECJ. It appears from the statistical informa­
tion that the Committee requested this ruling of its own motion.
The ECJ gave its judgment on October 6, 1981. It held that it had 




























































































considered as a court or tribunal of a Member State in the meaning of 
Article 177. The Netherlands Government had adopted the same position 
in its observations to the ECJ. On the substance of the case, the ECJ de­
cided that Directive 75/362 must be interpreted as meaning that a person 
like Mr Broekmeulen may establish himself as a general practitioner in 
the Netherlands.
In its final judgment of December 30, 1981, the Committee annulled 
the decision of the Registration Commission and ordered this Commission 
to enrol Mr Broekmeulen on the register as from the first of December 
1981. Broekmeulen’s claim for reimbursement of the costs of litigation 
was rejected. The final judgment is considered to be delivered in strict 
conformity with the ECJ’s ruling.
4. Summary of the main results of the questionnaires
It can be inferred from the answers that were given to the question­
naires that the application of Article 177 by special courts is satisfying. In 
fact, no irregularities were found in the two references concerned.
As to the standing of these courts under Article 177, it is submitted 
that the observations which were made by the Netherlands Government, 





























































































M r. J. KORTE
In this report, the application of the Article 177 EEC-procedure by 
courts in the Netherlands is discussed. The report is the Dutch 
contribution to a research project on the follow-up by national courts of 
preliminary references ex Article 177 in nine EC Member-States, 
initiated and directed by the European University Institute in Florence. It 
is intended to become part of a general report, covering all the national 
reports.
The report considers all preliminary rulings given by the ECJ at the 
request of courts in the Netherlands in relation to which the judicial 
process came to an end, either by final judgment or by a settlement of the 
parties, before December 1st 1985. Between 1961, when the first (ever) 
request for a preliminary mling on the basis of Article 177 reached the 
ECJ in Case 13/61 (De Geus & Uitdenbogerd) and December 1st 1985, 
the number of preliminary rulings by the ECJ references by Dutch courts 
discussed in this report, amounts to 152. These judgments as well as their 
follow-up are listed in the annexes to this report.
The relevant Dutch cases were examined on the basis of a detailed 
questionnaire, prepared by the European University Institute in Florence. 
The research based on the questionnaires resulted in an impressive 
amount of information on virtually every aspect of the dialogue between 
the referring courts in the Netherlands and the ECJ. In view of this 
amplitude of information, the Dutch team decided to deal with only a 
number of selected issues in its report. In accordance with the guidelines 
for the national reports provided by the Florence Steering Group, the 
Dutch report consists of two components: a global description of the 
functioning of the Article 177 procedure in the Netherlands and an 
analysis of the cases considered to be most problematic (the so-called 
exceptional or “pathological” cases). The general pattern as to the 
application of the preliminary procedure by the ordinary, administrative 
and special courts as it was found on the basis of the repies to the 
questionnaires, is subsequently outlined in Chapters III, IV and V by 
means of two illustrative cases for each type of court. The exceptional or 
“pathological” cases found are discussed in detail in these Chapters as 




























































































questionnaires for the type of court concerned. Before summarizing the 
most important results and before turning to the conclusions that may be 
drawn from the replies to the questionnaires, it is emphasized that the 
report only contains a partial survey of the application of the preliminary 
procedure by Dutch courts. The dialogue between the referring Dutch 
courts and the ECJ and the follow-up of the preliminary rulings in the 
pertinent domestic proceedings were the main subjects of the study. As 
the research project is restricted to the cases where preliminary rulings 
were indeed requested by Dutch courts, it is rather hazardous to draw 
conclusions from it as to the attitude of the courts in general towards 
Article 177. After all, disputes on EEC-Law of which no reference was 
made even though the national court might have requested a preliminary 
ruling or was even obliged to do so, were not examined here. The cases in 
which Dutch courts neglected the most essential rule of Article 177, i.e., 
the obligation to request a preliminary ruling, were thus not considered in 
this project. It is submitted that the exclusion of these “real pathological 
cases”, must have greatly affected the favourable overall result emerging 
from the questionnaires. In this regard, the research project confirmed 
our initial hypothesis that once a national court is prepared to request 
from the ECJ a ruling on the interpretation or the validity of Community 
Law, it will in all probability not obstmct the application of the ECJ’s 
ruling when it comes to delivering its final judgment.
As was mentioned in Chapter I, paragraph 2, the fact that the relevant 
cases were investigated solely on the basis of questionnaires imposes some 
important restrictions on the conclusions which may be drawn from this 
report as well. First of all it should be born in mind that the 
questionnaires only relate to the judgments as such and not to the 
complete files of each case. The questionnaires, therefore, were 
completed entirely on the basis of the texts of the set of judgments 
concerned, i.e, the judgment of the court making the reference, the ECJ’s 
ruling and the final judgment of the national court. It is submitted that an 
analysis of, for instance, the full arguments of the parties and of the other 
documents relating to the case might have provided us with even more 
information as to the application of the preliminary procedure and might, 
consequently, have infuenced the conclusions of the report.
Secondly, account is to be taken of the fact that the research was 
conducted entirely in the form of desk-research. Thus, we did not 
supplement or test our information by interviewing judges, parties or 
their counsel or by conducting any other form of field-research.
Thirdly, answering some of the questions of the questionnaires 
requires a personal evaluation of the person filling in the questionnaire. 
To avoid different standards being applied, the Dutch team devoted much 




























































































be forgotten that the completion of the questionnaires for the Netherlands 
involved some fifteen people. Some caution, therefore, seems to be 
appropriate when considering the results of these type of questions.
1. The general pattern and the “pathologies”
The examination of the 152 cases on the basis of the questionnaires 
demonstrates that the general pattern of the application of the preliminary 
procedure in the Netherlands is satisfactory.
This submission is first of all proved by the fact that only six out of 
the 152 cases were regarded as exceptional or “pathological”, i.e., 4% of 
all cases originating from Dutch courts. These cases are 141-143/81 
(Holdijk et al.), 31/68 (SA Chanel v Cepeha), 72/77 (U niversiteit 
Utrecht), 23/68 (Klomp), 100/63 (Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen) and 51/73 
(Smieja). These problematic cases (or “pathologies” as they are called in 
the Guidelines provided by the Florence Steering Group) were discussed 
in Chapters III and IV.
The problems as regards the application of the preliminary procedure 
which were found in these cases, may be classified according to their 
seriousness in two categories; a first and most reprehensible category, 
consisting of those cases where the referring court withheld one of the 
parties its right under EEC-Law, contrary to the purpose of the ECJ’s 
ruling. Here, the malfunctioning of the preliminary procedure had an 
unfavourable impact on the outcome of the case. The final judgments in 
Universiteit Utrecht, Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen and Smieja clearly belong 
to this category. The remaining cases (Holdijk, SA Chanel and Klomp) 
belong to a second and less reprehensible category, where the defect in 
the dialogue between the ECJ and the referring court, apparently, did not 
seriously affect the outcome of the case.
Taking a closer look at the roots of the problems in the six 
“pathological” cases, three causes can be distinguished. In Holdijk and 
Klomp, problems arose primarily due to poorly formulated preliminary 
questions. Indeed, these cases should not be regarded as “pathological” 
because of failures in the follow-up -both final judgment were in fact 
given in strict conformity with the ECJ’s ruling- but because the national 
courts (the Cantonal Court in Apeldoom and the Taxation Division of the 
Court of Appeal in The Hague) made it difficult for the ECJ to give 
proper answers to the preliminary questions. In view of the difficulties 
that had to be surmounted by the ECJ, it is somewhat paradoxical that, 
when these cases came to final judgment, EEC-Law turned out to be 




























































































The problems in SA Chanel and Universiteit Utrecht belong to a 
different category, since national procedural law created the difficulties 
here. In SA Chanel this difficulty consisted in that the referring judgment 
of the District Court in Rotterdam was quashed in appellate proceedings 
by the Court of Appeal in The Hague, which made a preliminary ruling 
of the ECJ superfluous. In Chapter IV, paragraph 3 Possen argues that in 
Universiteit Utrecht, the rules on evidence that were applied by the 
Tariffcommission effectively hindered an application of the ECJ’s ruling, 
favourable to the appealing party.
The two remaining cases, Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen and Smieja, are the 
only ones where problems arose due to a malcomprehension of the ECJ’s 
ruling on the part of the referring court, the Central Court of Appeal in 
Social Security Matters. In Chapter IV, paragraph 5 Professor Levelt- 
Overmars indicates that the unexpected interpretation given to Regulation 
No. 3 together with the ambiguous wording of the ECJ’s ruling, forms 
the most likely explanation of the remarkable final judgments in 
Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen. Furthermore, if regard is taken to the fact that 
this case was one of the first where questions on the complex system of 
Regulation No. 3 were put to the ECJ, it is not too difficult to appreciate 
the problems caused by the ECJ’s ruling. Under these circumstances, one 
can only reproach the Central Court of Appeal for not requesting a 
second preliminary ruling. As Professor Levelt-Overmars rightly points 
out, a second preliminary ruling would probably have solved most 
problems. Cases 98/77 (Schaap I) and 176/78 (Schaap II) as well as 
117/77 (Pierik I) and 182/78 (Pierik II) demonstrate that the Central 
Court of Appeal in Social Security Matters does indeed not hesitate to take 
recourse to Article 177 for a second time in the same case, whenever it 
feels unable to adjudicate cases on the basis of the first preliminary 
ruling.
As distinct from Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen, no mitigating 
circumstances can be advanced for the approach that was adopted by the 
Central Court of Appeal in Smieja. The analysis of this case in Chapter 
IV, paragraph 5 clearly indicates that the Central Court of Appeal did not 
follow the ECJ’s interpretation, thereby denying Mrs Smieja the 
transitional Old Age Benefit she was entitled to under the provisions of 
Regulations Nos. 3 and 1408/71. Fortunately, the Government decided to 
ignore the Smieja judgment of the Central Court of Appeal and enacted 
legislation in conformity with the ECJ’s ruling. In fact, the final judgment 
in Sm ieja  is the only decision reviewed in this report where the 
preliminary ruling was “evasively” applied.
A second indication for the satisfactory application of the Article 177- 
procedure by Dutch courts can be found in the replies that were given to 




























































































the preliminary ruling or does it deviate from the terms of the ruling? 
110 out of the 123 cases in which a final judgment was delivered (for the 
remaining 29 cases no final judgments were found; in 24 cases because the 
parties settled!), were considered to be in strict conformity with the ECJ’s 
ruling, i.e., 90%. In several of these cases, the operational part of the 
ECJ’s ruling was expressed in such clear terms that the referring courts 
could even confine themselves to a literal repetition of the ECJ’s dictum, 
as part of their final decisions. In twelve cases, the preliminary ruling 
required further interpretation by the referring court before being 
applied (9.75%). Here, before giving their final decisions, the referring 
courts first had to “fill in” the latitude which was left by the ECJ in its 
rulings. Apparently, the preliminary mlings as such were not sufficiently 
specific for an immediate application by the referring courts to the 
dispute at hand. As we mentioned earlier, only in the Smieja Case an 
“evasive application” of the ECJ’s ruling was found. Not one case, 
however, was found in which a Dutch court took a “defiant” attitude to 
the ECJ’s ruling. By way of example of such an attitude, the Florence 
Steering Group mentioned the judgment of the Bundesfinanzhof in 
Kloppenburg (Case 70/83). According to the Florence Interim Report, the 
percentages found for Dutch courts in this respect do not deviate from the 
average results found for all references made by Member State courts in 
the period considered by the Florence project.1
A further indication for the generally faithful application of Article 
177 by Dutch courts may be found in the response that was given to the 
question whether the ECJ was satisfied by the preliminary questions posed 
(question 6c). It appears from the replies to the questionnaires that the 
Dutch team estimated the ECJ to have been satisfied in 46% of the cases. 
The EEC-average for all 1014 references considered in this respect is 
51.%.1 2 In 42% the Dutch team estimated the ECJ to be neutral as to the 
way in which the questions were formulated, average 32% and in 11% it 
considered the ECJ to be less than satisfied, the EEC-average here being
8.5 %. Although the standards applied by national teams may differ, it is 
safe in our view to conclude that references by Dutch courts have not 
caused exceptional difficulties to the ECJ.
It is to be noted that the greater part of the “less than satisfied” cases 
were classified as such because the ECJ was forced to reformulate the 
preliminary questions in a more abstract fashion before answering them 
(question 6a). The most important reason for this is that the referring 
courts instead of asking for an interpretation of Community Law, 
referred questions to the ECJ as to the compatiblity of domestic law with
1 See graph 36 of the Florence Interim Report of March 1988.




























































































EEC-Law. The ECJ does not have the jurisdiction under Article 177 to 
answer this type of questions. Due to the lenient approach the ECJ usually 
takes towards inaccurately formulated questions, which are to be found in 
a good many preliminary references, they usually have no impact on the 
outcome of the case. The important function which is in fact performed 
by the preliminary procedure in the judicial review of provisions of 
national law, will be further discussed in this Chapter in paragraph 3. 
Even though it is not a failure with serious consequences, one can wonder 
why Dutch courts, as well as courts from other Member States, keep 
formulating this type of questions after so many years and after so much 
redrafting by the ECJ.
A second inaccuracy that we found in rather many Dutch references, 
making it sometimes difficult for the ECJ to give a proper answer, is a 
lack of information as to the facts of the case. In about 30% of the cases, 
the Dutch team indicated that the ECJ was not sufficiently supplied with 
the relevant facts (question 6b). The EEC-average found here is 22%. 
The high percentage found for Dutch cases comes as a surprise and must 
be avoidable in the future.
Finally, our overall favourable conclusion regarding the general 
pattern can be built on the response that was given to the questions 
concerning the usefulness of the ECJ’s ruling to the national courts’ final 
judgments (question 13b). In only 2.3% of the cases did Dutch courts 
explicitly mention that the ruling was not helpful. According to the 
Florence Interim report, the EEC-average for all member State courts 
amounts to 2.2%. In about 50% of the (123) Dutch cases in which a final 
judgment was delivered, the referring court considered the preliminary 
ruling to be helpful. The EEC-average here is 50% as well. For the 
remaining Dutch cases (some 47%) no indication as to the helpfulness was 
found. Even though the large share of cases where no indication of the 
helpfulness was found makes it difficult to draw safe conclusions, it is 
submitted that the low proportion of cases where the ECJ gave 
preliminary rulings which were explicitely stated to be unhelpful, 
corroborates the overall favourable pattern. Moreover, if we would have 
the courage to violate the laws of statistics and apply the maxim “silence 
gives consent” to the 47% of dark number cases, which is not so 
irresponsible in the context of this research project as it would seem to 
be, the helpfulness of the ECJ’s rulings becomes almost undisputed.
2. The courts
The greater part of the rulings (105 or 70%) were requested by 




























































































ordinary courts (30%) and 2 at the request of special courts. Besides this 
numerical preponderance for the administrative courts, we did not find 
any indication that the type of proceedings (administrative or ordinary) 
was of influence to the performance under Article 177.
The preponderance of references by administrative courts which is 
significant in itself, can be explained if regard is had to the type of 
litigation where disputes on EEC-Law rise. After all, it follows more or 
less logically from the fact that EEC-Law consists mainly of rules, 
regulating sectors of the economy where the Government or other public 
organs are actively engaged, that the bulk of EEC-litigation takes place 
against the State and not between private parties.3 Consequently, in the 
system of administration of justice in the Netherlands, the Administrative 
courts (the Court of Last Instance in Matters of Trade and Industry 
(CBB), the Social Security Courts and the Central Court of Appeal in 
Social Security Matters, the Tariff- commission, the Courts of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court in Taxation Matters and the Judicial Division of the 
Council of State) are called upon most frequently to decide disputes on 
EEC-Law. The number of preliminary requests by these courts, 
therefore, will as a matter of course equally be higher than the requests 
by courts belonging to the Ordinary Jurisdiction.
It appears from the Florence Interim Report that only German courts 
made a higher proportion of references in administrative proceedings; 
almost 90%.4 On the other hand, German and Dutch courts made 
relatively few references in civil cases in comparison with the other 
Member States’ courts. The share of references made in Dutch criminal 
cases, however, is about average. It is submitted that these interesting 
differences between the Member States are determined largely by the 
organization of the Judiciary and by the system of administration of 
justice. Thus, they are probably more indicative of the differences in this 
respect than of the application of Article 177.
Whereas the EEC-average on this point is 23.5%,5 appellate 
proceedings were brought against the final judgment of the referring 
courts in the Netherlands in only 5 cases (3%). This low result might give 
an indication of the authority the ECJ’s rulings enjoy in the Netherlands.
3 According to Graph 8 of the Interim Report, a public authority was one of the parties 
in the dispute in 89% of the Dutch cases. The EEC-average is 83%. Classified 
according to the subject-matter of the disputes, the break-down for the Dutch cases is 
as follows: social security and social policy 37 cases; free movement of goods 33 (6 of 
these disputes took place between private parties, in the remaining 27 either the public 
prosecutor or some other public authority was involved); CAP 30; CCT 18; VAT 9; 
free movement of persons 8 (only 1 between private parties); Arts. 85-86 6; transport 
policy 4; commercial policy 4; Protocol on Priviliges and Immunities 3.
4 Ibid, graph 6.




























































































A more likely explanation for this deviation, however, may be found in 
the fact that appellate proceedings are impossible in most procedures 
before Dutch administrative courts. As a matter of fact, the CBB, the 
Tariffcommission and the Council of State, accounting for 70 references, 
adjudicate in the first as well as in the last instance.
Another deviation that was found for Dutch courts as compared to 
courts in the other Member-States, is the share of references made by last 
instance courts. Whereas the EEC-average on this particular point is 34%, 
Dutch last instance courts account for a total of 103 references, i.e., 67% 
of all references made by Dutch courts.6 This deviation must also be 
explained by the mere fact that most administrative litigation in the 
Netherlands takes place in one instance only. Therefore, it is in our view 
not possible to infer from these percentages that Dutch courts against 
whose judgments no remedy lies, are more willing to request preliminary 
rulings than lower courts. After all, the 70 references made in 
administrative proceedings in which there is only one instance, account 
for no less than 70% of all references made by Dutch courts of last 
instance. Moreover, if the referring practice of Dutch courts belonging to 
the Ordinary Jurisdiction is taken into account, where in only 7 out of 45 
cases (16%) the reference was made by a court of last instance, the 
conclusion should rather be that the lower courts are most willing to 
request preliminary rulings (see Chapter III, paragraph 6).
In some 15% of the Dutch cases, the courts submitted their own 
interpretation of Community Law in their orders for reference (question 
3d). Compared to most other Member-State courts, this result is rather 
low. For German and French courts, e.g., the percentages are 90 and 81! 
In fact only Belgian, Irish and Luxembourg courts have a lower “score” 
than Dutch courts.7
It is difficult to find an explanation for this deviation. Since this is a 
clear difference between the organization of the Judiciary in the 
Netherlands and other Member-States, the fact that a large number of 
Dutch courts decide in the first and last instance at the same time, may 
have a lowering impact on the practice to submit an interpretation of 
Community Law in the order for reference. One may speculate, e.g., that 
since these courts are the first to take cognizance of a dispute on 
Community Law they cannot take an earlier judgment as a basis of 
discussion. They will, therefore, usually be more preoccupied than second 
or third instance courts, with discerning and analyzing the legal problem 
before them and with deciding whether or not to make a reference, than 
with the formulation of possible interpretations of Community Law. It is
6 Ibid, graph 7.




























































































to be noted, however, that such conclusions do not follow from the replies 
that were given to the questionnaires.
Another explanation may be found in the fact that, apparently, most 
Dutch courts look at the preliminary procedure first and foremost as a 
useful instrument to solve (complicated) questions on the interpretation of 
Community Law. In examining the results of the questionnaires and in 
reading the orders for reference, our convinction grew that most courts’ 
principal interest in a preliminary procedure was to obtain a clear-cut 
interpretation by the ECJ, rather than to start a discussion about the most 
desirable interpretation. What is important in our view is, that this 
pragmatic approach may indicate that Dutch courts are quite willing to 
share a part of their jurisdiction with the ECJ and are not afraid of a loss 
of autonomy. Nowhere in the relevant cases did we find any proof of such 
irritation. It would be interesting to examine where this pragmatic 
attitude of the Dutch Judiciary stems from and whether it differs 
substantially from the attitudes that were found for other Member-State 
courts. However, we will not enter into these discussions here.
Furthermore, the absence of (own) interpretations in so many orders 
for reference might be explained by a fear of face losing in case the 
suggested interpretation is not followed by the ECJ. It is more likely, 
however, that the time factor has an important impact here. In view of the 
huge workload Dutch courts generally have to cope with, the idea of 
calling in the ECJ may be an attractive solution in time-consuming cases. 
The pressure of time, however, may also stand in the way of an equally 
time-consuming formulation of views based on deliberation within the 
court making the reference, about a possible or preferable interpretation 
of EEC-Law.8 Moreover, the formulation of such views may be virtually 
impossible in the event the judges making up the court, do not reach 
consensus. As there is no possibility of a dissenting opinion in the Dutch 
judicial system, this is not necessarily a theoretical problem. Rather than 
risking to disclose the discord by formulating more than one possible 
view on the interpretation of EEC-Law, which could result in a breach of 
the “secret of deliberation in chambers” (geheim van raadkamer), the 
judges will under such circumstances prefer to ask the ECJ to cut the 
knot.
It is submitted that the practice of omitting one or more possible 
interpretations of Community Law in the referring order, may have 
several drawbacks. As a matter of fact, one explanation for the 
remarkably large share of Dutch cases where the ECJ was insufficiently 
informed as to the facts of the case or for the persistent practice of
8 However, overburdened courts are not a specific Dutch phenomenon. Therefore, 





























































































wrongly formulated preliminary questions (see earlier in this Chapter) 
may well be found in the absence of one or more possible interpretations 
in the order for reference. Surely, it must be easier for the ECJ to 
identify the question for which the national court seeks an answer, if the 
latter has indicated its own view. Likewise, the formulation of such a 
view forces the national court to respect the (limited) jurisdiction of the 
ECJ in preliminary procedures, avoiding questions as to the interpretation 
of national Law. Since familiarizing itself with Community Law is a 
prerequisite for the submission of a possible interpretation, an even 
greater advantage may be that the national court will find the answer 
itself in the case law of the ECJ or in EC-legislation, thus avoiding an 
unnecessary reference and leaving the ECJ more time for cases 
concerning unclarified questions. In view of these advantages, we think it 
is advisable if Dutch courts would adopt a more active approach in the 
formulation of their own view in future cases.
In 123 of the 152 cases, the referring courts delivered a final 
judgment taking into account the ECJ’s ruling, i.e., in approximately 80% 
of all Dutch cases (question 10a). In 24 cases no final judgment was given 
by the referring court because the ruling of the ECJ made such judgment 
superfluous. In most of those cases litigation ended because the parties in 
the dispute reached a settlement or, in criminal cases, because the 
prosecution was dropped as a result of the ECJ’s ruling. The outcome of 5 
cases remained unknown. Graph 31 of the March 1988 Interim Report of 
the Florence Steering Group indicates that the average “score” of final 
judgments for all 1014 references made under Article 177 between 1961 
and 1985 is about 72%. Again the Dutch practice does not deviate 
substantially from the general pattern found for nine Member States.
In 12 cases Dutch courts addressed questions as to the validity of 
Community Law to the ECJ, accounting for some 8% of all Dutch 
references. For all 1014 preliminary references made during the period 
covered by this project, validity questions account for approximately 15% 
of the requests. Only French (35%) and German (22%) courts requested 
more rulings on the validity than Dutch courts.9 In the Netherlands, only 
the Court of Last Instance in Matters of Trade and Industry and the 
Tariffcommission have asked such questions.10
In Chapter III, paragraph 6 it was argued that the absence of “177b- 
references” by the ordinary courts, may possibly be explained by the fact 
that these courts are called upon less frequently than the courts belonging 
to the Administrative Jurisdiction to decide matters relating to secondary 
Community Law. This holds true in particular for those parts of
9 Ibid, graph 51.




























































































Community Law, like the CAP, which have to be further implemented by 
a national administrative body. Equally, questions as to the validity of 
Community Acts are most likely to rise in those parts of Community 
Law, like the CAP or the Common Customs Tariff, which are very 
densely regulated. As distinct from the administrative courts, most 
questions originating from the Ordinary Jurisdiction relate to the EEC- 
Treaty itself and to Articles 30-36 in particular. In all but one of the 
validity-cases, did the ECJ hold the contested Community Act to be valid. 
As Kellermann indicates in Chapter IV, subparagraph 2.3, the ECJ only 
decided otherwise in Case 116/76 (Granaria /).
3. The parties
The results to the questionnaires clearly indicate that the parties in the 
dispute played an important role in initiating the reference. The 
expression “initiating a reference”, which is adopted here because it was 
used in the Florence-questionnaires, may give rise to confusion as it is 
formally speaking always the national court which decides to make a 
request under Article 177. When the expression is used here, it should be 
read as referring to the question who suggested the court to make the 
reference (question 2b). It appears from the replies to the questionnaires 
that the parties initiated a reference in some 30% of the cases as compared 
to 27% of the cases which were referred by the courts of their own 
motion. For the remaining cases (43%) no information is available. No 
substantial differences for administrative and ordinary courts where 
found.
It was demonstrated in Chapter IV that if one of the parties in 
administrative proceedings took the initiative to request a preliminary 
ruling, it turned out to be nearly always the private party. The responding 
parties in such proceedings, public authorities of some kind, have made 
hardly any suggestion to the courts as to the application of Article 177. 
Only for the two instances of the Social Security Courts did we find a 
more active role on the part of the responding public authority in this 
respect (see Chapter IV, subparagraph 5.2).
As regards the private parties in the disputes, the most significant 
conclusion of the project is the important function of the preliminary 
procedure as an additional mechanism for the judicial review of national 
provisions and thus for judicial protection against the Government. Even 
though the ECJ, formally, does not pronounce itself on domestic law in 
the context of Article 177, the replies to the questionnaires clearly 




























































































effective (additional) instrument of judicial protection against the 
Government.
The Interim Report indicates that 83% of the Dutch preliminary cases 
involved a review of national provisions (question 8). Following the 
ECJ’s rulings in those cases, the referring courts considered the national 
provisions to be incompatible with EEC-Law in about 43% of the cases 
(question 9f). In these cases, the contested provisions were in the end not 
applied by the referring courts when they delivered their final judgments. 
These percentages are almost perfectly in line with the EEC-average as 
found in the Interim Report.11
For the Dutch courts belonging to the Administrative Jurisdiction, we 
found a much larger share of “incompatibility verdicts” than for the 
ordinary courts; 58% as opposed to 26% (question 90- The differences 
between some individual courts are even more remarkable. In only 10% 
of the references made by the Supreme Court, e.g., the contested 
provision was held to be incompatible with Community Law, as compared 
to 70 and 71% of the references made by the Central Court of Appeal and 
the Tariffcommission respectively1 2. Notwithstanding these interesting 
differences, the importance of the preliminary procedure as a mechanism 
for judicial review of national measures in administrative as well as 
ordinary proceedings, is established beyond any doubt.
11 Graphs 37 and 38, Supra, note 1.
12 For the remaining courts the percentages are: Courts of Appeal 37; District Courts 35; 





























































































Survey of the Follow-up of the Preliminary rulings 
Considered in this report (classified according to type of 
court making the reference)
Case ECR F in a l Source+ A ppeal^/
Judgment Cassation2*
A. C ourts with O rdinary  Jurisdiction (gewone rechterlijke macht) (45)
I. Cantonal Courts (Kantongerechten) (3)
39/82 Donner (1980) 19 13.04.84
104/75 De Peijper (1976) 613 06.09.76
141-143/81 Holdijk (1982) 1299 06.01.83
II. District Courts (Arrondissementsrechtbanken (24)
31/64 Beriholet (1965) 81 18.11.65 Asser4B
33/64 Betriebskrankenkasse (1965) 37 15.06.65 Asser 4B
31/68 Chanel v CEPEHA (1970) 403 no
78/72 Ster-Alg. Syndicaat (1973) 499 no
36/74 Walrave & Koch (1974) 1405 no
3/78 Centra farm v AHP (1978) 1823 unknown
99/79 Lancôme & Cosparfrance (1980)2511 04.04.84 KG'84 143
106/79 VBBB v Eldi Records (1980) 1137 16.05.80
187/80 Merck v Stephar (1981)2063 no
181/82 Roussel (1983) 3849 18.07.84
237/82 Jongencel Kaas (1984)483 30.05.84
238/82 Duphar (1984) 523 07.06.84 RvdW'84 196
179/83 Industriebond FNV (1985)514 no
190/73 Van Haastcr (1974) 1123 16.12.74 NJ'74 268
3,4-6/76 Kramer (1976) 1279 09.11.76 Asser 242
185-204/78 Van Dam & 19 others (1979) 2345 13.11.79
27/80 Fietje (1980)3839 23.02.81
32/80 Kortmann (1981)252 16.07.81
124/80 Van Dam II (1981) 144 unknown
130/80 Kcldcrman (1981)527 03.04.81
94/82 De Kikvorsch (1983) 947 16.05.83
174/82 Sandoz (1983) 2445 31.10.83 NJ'84 178
227/82 Van Bennekom (1983)3883 30.05.84































































































Case ECR F inal
Judgm ent
Source*
III. Courts of Appeal (Gerechtshoven) (11)
13/61 De Geus & Uitdenbogerd (1962)45 no
24/67 Parke, Davis v Pròbel (1967)345 01.03.68
25/75 Van Vliet v Fratelli (1975) 1103 29.06.76
6/81 Bcele (1982) 707 09.12.82
144/81 Nancy Kean Gifts (1982) 2853 no
111/76 Van Dcr Hazel (1977) 901 23.06.77
82/77 Van Tiggcle (1978) 25 27.04.78
94/79 Vricnd (1980) 327 27.03.80
53/80 Kon. Kaasfabriek Eyssen (1981)409 04.06.81
272/80 Biologi sche Produkten (1981) 3277 29.10.82 NJ'83 654
286/81 Oosthoek's Uitgeversmij.(1982) 4575 11.03.83
IV. Surpreme Court (Hogc Raad) (7)
15/74 Centrafarm v Sterling (1974) 1147 21.02.75 NJ’75 456
16/74 Centrafarm v Winthrop (1974) 1183 21.02.75 NJ'75 457
35-36/82 Morson & Jhanjhan (1982) 3723 no
19/84 Pharmon v Hoechst (1985) 2291 13.12.85 RvdW'86 9
20/84 De Jong and "Domo Bedum"(1985) 2106 20.12.85 RvdW'86 18
279/80 Webb (1981)3305 20.04.82 NJ'82 582
97/83 CMC Mclkunie (1984) 2367 13.11.84 NJ'85 338
A ppeal2/
Cassa t ion2 *
29.11.831
B. A dm inistrative C ourts
I. Court of Last Instance in Matters of Trade and Industry 
(College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven, CBB) (42)
73-74/63 Puttcrshoek (1964) 1 19.06.64
16/70 Necomout (1970)921 09.03.71 ARB'71 87
17/70 Kon. Lassiefabrieken I (1970)945 12.01.71 ARB'71 70
58/70 Compagnie Continentale (1971)163 06.07.71 ARB70 238
38-39/71 Wcstzucker en Dietz (1972) 1 11.04.72 Asser4B
51-54/71 International Fruit I (1971) 1107 05.05.72 ARB72 189
18/72 Gran aria (1972) 1163 03.08.73 ARB74 39
21-24/72 International Fruit II (1972)1219 no
26/72 Vercnigde Oliefabriekcn (1972)1031 15.01.74 ARB70 298
61/72 PPW International (1973)301 no
80/72 Kon. Lassiefabrieken II (1973)635 18.09.73 ARB74 24
138/73 Codrico (1973)1341 30.07.75 ARB75 260
150/73 Holl. Melksuikerfabriek (1973)1633 16.07.74 ARB74 311
51/74 Van der Hulst's (1975) 79 17.02.76 ARB76 103
92/74 Van Den Bergh (1975) 599 05.08.75 ARB75 261
39/75 Coencn v SER (1975) 1547 23.03.76 ARB75 124




























































































Case ECR F inal Source+
Judgm ent
50/76 Amsterdam se Bulb (1977) 137 no
116/76 Granaria I (1977) 1247 18.01.80 SEW'80 12
6/77 Schouten I (1977) 1291 01.11.77 ARB’78 121
125/77 Kon. Scholten Honig (1978) 1991 no
34/78 Yoshida (1979)115 no
35/78 Schouten II (1978) 2543 no
101/78 Granaria II (1979) 623 18.01.80 AsserNL6
113/78 Schouten III (1979) 695 27.11.79 ARB'81 259
115/78 Knoors (1979) 399 no
137/78 Henningsen v.d. Burg (1979) 1707 28.12.79 Asser 6831
240/78 Atalanta (1979) 2137 28.12.79 Asser 716
265/78 Ferwcrda (1980) 617 06.10.81 Asser NL39
15/79 Groenveld (1979) 3409 01.04.80 Asser 624I+N
124/79 Van Walsum (1980)813 no
759/79 Pesch (1980) 2705 no
35/80 Dcnkavit I (1981)45 no
109/80 Toncman (1981) 881 20.05.81 Asser NL79
136/80 Hudig cn Pieters (1981)2233 26.02.82
29/82 Van Luipen (1983)151 no
276/82 De Beste Botcr (1983)3331 no
327/82 Ekro (1984) 107 unknown
15/83 Dcnkavit II (1984) 2171 no
38/83 Vrccland (1984) 3343 unknown
47-48/83 Van Micrt (1984) 1721 08.03.85 AB'86 171
105/83 Pakvrics (1984) 2101 01.11.85
II. Tariffcommission (Tariefcommissie) (13)
26/62 Van Gend & Loos (1963) 1 no
28-30/62 Da Costa en Schaake (1963)31 no
38/75 Douaneagcnt NS (1975) 1439 05.04.76 UTC'76 29
38/77 Enka (1977) 2203 30.01.78 UTC’83 7
72/77 Universilert Utrecht (1978) 189 13.03.78 UTC’78 37
11/79 Cleton (1979) 3069 29.10.79 UTC'80 19
160/80 Smuling-De Leeuw (1981) 1767 01.02.82 UTC’82 61
208-209/81 Palle en Haentjes (1982) 2511 05.04.83 UTC'83 45
37/82 Ned. bevr. kantoor (1982)3481 20.12.82 UTC’83 3
47/82 Gcbrocders Vismans (1982) 3983 31.12.82 UTC'83 2
46/83 Gerlach & Co (1984)841 02.04.84 UTC'84 24
185/83 Intcrfac. Instituut (1984) 3623 07.01.85 UTC’85 2
32/84 Van Gend & Loos (1985) 782 20.05.85 UTC'85 25
III. Surpreme Court and Courts of Appeal in Taxation M atters (13)
Surpreme Court Taxation cases (9)
51/76 VNO (1977)113 30.11.77 BNB'78 152
102/76 Pecreboom (1977) 815 07.09.77 BNB'77 224





























































































Case ECR F inal Source+ A ppeal*/
Judgm ent C assa tio n 2
181,229/78 Van Paassen (1979) 2063 19.12.79 BNB'80 194
154/80 Aardappelbewaarplaats (1981)445 10.06.81 BNB'81 1271
89/81 Hong Kong TDC (1982) 1277 06.10.82 BNB'82 312
268/83 Rompelman (1985) 660 27.08.85
47/84 Schul II (1985) 1501 23.10.85
139/84 Van Dijk's Boekhuis (1985)1412 02.10.85 WFR’86 57
Courts of Appeal Taxation cases (4)
32/67 Van Leeuwen (1968) 43 22.08.68 BNB'69 203
23/68 Klomp (1969)43 20.06.69 Asser4B 07.01.701
7/74 Broverius van Nidek (1974) 757 28.10.74 BNB’75 199
15/81 Schul I (1982) 1409 18.02.83 UTC'83 218 15.02.84*
IV. Social Security Courts of First Instance (Raden van Beroep) (7)
109/76 Blottner (1977) 1141 09.12.77
9/79 Koschniske (1979) 2717 09.10.79 RSV'80 37
274/81 Bescm (1982) 2995 30.11.82
285/82 Derks (1984)433 15.08.84
135/83 Abels (1985) 479 28.05.85 AB’85 342
104/84 Kromhout (1985) 2213 unknown
145/84 Cochet (1985) 803 11.06.85
V. Central Court of Appeal (Centrale Raad van Beroep) (25)
75/63 Unger (1964) 177 07.07.64 ARB'66 380
92/63 Nonnenmacher (1964) 281 15.07.64 ARB'66 422-423
100/63 Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen (1964) 565 07.10.64 RSV'64 169
24/64 Dingemans (1964) 647 01.04.64
4/66 Hagcnbeek (1966) 425 05.10.66 ARB'68 462-464
19/67 Van Der Vecht (1967) 345 01.03.68 ARB’70 258
82/72 Waldcr (1973) 599 26.07.73 RSV'74 67
51/73 Smieja (1973)1213 19.02.74 RSV'74 248
184/73 Kaufmann (1974)517 05.09.74 RSV'75 55B
33/74 Van Binsbergen (1974) 1299 13.03.75 Asser 171
39/76 Mouthaan (1976) 1901 05.05.77 RSV’77 246
98/77 Schaap I (1978) 707 19.06.79 RSV'80 64
105/77 Boerboom-Kersjes (1978)717 11.07.78 RSV'78 320
117/77 Pierik I (1978) 825 11.07.78
129/78 Lohmann (1979) 853 22.05.79 RSV'79 190
176/78 Schaap II (1979) 1673 19.06.79 RSV'80 64
180/78 Brouwer (1979)2111 30.10.79
182/78 Pierik II (1979) 1977 09.10.79
69/79 Jordcns-Vosters (1980)75 11.03.80 RSV'80 617
238/81 Van Der Bunt-Craig (1983)1385 11.10.83 RSV'84 146
275/81 Koks (1982)3013 18.01.83 RSV’83 84
276/81 Kuijpers (1982) 3027 no































































































101/83 Brusse (1984) 2223 18.09.84 RSV’84 227b
181/83 Weber (1984) 4007 28.06.85
VI. Council of State (Raad van State) (5)
36/73 Ncderlandse Spoorwegen (1973) 1299 06.06.74 ARB74 283
126/82 Smit (1983) 73 01.12.83 ARB'84 232
145/78 Augustein (1979) 1025 19.07.79 Asser 636
146/78 Wattcnberg (1979) IMI 19.07.79 Asser 637
53/81 Levin (1982) 1035 21.07.82 AB'83 353
C. Special C ourts (Bijzondere Rechters) (2)
Appeal*/
Cassa t ion2 *
I. Arbitration Tribunal for disputes regarding the pension fund for the mining 
industry (Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor het M ijnbedrijfte Heerlen)
61/65 Vaassen-Goebbels (1966)261 04.10.66 Asser4B
II. Appeals Committee for General Medicine (Commissie van Beroep 
Huisartsgeneeskunde te Den Haag)
246/80 Broekmeulen (1981)2311 30.12.81
* Explanatory Note: The column Appeal/Cassation is only applicable if an appeal (or an appeal in 
cassation) was lodged against the final judgment of the referring court taking into account the ECJ's 
preliminary ruling. Thus, appeals against judgments or orders in which the reference under Article 177 
was made arc not mentioned here.
+ Explanatory Note: All remaining final decisions by the referring courts are not published. Several of 









































































































Beslissingcn in Belastingzaken 
Ncdcrlandse Jurisprudentie 
Rechtspraak Sociale Verzekeringen 
Rechtspraak van de Week 
Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 
Uitspraken Tariefcommissie 
Weekblad voor Fiscaal Recht
Case Law collected by and available at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in the Hague.
-  Asser 4B: Nationale Jurisprudentie op het gebied van het recht van de Europese 
Gemecnschappen. Deze verzameling beslaat de période 1958-1973 en is opgeborgen in 
bandcn van groenc kleur. De prejudiciële verwijzingen zijn gepubliceerd in band 4B onder 
art. 177 EEG en nadcr ingedeeld op datum van de uitspraak.
-  Asser 723: Verzameling Nationale Jurisprudentie. Deze verzameling beslaat de période 
1973-1980 en is opgeborgen in banden van blauwe kleur. De uitspraken zijn genummerd 
1 tôt en met 864.
-  Asser f. NL 33: Sinds 1980 zijn de nationale uitspraken alleen beschikbaar op fiche (f.) 





























































































Survey of the Follow-up of the Preliminary rulings 
Considered in this report (numerical order)
Case ECR Final
Judgm ent
Source* A ppealV  
C assation
13/61 De Geus & Uitdenbogerd (1962)45 no
26/62 Van Gend & Loos (1963) 1 no
28-30/62 Da Costa en Schaake (1963)31 no
73-74/63 Puttershoek (1964) 1 19.06.64
75/63 Unger (1964) 177 07.07.64 ARB'66 380
92/63 Nonnenmacher (1964) 281 15.07.64 ARB'66 422-423
100/63 Kalsbeek-Van Der Veen (1964)565 07.10.64 RSV'64 169
24/64 Dingemans (1964) 647 01.04.64
31/64 Bcrtholet (1965)81 18.11.65 Asser4B
33/64 Betriebskrankenkasse (1965) 37 15.06.65 Asser4B
61/65 Vaassen-Goebbels (1966) 261 04.10.66 Asser4B
4/66 Hagenbeek (1966) 425 05.10.66 ARB’68 462-464
19/67 Van Der Vecht (1967) 345 01.03.68 ARB'70 258
24/67 Parke, Davis v Pròbel (1967) 345 01.03.68
32/67 Van Leeuwen (1968) 43 22.08.68 BNB'69 203
23/68 Klomp (1969) 43 20.06.69 Asser4B 07.01.701
31/68 Chanel v CEPEHA (1970) 403 no
16/70 Necomout (1970) 921 09.03.71 ARB'70 87
17/70 Kon. Lassiefabrieken I (1970) 945 12.01.71 ARB’71 70
58/70 Compagnie Continentale (1971) 163 06.07.71 ARB'70 238
38-39/71 Westzucker en Dietz (1972) 1 11.04.72 Asser4B
51-54/71 International Fruit I (1971) 1107 05.05.72 ARB'72 189
18/72 Granaria (1972) 1163 03.08.73 ARB'74 39
21-24/72 International Fruit II (1972)1219 no
26/72 Verenigde Oliefabrieken (1972) 1031 15.01.74 ARB'74 298
61/72 PPW International (1973) 301 no
78/72 Ster-Alg. Syndicaat (1973) 499 no
80/72 Kon. Lassiefabrieken n (1973) 635 18.09.73 ARB'74 24
82/72 Waldcr (1973) 599 26.07.73 RSV'74 67
36/73 Nederlandse Spoorwegen (1973) 1299 06.06.74 ARB’74 283
51/73 Smieja (1973) 1213 19.02.74 RSV’74 248
138/73 Codrico (1973)1341 30.07.75 ARB'75 260
150/73 Holl. Melksuikerfabriek (1973) 1633 16.07.74 ARB’74 311




























































































Case ECR F inal
Judgm ent
Source+
190/73 Van Haas ter (1974) 1123 16.12.74
7/74 Broverius van Nidck (1974) 757 28.10.74 BNB’75 199
15/74 Centrafarm v Sterling (1974)1147 21.02.75 NJ'75 456
16/74 Centratami v Winthrop (1974) 1183 21.02.75 NJ’75 457
33/74 Van Binsbergcn (1974) 1299 13.03.75 Asser 171
36/74 Walrave & Koch (1974) 1405 no
51/74 Van der Hulst's (1975) 79 17.02.76 ARB'76 103
92/74 Van Den Bergh (1975) 599 05.08.75 ARB'75 261
25/75 Van Vliet v Fratelli (1975) 1103 29.06.76
38/75 Douaneagcnt NS (1975) 1439 05.04.76 UTC’76 29
39/75 Coenen v SER (1975) 1547 23.03.76 ARB'76 124
104/75 De Peijper (1976) 613 06.09.76 NJ’76 549
3,4-6/76 Kramer (1976)1279 09.11.76
39/76 Mouthaan (1976) 1901 05.05.77 RSV'77 246
45/76 Comet (1976) 2043 11.05.77 ARB’77 802
50/76 Amsterdam se Bulb (1977) 137 no
51/76 VNO (1977)113 30.11.77 BNB'78 152
102/76 Peercboom (1977) 815 07.09.77 BNB'77 224
109/76 Blottner (1977) 1141 09.12.77
111/76 Van Der Hazel (1977) 901 23.06.77
116/76 Granaria I (1977)1247 18.01.80 SEW'80 12
6/77 Schouten I (1977) 1291 01.11.77 ARB'78 121
38/77 Enka (1977) 2203 30.01.78 UTC'83 7
72/77 Universiteit Utrecht (1978) 189 13.03.78 UTC'78 37
82/77 Van Tiggele (1978) 25 27.04.78
125/77 Kon. Scholten Honig (1978) 1991 no
98/77 Schaap I (1978) 707 19.06.79 RSV'80 64
105/77 Boerboom-Kersjes (1978)717 11.07.78 RSV’78 320
117/77 Pierik I (1978) 825 11.07.78
3/78 Centrafarm v AHP (1978) 1823 unknown
34/78 Yoshida (1979) 115 no
35/78 Schouten II (1978)2543 no
101/78 Granaria II (1979) 623 18.01.80 Asser NL6
113/78 Schouten III (1979) 695 27.11.79 ARB'81 259
115/78 Knoors (1979) 399 no
126/78 NS (1979)2041 14.11.79 BNB'80 15
129/78 Lohmann (1979) 853 22.05.79 RSV'79 190
137/78 Henningsen v.d. Burg (1979) 1707 28.12.79 Asser 6831
145/78 Augustein (1979)1025 19.07.79 Asser 636
146/78 Wattenberg (1979)1041 19.07.79 Asser 637
176/78 Schaap II (1979) 1673 19.06.79 RSV'80 64
180/78 Brouwer (1979)2111 30.10.79
181,229/78 Van Paassen (1979) 2063 19.12.79 BNB'80 194
182/78 Pierik II (1979) 1977 09.10.79
185-204/78 Van Dam & 19 others (1979) 2345 13.11.79
240/78 Atalanta (1979)2137 28.12.79 Asser 716
Appeal*/




























































































Case ECR F in a l Source+ A ppeal*/
Judgm ent C assation^
265/78 Fcrwerda (1980) 617 06.10.81 Asser NL39
9/79 Koschniske (1979) 2717 09.10.79 RSV'80 37
11/79 Cleton (1979) 3069 29.10.79 UTC'80 19
15/79 Groenveld (1979) 3409 01.04.80 Asser 624I+NL14
69/79 Jordens-Vosters (1980) 75 11.03.80 RSV'80 617
94/79 Vriend (1980) 327 27.03.80
99/79 Lancôme & Cosparfrance (1980)2511 04.04.84 KG'84 143
106/79 VBBB v Eldi Records (1980)1137 16.05.80
124/79 Van Walsum (1980)813 no
759/79 Pesch (1980) 2705 no
27/80 Fietje (1980) 3839 23.02.81
32/80 Kortmann (1981) 252 16.07.81 01.02.832
35/80 Denkavit I (1981)45 no
53/80 Kon. Kaasfabriek Eysscn (1981)409 04.06.81
109/80 Toneman (1981)881 20.05.81 Asser NL79
124/80 Van Dam II (1981) 144 unknown
130/80 Kelderman (1981) 527 03.04.81
136/80 Hudig en Pieters (1981) 2233 26.02.82
154/80 Aardappelbewaarplaats (1981)445 10.06.81 BNB’81 1271
160/80 Smuling-De Leeuw (1981) 1767 01.02.82 UTC'82 61
187/80 Merck v Stephar (1981)2063 no
246/80 Broekmeulen (1981)2311 30.12.81
272/80 Biologische Produkten (1981)3277 29.10.82 NJ'83 654
279/80 Webb (1981)3305 20.04.82 NJ'82 582
6/81 Beele (1982) 707 09.12.82
15/81 Schul I (1982) 1409 18.02.83 UTC'83 218 15.02.84*
53/81 Levin (1982)1035 21.07.82 AB’83 353
89/81 Hong Kong TDC (1982) 1277 06.10.82 BNB'82 312
141-143/81 Holdijk (1982) 1299 06.01.83
144/81 Nancy Kean Gifts (1982)2853 no
208-209/81 Palte en Haentjes (1982)2511 05.04.83 UTC'83 45
238/81 Van Der Bunt-Craig (1983)1385 11.10.83 RSV'84 146
274/81 Bescm (1982) 2995 30.11.82
275/81 Koks (1982) 3013 18.01.83 RSV’83 84
276/81 Kuijpers (1982) 3027 no
286/81 Oosthoek's Uitgeversmij.(1982) 4575 11.03.83 29.11.83*
29/82 Van Luipen (1983)151 no
35-36/82 Morson & Jhanjhan (1982) 3723 no
37/82 Ned. bevr. kantoor (1982) 3481 20.12.82 UTC'83 3
39/82 Donner (1980)19 13.04.84
47/82 Gebroeders Vismans (1982) 3983 31.12.82 UTC'83 2
94/82 De Kikvorsch (1983) 947 16.05.83
126/82 Smit (1983) 73 01.12.83 ARB'84 232
174/82 Sandoz (1983) 2445 31.10.83 NJ'84 178
181/82 Roussel (1983)3849 18.07.84




























































































Case ECR F inal S o u rc e t A ppealV
Judgm ent C assation^
237/82 Jongeneel Kaas (1984)483 30.05.84
238/82 Duphar (1984) 523 07.06.84 RvdW'84 196
276/82 De B es te Boter (1983)3331 no
285/82 Derks (1984)433 15.08.84
327/82 Ekro (1984) 107 unknown
15/83 Denkavit II (1984) 2171 no
23/83 Liefting (1984) 3225 24.06.86
38/83 Vrceland (1984) 3343 unknown
46/83 Gerlach & Co (1984)841 02.04.84 UTC'84 24
47-48/83 Van Miert (1984) 1721 08.03.85 AB'86 171
94/83 Albert Heijn (1984) 3263 06.05.85
97/83 CMC Melkunie (1984) 2367 13.11.84 NJ'85 338
101/83 Brusse (1984) 2223 18.09.84 RSV'84 227b
105/83 Pakvries (1984)2101 01.11.85
135/83 Abels (1985) 479 28.05.85 A B ^  342
179/83 Industriebond FNV (1985)514 no
181/83 Weber (1984) 4007 28.06.85
185/83 Interfac. Instituut (1984) 3623 07.01.85 UTC'85 2
268/83 Rompelman (1985) 660 27.08.85
19/84 Pharmon v Hoechst (1985) 2291 13.12.85 RvdW86 9
20/84 De Jong and "Domo Bcdum"(1985) 2106 20.12.85 RvdW'86 18
32/84 Van Gcnd & Loos (1985) 782 20.05.85 UTC'85 25
47/84 Schul II (1985) 1501 23.10.85
104/84 Kromhout (1985) 2213 unknown
139/84 Van Dijk’s Boekhuis (1985) 1412 02.10.85 WFR'86 57
145/84 Cochet (1985) 803 11.06.85
* Explanatory Note: The column Appeal/Cassation is only applicable if an appeal (or an appeal in 
cassation) was lodged against the final judgment of the referring court taking into account the ECJ's 
preliminary ruling. Thus, appeals against judgments or orders in which the reference under Article 177 
was made are not mentioned here.
+ Explanatory Note: All remaining final decisions by the referring courts are not published. Several of 









































































































Beslissingen in Belastingzaken 
Ncderlandse Jurisprudentic 
Rcchtspraak Sociale Verzekeringen 
Rechtspraak van de Week 
Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 
Uitspraken Tariefcommissie 
Weekblad voor Fiscaal Recht
Case Law collected by and available at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in the Hague.
-  Asser 4B: Nationale Jurisprudence op het gebied van het recht van de Europese 
Gemeenschappen. Dcze vcrzameling beslaat de période 1958-1973 en is opgeborgen in 
banden van groene kleur. De prejudiciële vcrwijzingen zijn gepubliceerd in band 4B onder 
art. 177 EEG en nader ingedeeld op datum van de uitspraak.
-  Asser 723: Vcrzameling Nationale Jurisprudence. Dezc verzameling beslaat de période 
1973-1980 en is opgeborgen in banden van blauwe kleur. De uitspraken zijn genummerd 
1 tot en met 864.
-  Asser f. NL 33: Sinds 1980 zijn de nationale uitspraken allcen beschikbaar op fiche (f.) 





























































































Survey of the cases in which Questions on the Validity of 
Community Acts were Addressed to the ECJ
I. Court of Last Instance in M atters of Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor 
het Bedrijfsleven)
Case ECR
73-74/63 Puttershoek (1964) 1
21-24/72 International Fruit Company II (1972)1219
116/76 Granaria I (1977)1247
125/77 Koninklijke Scholten Honig* (1978)1991
34/78 Yoshida (1979)115
35/78 Schouten II (1978) 2543
240/78 Atalanta* (1979)2137
35/80 Denkavit I (1981)45
276/82 De Beste Boter* (1983)3331
15/83 Denkavit II (1984)2171
II. Tariffcommission (Tariefcommissie)
Case ECR
38/75 Douaneagent NS (1975) 1439
185/83 Interfacultair Instituut (1984)3623
* Explanatory Note: In the three cases marked with * the CBB requested a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation as well as on the validity of EEC-Law. For each of these cases, the Dutch team completed 
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